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“For almost 30 years, Europe has been struggling to handle 
several territorial or separatist conflicts in its Eastern neighbourhood: 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh, and Transdniestria. In the 
meantime, similar conflicts have also erupted over Crimea and Donbas. 
There are different mixes of geopolitics and local conflict in all these 
arenas. The affected countries have largely adjusted to an abnormal 
situation, but the conflicts still pose considerable dangers, and in Ukraine 
the war is still active. Russia is directly involved in almost all conflicts, 
and has a less overt role in Nagorny Karabakh. Russia’s role in the 
conflicts in Ukraine overshadow its relations with the European Union. 
While the European Union has developed a strong relationship with all 
countries of the Eastern neighbourhood, its approach to the conflicts has 
sometimes been hesitant. 
“In this thorough and excellent study, the Thomas De Waal and 
Nikolaus von Twickel trace the development of the conflicts in order to 
make predictions for their further course together with policy 
recommendations for the European Union. The status quo continues to 
be the likeliest scenario, but it is a dangerous one and demands that the 
European Union use its political and economic leverage to engage and 
transform the conflicts.” 
Peter Semneby,  
Former EU Special Representative for South Caucasus 
“This book provides a compelling and comprehensive account of 
the fluid conflicts and frozen peace processes in Eastern Europe. A must 
read for all those who wish to understand the region and prevent the 
Donbass from falling into the same ‘frozen’ trap which Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh and Transdnistria have succumbed to.”  
Natalie Tocci,  
Director, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome 
“This volume is the indispensable source for information and 
analysis on the conflicts and separatist entities on the post-Soviet 
periphery in Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus. Co-authors Nikolaus 
von Twickel and Thomas De Waal bring on the ground experience, a 
journalist’s keen eye, and scholarly insight to this lucid, penetrating and 
comprehensive survey of the region. Whether you are a seasoned expert 
or unfamiliar with the region, for both historical understanding and 
policy insight, this is a must read.”   
William Hill, Global Fellow,  
Kennan Institute, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
  
“Protracted conflicts permeate people’s collective identities, 
impact their views of the past and the future and define their present. 
They are difficult to resolve in the sense of the elimination of the root 
causes precisely because conflict sides regard the causes and solutions in 
diametrically opposite ways. Thinking scenarios is a useful exercise that 
helps look beyond the ‘right’ course of action and stimulates critical 
(re)assessment of one’s own position. This book invites the reader to 
embrace the complexity of the conflicts in the post-Soviet space and 
disentangle geopolitical manoeuvers from collective grievances.” 
Natalia Mirimanova,  
Founder and Director of the Eurasia Peace Initiative 
 
“The negotiations over the secessionist conflicts in the eastern 
European borderlands may be at a standstill, but the conflict parties 
continue to make crucial choices to advance their interests. This book 
examines the options available to them and their consequences for the 
transformation of the conflicts. One of the book’s key achievements is to 
offer an in-depth analysis of the range of potential future scenarios.” 
Professor Bruno Coppieters,  
Free University of Brussels 
 
“Thomas de Waal and Nikolaus von Twickel’s study is an honest, 
brave, comprehensive and timely analysis of the possible ways of 
mitigation of the geopolitical risks connected with five post-Soviet 
‘frozen’ conflicts. As a Ukranian I completely support their conclusions 
that evolutionary status-quo is the most likely scenario for Donbas’ 
future settlement and that the EU should stand for a lifting of Kyiv’s 
trade blockade of the non-government-controlled areas and should assist 
Ukraine in a project of national dialogue and reconciliation with the 
traditionally Russian-speaking regions of the country.” 
H. E. Oleksandr Chalyi,  
former First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 
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PREFACE 
This book forms part of a wider project on the relations between the 
European Union and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and in 
particular the Association Agreements and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) between these three 
states and the European Union.  
The wider project was begun in 2015 in the aftermath of the 
Maidan uprising at the beginning of 2014, which had been provoked 
when President Yanukovich reneged over the signing of Ukraine’s 
Association Agreement with the EU. Following Yanukovich’s flight 
to Russia, the Association Agreement was duly signed later in 2014.  
The agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have a 
substantial common content, while differing in various details. 
Overall, they provide an association model of unprecedented extent 
and depth. Democratic political values are at the heart of the 
agreements, while the economic content goes far beyond classic free 
trade agreements to include a wholesale approximation of EU 
internal market regulatory law. The purpose of our wider project was 
first of all to explain the complex content of the Association 
Agreements and DCFTAs, which was achieved in a series of 
comprehensive handbooks published at www.3dcftas.eu.  
However, the agreements contain only short and simple 
articles on conflict prevention and management, without meaningful 
operational content. This was notwithstanding the fact that the EU 
considers itself, for its own historical reasons, to have a special 
vocation in conflict prevention and resolution. In addition, Georgia 
and Moldova were already the sites of unresolved separatist conflicts 
originating around the collapse of the Soviet Union three decades 
ago, namely Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, and 
Transdniestria in Moldova, to which we have added the case of the 
Nagorny Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On top of this 
2  BEYOND FROZEN CONFLICT 
 
legacy, the Maidan uprising led to the Russian annexation of Crimea 
and its hybrid war in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of the Donbas. 
The Donbas thus joined the old ‘frozen conflicts’.  
In the light of the above, CEPS took the initiative to examine all 
five unresolved conflicts, to assess where these disputes seem to be 
heading, and what different scenarios could be imagined for their 
future, including how the European Union might become more 
engaged. Indeed, while none of the conflicts are resolved, none are 
for that matter ‘frozen’. Our first practical priority was to find an 
author to undertake a comprehensive study of the Donbas, since 
conditions there make it practically impossible for any analysts from 
the government-controlled part of Ukraine or from Europe to safely 
enter these territories for research purposes. We were therefore very 
fortunate to find Nikolaus von Twickel who had recently been 
travelling in the Donbas as part of the OSCE Mission there, and is 
now an independent analyst. For the other four ‘old’ conflicts we 
were also most fortunate to bring in Thomas de Waal, who has been 
a leading scholar of the region for some decades, and was willing to 
bring the stories of these conflicts up to date. The two authors were 
able to address the complete set of conflicts with a consistent 
analytical approach, as will be evident from reading the sets of 
scenarios.  
We express our warm appreciation towards Sweden and the 
Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) for their support 
to the entire project.  
Michael Emerson 
CEPS, Brussels, February 2020 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
THOMAS DE WAAL AND 
NIKOLAUS VON TWICKEL 
This volume looks at future prospects for the string of unresolved 
conflicts that continue to plague the post-Soviet world. Four of them 
date back to the period when the USSR began to break up in the late 
1980s. A new conflict, with many different elements and some 
similarities, was added to the list in 2014: the Donbas in eastern 
Ukraine. The open confrontation between Russia and Ukraine over 
the Donbas and Crimea not only destroyed relations between 
Moscow and Kyiv but changed politics across the region, shaking up 
the dynamics of the four existing protracted territorial conflicts over 
Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transdniestria.  
The five post-Soviet conflicts are often called ‘frozen’, but this 
is a misnomer. Although the peace processes around them often look 
frozen, the situations themselves are anything but frozen and are 
constantly changing. Two of them, over the Donbas and Nagorny 
Karabakh, are either ongoing or close to violence. Each dispute has 
its own history, character and context, which has grown more 
distinctive over time and has been further shaped by the 
confrontation over Ukraine. Each continues to evolve. Here we chart 
scenarios for how these conflicts may develop further with the aim of 
focusing policymakers’ thinking on which tendencies are dangerous 
and which ones can be encouraged. There are many moving parts to 
these situations and complacency is not an option.  
International fatigue is certainly a negative factor. The four 
post-Soviet conflicts of the 1990s have slipped down the international 
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agenda and the Donbas conflict risks suffering the same fate. The 
multilateral mechanisms entrusted with mediating them have 
struggled to deliver results. The Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE), which leads the mediation efforts for 
Karabakh and Transdniestria and is in charge of the monitoring 
mission for the Donbas, lacks the resources and executive structures 
of the United Nations, and its decision-making capacity is weakened 
by the use of vetoes by member states. This poses a challenge to the 
EU to be more creative in dealing with these conflicts in its eastern 
neighbourhood. 
1.1 Scenarios 
The oldest of the five conflicts considered here is the dispute between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis over the territory of Nagorny 
Karabakh, dating back to 1988. This is also the conflict where the 
scenario of a return to full-scale violence is most likely. A four-day 
outbreak of violence in 2016 was a salutary lesson in this regard. Over 
the previous three decades, the conflict has expanded to be one of full 
rivalry between the two nation-states of Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
Geopolitical factors are secondary, and Russia is more detached, as it 
lacks a presence on the ground in the conflict region and seeks to 
maintain good relations with both sides. The profile of the EU is 
extremely low. 
The long-running conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
which broke away from rule by Georgia in the early 1990s, not long 
after it had won independence from the Soviet Union, became yet 
more acrimonious in 2008, when Georgia and Russia fought a five-
day war and Moscow unilaterally recognised the two territories as 
independent states. The geopolitical divide over the two conflicts 
deepened further still with the Ukraine crisis of 2014 and the regions 
are more isolated than ever from Georgia proper and consequently 
from the wider Europe.  
At the same time the differences between these two regions 
have been magnified over the last decade. South Ossetia has been 
depopulated and may now be home to less than 40,000 people. It is 
almost completely reliant on Russian aid. Its small political elite 
openly advocates for full union with Russia but is politely rebuffed 
by Moscow when it does so. The region’s main utility to Russia is as 
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a military base. A scenario of further stagnation and isolation that 
benefits neither Ossetians nor Georgians is the most likely one. 
 Since 2008, Abkhazia has also grown more isolated from the 
outside world and more reliant on Russia, but the dynamics of its 
development are more complex. Many in Abkhazia still aspire –
however improbably – for independence from both Georgia and 
Russia, and wish to keep connections open to the world at large. The 
government in Tbilisi and the EU still have stakes in the future of 
Abkhazia, as well as the powerful patron in Moscow. This allows us 
to list different scenarios for the future, although a perpetuation of 
the current situation where Abkhazia becomes more isolated and 
dependent on Russia, currently looks the most plausible. 
Transdniestria, the pro-Russian province which broke from 
Moldova in 1990-2, as the Soviet Union dissolved, is different again. 
This is the only dispute where positive incremental change is 
noticeable, thanks to a successful programme of confidence-building 
measures, initiated in 2016 and overseen by the OSCE. There is no 
ethnic factor in this conflict and the threat of renewed violence is 
almost zero. Politics and economics are predominant. The 
government in Transdniestria backed by the business conglomerate 
Sheriff has promoted trade links with the EU and outreach to right-
bank Moldova, while maintaining political loyalty to Russia. This 
allows us to envisage a scenario in which a partial or even full 
resolution of the dispute is more likely than in the other cases, even 
though powerful forces still militate for the status quo. 
The conflict in the Donbas is ongoing and still causing 
bloodshed. It has cost more than 13,000 lives in the five years since 
2014. Here, geopolitics play a dominant role while regional dynamics 
have much less relevance. Ethnic identity is of little importance 
locally, although nationalistic rhetoric is common in Kyiv and 
Moscow. Local opposition to the Euromaidan revolution in 2014 
escalated in the eastern Donetsk and Luhansk regions thanks to 
active Russian support, which was initially political and then 
military. The separatist ‘People’s Republics’ stabilised somewhat 
after the Minsk agreement of 2015, but they remain strongly 
subordinate to Moscow, which initially even provided some of its 
leaders.  
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While the ‘People’s Republics’ have been recognised by no one, 
the separatists openly talk about joining Russia at an unspecified 
future date. The Kremlin largely ignores these aspirations but continues 
to play a huge role in day to day political, economic and military 
affairs. While fighting has been confined to the Line of Contact since 
2015, the ongoing violence is useful for the separatists to stay in 
power. A military solution of any kind is unlikely, but a fundamental 
rapprochement is also not in sight as long as Kyiv stays on its 
western-orientated path and Moscow believes that it needs to derail 
that aspiration. The most likely scenario is therefore stagnation, even 
though the growing economic cost of the conflict may cause Russia to 
make limited concessions. While the EU is a key backer for Kyiv’s reform 
agenda, it has taken a back seat in negotiations, leaving them to 
France and Germany in the ‘Normandy Four’ format and the OSCE. 
Table 1.1 Scenarios for the future of the unresolved conflicts 
The Donbas  
1. Minsk scenarios for reintegration Conceivable but problematic 
2. Formal integration with Russia Conceivable but unlikely 
3. Military scenarios  
4. Evolutionary status quo 
Highly unlikely 
Most likely 
Transdniestria  
1. Reintegration with Moldova Possible long term 
2. Status quo with Europeanisation Ongoing for medium term 
3. Political retrenchment, isolation Unlikely 
Abkhazia 
 
1. Integration with Georgia Remote prospect 
2. Annexation by Russia Unlikely 
3. International recognition Not credible 
4. Softening of border Desirable but political will 
needed 
5. Status quo/isolation Most likely 
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South Ossetia  
1. Integration with Georgia Hardly conceivable 
2.Annexation by Russia Unlikely 
3. Partial opening of border Desirable but unlikely 
4. Status quo with stagnation Most likely 
Nagorny-Karabakh  
1. Peace agreement Only far into the future 
2. Return to war Possible through 
miscalculation 
3. Status quo Most likely for medium term 
1.2 Thinking in the long term 
Commentators often express frustration at the non-resolution of 
these conflicts. This report makes the case that there is no substitute 
for a long-term approach, and that ‘quick fixes’ and cleverly devised 
peace plans with fast timetables will not deliver results. Strategic 
patience and work inside the societies affected by conflict is needed. 
Russian intransigence is commonly cited as the main reason for 
the non-resolution of conflicts. If Moscow wanted to see these 
conflicts resolved, it could do so, the argument goes, but it prefers to 
keep them ‘frozen’ so as to maintain leverage.  
This is undoubtedly true in one of the cases, the Donbas, and 
partly true in some of the others. But there are many reasons for their 
non-resolution, and it might be more useful to ask why these long-
running conflicts should be resolved, given the strong vested 
interests in maintaining the status quo on many sides.  
To a greater or lesser degree, all these disputes are marked by 
an estrangement of the societies on either side of the conflict divide 
and by isolation of the breakaway territories. Travel to and from the 
territories is usually highly restricted, and local communities re-
orientate to the patron state (Russia for four of the territories, 
Armenia for Karabakh). Transdniestria and the Donbas are 
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somewhat different. In the former there is much traffic back and 
forth. In the Donbas there are up to one million monthly crossings of 
the ‘Contact Line’, which keeps up people-to-people connections, 
though this is a very one-sided phenomenon, driven mainly by 
pensioners from non-government-controlled areas collecting state 
benefit payments on the government-controlled side.  
Isolation has had strong negative impacts over time, tending to 
entrench hardline attitudes, rather than create conditions for 
compromise. The longer communities exist with little or no access to 
their former parent states, the less they identify with them. The break 
is especially acute if large-scale displacement has occurred of the 
other ethnic community, as occurred in Abkhazia and Nagorny 
Karabakh, where Georgians and Azerbaijanis respectively were 
forced to flee. Isolation is also a strong factor in the Donbas, where 
the Russian-controlled ‘People’s Republics’ have been able to wage a 
propaganda campaign against all things Ukrainian for the past five 
years. 
A Russian role is a common factor in all these disputes, but this 
study seeks to look beyond stereotypical statements about how 
Moscow caused and directs these conflicts to explain how its role is 
different in each case. In each region Moscow employs different tools 
and different actors to project influence, with varying success. Often 
the approach has been inconsistent, and the results have decreased 
Russian influence rather than boosting it. In Georgia and Ukraine, for 
example, support for breakaway regions has undoubtedly 
undermined hopes of the much bigger goal of winning political 
influence in Tbilisi and Kyiv. 
A variety of Russian interests are evident. Hard power, exerted 
by the military, is most obvious in the Donbas, where the two 
‘People’s Republics’ would be at risk of collapse without direct 
Russian military support. It is also strongly exerted in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, where around 7,000 troops are stationed in each of the 
territories.  
In the Karabakh and Transdniestria disputes, Russian 
diplomacy is more prominent, with Moscow playing a leading role 
in the OSCE mediation processes for both conflicts and working 
alongside Western partners. In both of these cases, the conflict often 
takes a back seat in Russian policymaking as Moscow seeks to 
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exercise political influence and build bilateral relations with friendly 
partners in Baku, Yerevan and Chisinau.  
An important and ongoing change is that, partly in reaction to 
zero-sum behaviour from Russia, the ‘parent states’, which included 
these autonomous regions in Soviet times, have also become stronger 
and developed bilateral relationships with the outside world. Three 
of them, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, have signed Association 
Agreements with the European Union. One result of this is that on an 
everyday level they prioritise domestic development and conflict 
resolution is no longer felt to be so urgent. All of them also reject 
compromise proposals which would see a high degree of autonomy 
granted to the breakaway regions, fearing that this would upset the 
political balance in the country and indirectly give influence to 
Russia. 
1.3 Policy recommendations  
When it comes to policy recommendations, it is somewhat unrealistic 
to give them to the actors who have been directly involved in these 
conflicts for years, or decades. The international mediators, most 
notably the OSCE, could benefit from stronger mandates that reflect 
new realities on the ground, such as the militarisation of the situation 
around Nagorny Karabakh, but the chances of them achieving this 
are very small.  
It can be plausibly argued that Russia would benefit from a 
strategic rethink of its priorities with regard to these conflicts, having 
lost influence in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, as a result of the role 
it has played in four of these conflicts. However, this advice is likely 
to fall on deaf ears, given the geopolitical framing applied to most of 
these conflicts in Moscow and the strong investment in them by the 
military and security services. 
The conflict parties themselves are often advised, with good 
reason, to rethink their priorities, to stop instrumentalising the 
conflicts in their domestic politics and to be bolder in their outreach 
to one another. This risks becoming a worthy but rather unrealistic 
recommendation for these societies, whose identities are deeply 
entwined with the conflicts they have fought, to rethink their entire 
national projects.  
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In the cases of Transdniestria and the Donbas and to a more 
limited degree in Abkhazia, there is more scope for incremental 
measures. A common denominator of all of these disputes is that 
where there has been more engagement and confidence building 
there has been more progress, if often painfully slow. Yet this kind of 
outreach to the other side in the conflict requires political capital and 
strong leadership which is often in short supply.  
In the light of this, the recommendations made here are mainly for 
one outside actor, which has more flexibility and capacity to do more, 
the European Union.  
The European Union did not exist as a foreign policy actor 
when these conflicts broke out – with the exception of the one in the 
Donbas. As it has developed foreign policy capacity, the EU has 
struggled to find the strong role here that it played in the conflicts of 
the Balkans. The substantial domestic bilateral agenda it now has 
with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has also put conflict resolution 
in the shade.  
Can the European Union do more? It certainly can, but the 
issue is not one of getting directly more involved in the negotiation 
formats or coming up with new formulas for conflict resolution. 
Clearly, policymakers need to be acutely aware of Russia’s role. This 
is not an easy task, given the Kremlin’s habit of non-transparent and 
irrational decision-making. And in order to be effective, Europe must 
retain a united stand versus Moscow. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for greater European 
involvement is the highly positive image that the EU has in 
practically all the countries affected. The Union’s image in Ukraine is 
significantly better than in a range of EU member countries.1 Even in 
Russia, where state-controlled media have been waging anti-western 
campaigns since 2014, attitudes towards the EU have swung back to 
positive again in 2019.2 Thus, West European policymakers should 
act collectively and forcefully, when it comes to projecting soft 
powers not only into Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, but also into 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. 
                                                        
1 https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/21/attitudes-toward-eu-
are-largely-positive-both-within-europe-and-outside-it/  
2 https://www.levada.ru/indikatory/otnoshenie-k-stranam/  
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Policy recommendations for the European Union: 
regarding Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine 
 Integrate conflict transformation strategies into the bilateral 
agenda; develop a strategy paper which sets out EU goals for 
improving security and resilience for parent states, 
supporting civil society, while enhancing engagement with 
the populations of breakaway territories.  
Ukraine 
 Continue support for Ukraine and its reform agenda, to 
ensure that the government wholeheartedly and sustainably 
implements measures for democratisation, decentralisation 
and fighting corruption. 
 Sustain sanctions (personal and sectoral) against Russia in 
order to keep up international pressure on Moscow. 
 Develop strategies to assist Ukraine in projecting soft power 
into both government-controlled and non-government-
controlled Donbas to overcome the region’s traditional 
isolation from Kyiv. Support schemes for better-quality 
media and culture and to facilitate access to Ukrainian 
civilian documentation and pensions. A civilian EU mission 
could reinforce the positive image of European partnership 
on the ground, even if it is unlikely to gain access to non-
government-controlled areas. 
 Develop aid programmes to foster economic stability in 
Ukrainian regions, first and foremost the Donbas, to assist its 
transformation from reliance on heavy industry to a more 
sustainable economic model. Support small and medium-
sized business. Start in government-controlled areas, as 
model for what could follow in the non-government-
controlled areas. 
 There should be a push for a lifting of Kyiv’s trade blockade 
of the non-government-controlled areas, which keeps driving 
them towards Russia. 
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 Assist Ukraine in a project of national dialogue and 
reconciliation with traditionally Russian-speaking regions of 
the country to integrate them into a more inclusive national 
discourse. 
Moldova 
 Provide diplomatic and political support to Moldova when 
faced with Russian subversion. 
 Provide technical and intellectual assistance for Moldova’s 
Ministry of Reintegration and Foreign Ministry. 
Transdniestria 
 Work to implement as fully as possible the limited DCFTA 
agreement between Chisnau and Tiraspol, and deepen the 
EU trade relationship. Develop the technical assistance 
programme for Transdniestrian business and professionals 
trying to implement the DCFTA.  
Georgia 
 Continue to give diplomatic and political support for 
Georgia, when it faces subversion by Russia. 
 Reaffirm the non-recognition policy on Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia; condemn states that recognise the two territories.  
 Through the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), 
continue work to ensure stability on the ground, especially in 
border areas, in line with the mandate “to facilitate the 
resumption of a safe and normal life for the local 
communities living on both sides of the Administrative 
Boundary Lines (ABL) with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” 
 Continue to support the domestic agenda of civic equality for 
minorities that makes Georgia a potentially attractive state 
for Abkhaz and Ossetians.  
Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
 Work to implement the Non-Recognition and Engagement 
Policy, specifically by offering enhanced support to: 
education sectors (e.g. offering English-language teaching, 
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exchange programmes, summer schools); health sector 
(training health professionals, offering vaccination 
programmes); environmental (offering EU advice and 
assistance on environmental issues). 
 Develop a draft programme of economic assistance that 
would follow joining the Georgian DCFTA to a limited 
degree (as Transdniestria in Moldova). 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh 
 Support the OSCE Minsk Group with stronger public 
messages about the need for peace, and about the damage 
caused by bellicose rhetoric.  
 Send stronger messages about conflict prevention; threaten 
punitive measures (sanctions, suspension of relations) in case 
of resumption of conflict.  
 Draft a provisional technical assistance programme which 
informs governments on how the EU can assist a future 
Karabakh peace process.  
 Continue to support civil society projects with both between 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis and inside societies.  
 Give support and funding to independent experts seeking to 
fill the intellectual gap in the negotiations process.  
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2. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE 
OF EASTERN EUROPE’S 
UNRESOLVED CONFLICTS 
THOMAS DE WAAL AND 
NIKOLAUS VON TWICKEL 
2.1 Introduction – the Ukraine effect 
The outbreak of conflict in the spring of 2014 between Russia and 
Ukraine changed politics across the post-Soviet space. The 
annexation of Crimea and the start of fighting in eastern Ukraine 
destroyed relations between Moscow and Kyiv, which had 
succeeded in managing their differences peacefully since 1991. It also 
shook up the dynamics of the four protracted territorial conflicts 
(Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transdniestria) 
that date back to the break-up of the Soviet Union and remain 
unresolved to this day. 
The repercussions have not always been as predicted. In 
Ukraine, Russia lost most of its influence over domestic politics after 
President Petro Poroshenko’s government embarked on a staunch 
pro-western course aimed at NATO and EU membership. Later, 
when Poroshenko ran on a nationalistic ticket for re-election in 2019, 
he lost spectacularly to television comedian Volodymyr Zelenskiy, 
who promised to end corruption and the war in the Donbas. The 
events of 2014 caused a deep rupture between the two countries that 
would not be mended easily. However, a rapprochement with 
Moscow looked more feasible after the two sides agreed on an 
exchange of prisoners and signed (albeit with reservations, on which 
see more below) the Steinmeier Formula in September/ October 2019. 
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 In Georgia, the Ukraine crisis gave the disputes over Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia an even stronger geopolitical character. While the 
European Union and United States have strengthened their 
relationship with Tbilisi and regularly reaffirm their support for its 
territorial integrity, Moscow has reaffirmed its backing for the two 
territories, which it recognised as independent states in 2008. In the 
case of South Ossetia, Russia has continued a policy of economic and 
political integration, which means that the region has little autonomy 
in deciding its future.  
There are striking differences between the evolution of the 
international conflict dynamics. Russia has kept up a very aggressive 
posture towards Tbilisi, reinforcing the boundary lines of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia. In other respects, Moscow’s heavy involvement in 
Ukraine has resulted in a reduction of interest in other regions. Even 
as it keeps up aggressive policies towards Ukraine, Russia adopts an 
approach in the Transdniestria and Nagorny Karabakh conflicts that 
is more reliant on diplomacy. Russia collaborates quite effectively 
with Western partners in the negotiating processes led by the OSCE 
for both conflicts, namely the ‘Five Plus Two’ process in 
Transdniestria and the Minsk process for the Karabakh conflict. The 
calculation in Moscow is evidently different in these two cases, where 
it has stakes on both sides, in Chisinau and Tiraspol and Baku and 
Yerevan respectively. In Transdniestria, contrary to many 
expectations, there has been progress since 2014. Moreover, the huge 
drain of resources that Crimea and the Donbas make on Moscow, is 
one reason why Russia has reduced financial support for both 
Abkhazia and Transdniestria in the last five years. Although the 
overall political support for these two territories looks set to continue, 
they are less of a strategic priority than they were a decade ago. At 
the same time, they have also fallen down the agenda of the EU.  
This book considers what the future holds for the five post-
Soviet territorial conflicts in eastern Ukraine, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, Nagorny Karabakh and Transdniestria. First it considers the 
various factors which will influence developments. Then it sketches 
out possible scenarios in each case. 
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2.2 Overarching conditions 
 Frozen diplomacy? 
The post-Soviet conflicts (with the exception of Ukraine) are often 
described as ‘frozen’. This is a misleading term, which can border on 
the dangerous. The political context of these disputes is always 
changing and in some there is a potential for a thaw into violence. In 
Karabakh up to 200 people lost their lives in the Four-Day War of 
2016 and there are detentions and deaths on the boundaries of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
It might be more accurate to describe the negotiating processes 
around these conflicts as frozen, despite the best efforts of the 
diplomats involved in them. The Transdniestria and Nagorny 
Karabakh conflicts have been the responsibility of the OSCE since 
1992. Resources available remain modest, even though in the case of 
Transdniestria since 2016, they have successfully helped delivered a 
series of “small steps” that have improved the lives of ordinary 
people on the ground.  
Hopes in the 1990s that the OSCE would emerge as a powerful 
European security organisation were not fulfilled. In 2014 in Ukraine 
it stepped in to provide a monitoring mission and mediation capacity, 
but one which consumes some €100 million per annum, almost as 
much as the organisation’s separate unified budget, which was €138 
million in 2019.1 
The organisation’s overall budget has remained small, just 5% 
of the United Nations’ €2.5 billion. It has only a small leadership 
structure in Vienna.2 While the organisation can be effective in the 
peaceful context of the Transdniestria dispute, it lacks the proper 
resources to prevent potential outbreaks of fighting in the much more 
dangerous Karabakh conflict. The OSCE has not developed a 
peacekeeping capacity – even though it was mandated to do so for 
the Karabakh conflict at the Budapest summit in 1994.  
                                                        
1 https://www.osce.org/funding-and-budget  
2 https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/aussenpolitik/internationale-
organisationen/vereintenationen/-/281336  
18  BEYOND FROZEN CONFLICT 
 
Moreover, the organisation’s consensus-based structure means 
that countries that are parties to the conflicts it deals with are able to 
veto new initiatives. Armenia and Azerbaijan – which contribute just 
0.05% each to the budget each year3 – have blocked various efforts 
intended to strengthen the Minsk Process and the Karabakh ceasefire 
regime. Baku also ensured the closure of the OSCE office in Yerevan 
in 2017 on very controversial grounds. As a result, the OSCE still lives 
with the same rather limited format it adopted for the Karabakh 
conflict in 1994. There are still, for example, just six unarmed OSCE 
monitors observing the ceasefire between Armenian and Azerbaijani 
forces, despite the heavy militarisation of the ceasefire zone in the last 
decade, with up to 10,000 soldiers on each side of the Line of Contact. 
In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the diplomatic 
challenges have been even greater since 2008 when the last structured 
international mediation process was suspended. In August of that 
year Georgia and Russia fought a five-day war over South Ossetia, 
Moscow recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent and 
the United Nations mission left Abkhazia and the OSCE withdrew 
from South Ossetia. Since then the only international forum has been 
the four-times-yearly Geneva International Discussions during 
which the parties meet but without formal labels and in which 
political and status issues are not properly debated.  
 Russia  
The post-conflict formats of the 1990s gave a central place to Russia, 
at a time when relations with the West were far better under 
President Boris Yeltsin, with no role for the European Union. Russia’s 
role has changed over the years. 
Moscow’s policy towards its neighbours has grown steadily 
more aggressive under Vladimir Putin’s presidency. A pivotal 
moment was Putin’s speech to parliamentarians on March 18, 2014 
when he for the first time openly invoked a Russian nationalist 
narrative he had previously shied away from in justifying the capture 
of Crimea. In that speech, as well as raising the fear of Ukraine joining 
NATO and a Western base being established in Sevastopol, Putin 
spoke much more openly than before of his country’s historical 
                                                        
3 https://www.osce.org/permanent-council/417152  
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destiny, invoking Sevastopol as “this city of Russia’s military glory” 
and referred to a mission to defend Russian-language speakers in 
neighbouring countries.4 
Since 1991 Russia has tried to maintain its influence in its post-
Soviet neighbourhood in various ways that reflect its complex history 
and multiple interests in that region. The term ‘Near Abroad’, which 
acquired currency in Russia in 1992 after the end of the USSR, in and 
of itself suggests the ambiguity of that relationship. In the light of 
modern history, countries such as Ukraine and Georgia are seen as 
both ‘abroad’ and ‘not abroad’. That in turn means that the 
neighbourhood is not a pure foreign policy issue, and the Foreign 
Ministry plays only a limited role there. Ukraine policy has always 
been directed out of the Kremlin. The military and security services 
have a powerful voice, as do economic actors, ranging from Gazprom 
to smaller companies. Ethnic diasporas from these countries resident 
in Russia also exert influence. 
These contradictions have been reflected in policies towards 
the breakaway regions and conflict zones of Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transdniestria – as well as, in different periods, Crimea and the 
Donbas. In the 1990s Yeltsin and his team believed in the project of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States, the CIS, a close club of 
post-Soviet nations, with Russia informally at its head. That meant a 
policy of cooperation with the neighbours – though combined with 
tougher measures if they were seen to act against Russian interests. 
Yeltsin’s government backed a sanctions regime against Abkhazia in 
the 1990s and pressed hard for its reintegration with Georgia in 1997-
8. The Kremlin of that era was suspicious of the de facto regime in 
Transdniestria, with its close ties to the nationalist opposition in 
Russia and discouraged separatist tendencies in Crimea.  
In parallel to the official Kremlin policy of that era, other actors, 
especially in the military and parliament, were working to 
undermine regimes in Baku, Chisinau or Tbilisi. Two assassination 
attempts on Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze in 1995 and 1998 
were linked to Russia. The mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov took an 
openly nationalist stance on issues such as Crimea. These players saw 
the breakaway regions as natural allies loyal to Russia and also 
                                                        
4 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603  
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instruments that can subvert or break the Western trajectories of 
unfriendly governments. Many military officers, security personnel 
and parliamentarians actively supported the Abkhaz and 
Transdniestrians in the conflicts of the early 1990s. Some of them, 
such as Dmitry Rogozin and Konstantin Zatulin, were in opposition 
in the 1990s but are now in or close to the government.  
From 2000, President Putin began to try to impose a ‘power 
vertical’ in which policy was more unified. He moved towards a more 
assertive posture in the neighbourhood – but not in all cases and at 
all times. In 2001 Putin allowed Abkhaz and South Ossetians to 
receive Russian passports. Russia tried to intimidate Georgia and 
Ukraine by cutting off gas supplies in 2006 and 2009. The policy 
towards Georgia became much more belligerent in 2004 when, after 
an initial positive start, relations deteriorated with Georgian 
president Mikheil Saakashvili, who began to advocate a strongly pro-
Western line and prioritised NATO membership. In 2008, the two 
countries went to war over South Ossetia and Russia recognised 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent countries. When in 2014 
the Euromaidan revolution swept away Moscow-friendly Ukrainian 
President Viktor Yanukovych and Russia annexed Crimea and 
fomented conflict in eastern Ukraine, Putin crossed another Rubicon, 
by confronting and alienating Russia’s biggest and most important 
post-Soviet neighbour. 
This is not likely to be the end of the story, however. Despite 
the 2008 Georgia war and the conflict in Ukraine, the policy remains 
diversified. Perceptive Kremlin watchers such as Mikhail Zygar or 
Mark Galeotti portray an administration that is still very 
dysfunctional and lacks consensus or strategic vision.5 Putin himself 
appears to focus on only two or three major issues at a time (notably 
Ukraine, Syria, the United States). With regard to other issues, he can 
be likened to a lighthouse whose beam of bright light lands on an 
issue such as Georgia or Moldova only occasionally, prompting brief 
but strong bursts of policymaking from the centre – as happened with 
Georgia in the summer of 2019. The rest of the time the president 
                                                        
5 Mark Galeotti, We Need to Talk About Putin, Ebury Press, 2019; Mikhail Zygar, 
All the Kremlin’s Men, Public Affairs, 2016.  
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delegates decision-making on the less topical issues to various 
officials, who often take contradictory positions.  
The drain on financial, political and human resources coming 
from Crimea and the Donbas also means there is reduced money, 
time and interest than before for the other conflict regions. Financial 
aid for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria has been cut since 
2014. Despite continued political support for these three regions, 
there is also disappointment in them for perceived disloyalty, corrupt 
misuse of Russian funds and insistence on the right of autonomous 
decision-making.  
In Ukraine relations deteriorated rapidly from normal to 
warlike. Crimea was annexed on 18 March 2014, just two days after a 
hastily organised referendum that was widely criticised as being held 
under conditions of military occupation. In the course of the war in 
the Donbas, which broke out in April 2014, Moscow massively 
stepped up its political, military and financial help for the hitherto 
marginal pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, culminating in 
large-scale invasions by regular Russian troops in August 2014 
(Ilovaisk) and February 2015 (Debaltseve). 
While Russia and Ukraine shied away from declaring war or 
severing diplomatic relations, mutual ties remain severely strained 
despite the signing of the Minsk agreements of 2014/15, as elites and 
the media in both Moscow and Kyiv habitually depict the other 
country as an enemy.  
Russia has had no diplomatic relations with Georgia since 2008. 
It has doubled down on political support for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, even as those two territories have developed diverging 
agendas. Yet after the Georgian Dream party took power in Tbilisi in 
2012, a partial normalisation of relations with Tbilisi also began in 
other areas, such as trade and travel. Business actors and security 
actors have been pursuing very different policies. A diplomatic 
channel established between Russia’s deputy foreign minister 
Grigory Karasin and Georgian envoy Zurab Abashidze yielded 
results in several areas. The majority of Georgian wine is now once 
again exported to Russia, for example. In 2019 shortly before Russia 
suspended commercial flights to Georgia over an incident with a 
Russian parliamentarian in Tbilisi, Moscow and Tbilisi were reported 
to be close to completing a deal which Karasin and Abashidze had 
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worked on, setting up transport corridors between their two 
countries across Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Switzerland had 
brokered the deal in 2011 so that Georgia would not veto Russia’s 
accession to the World Trade Organization. A Swiss commercial 
company has been approved to monitor the cargoes.6 The impression 
was given that when it comes to Georgia policy the left hand in 
Moscow does not always know what the right hand is doing.  
The policy is different towards Moldova. Seeing a country 
which has a much larger traditionally pro-Russian electorate, the 
Russian government explicitly seeks good relations with Chisinau 
and sees prospects in Moldova turning away from the EU and back 
towards Russia, if the Socialist Party led by President Igor Dodon can 
win power. In 2008 the Kremlin refused to recognise Transdniestria 
as independent, as it had done to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and 
despite requests from the State Duma to do so. Russia backs the 
international consensus that Moldova should be unified as a single 
state, with Transdniestria being given special status – although it has 
its own views and terms on how this should be accomplished.  
With Armenia and Azerbaijan, the picture is different again. As 
a co-chair of the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia is one of three mediators 
of the Karabakh conflict and has generally worked well with the other 
two, France and the United States. It has a military alliance and close 
economic relationship with Armenia, but also values a close 
relationship with the government in Azerbaijan. It therefore does not 
want to jeopardise those bilateral ties by being seen to take sides in 
the Karabakh conflict – or even proactively press one or other side to 
make a deal. In 2010 Putin stated, “Both Russia and other participants 
in this process are ready to help, but we cannot take Armenia or 
Azerbaijan’s place. Russia will not take on any additional 
responsibility to press the countries to act, only to be viewed as guilty 
of some misdeed by one or both of the countries later on. Our 
relationship with Azerbaijan and Armenia spans centuries. We do 
not want to be seen as having pressured one side to accept an unfair 
                                                        
6 https://dfwatch.net/moscow-approveds-abkhazia-south-ossetia-cargo-
monitoring-scheme-swiss-company-sgs-50405  
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outcome. I would like to stress that we can only guarantee any 
agreements that are reached.”7  
What conclusions can we draw from this about the evolution 
of Russia’s policy towards the conflict zones? 
First, that Russian policy towards these neighbours and their 
conflict zones is likely to remain contradictory. On the one hand, 
there is a continued commitment to support client regimes in the 
breakaway regions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdniestria and 
the Donbas. Moreover, the Russian military and security services 
have established themselves in these regions and do not intend to 
withdraw from them. These places will not be abandoned.  
At the same time, some Russian policymakers also understand 
that efforts to use these conflict zones as instruments to block the 
Euro-Atlantic ambitions of Chisinau, Kyiv and Tbilisi have not 
succeeded. So Moscow adopts a ‘hedging’ approach, supporting the 
breakaway regions, while also simultaneously seeking to keep doors 
open and economic links alive with these capitals. The most likely 
result will be inertia, but less as a strategy, more by default.  
The second conclusion is that Moscow continues to view these 
conflicts in geopolitical terms, as proxy struggles with the West (with 
the exception of the Karabakh conflict, where neither of the conflict 
parties have a strong east-west orientation). Theoretically, Moscow 
might be interested in a ‘grand bargain’ in which it makes 
concessions on these conflicts in return for commitments from 
Western powers and Georgia or Ukraine to desist from seeking 
NATO membership or seek neutrality. The chances of this are 
extremely small, however, and are constrained by local dynamics. 
Russia’s actions in Georgia in 2008 and in Ukraine since 2014 have 
only reinforced anti-Russian sentiments in these countries. Likewise, 
a majority of Moldovans are unlikely to support a trade-off in which 
they get the complex outcomes resulting from reintegration with 
Transdniestria in exchange for the benefits of integration with the EU. 
The European Union does not think or act in these 19th century terms 
and will not engage in bargaining of this kind.  
                                                        
7 From press conference between Putin and Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, June 8, 2010, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/ 
news/10922/ 
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 Stronger nations 
The five post-Soviet countries still affected by conflict – Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – have grown and 
changed immensely since achieving independence in 1991-2, with the 
break-up from the Soviet Union. The chaos, violence and 
hyperinflation which they all experienced in the early 1990s are a 
thing of the past. Almost all displaced persons from the conflicts have 
been rehoused. Despite many problems – the chief one in all cases 
probably being large-scale emigration – all of them are relatively 
stable full-fledged states with functioning institutions and an 
established presence in global affairs. In most cases (Azerbaijan being 
the exception) free elections take place in which opposition 
candidates are able to prevail.  
One consequence of this consolidation of statehood is the 
resolution of the conflicts is not so high up the political agenda, as it 
was in the 1990s. Opinion polls show that citizens of Georgia and 
Moldova consistently say issues such as the economy and the fight 
against corruption are more important to them than the conflicts. In 
Ukraine, Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the conflict is ongoing or 
threatens to resume, public interest is understandably higher. Here 
attitudes are tougher and there is greater resistance to the idea of 
compromise for peace. In polls published between January and 
March 2019, between 50% and 65% of respondents in Ukraine said 
that they believe that the war in the Donbas is the most pressing 
problem for their country.8 
In all these cases, the parent state (Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine) has been offered a chance for conflict 
resolution that entails significant compromise but has rejected it. 
Azerbaijan has rejected peace deals for Nagorny Karabakh that 
would lead to high autonomy or the prospect of eventual secession 
for Karabakh in exchange for the return of six of the seven Azerbaijani 
territories around Karabakh held by Armenian forces. Georgian 
president Eduard Shevardnadze rejected a Russian plan for a 
                                                        
8 https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-society/2623913-donbas-kercenska-kriza-
ta-cini-aki-problemi-najvazlivisi-dla-ukrainciv.html and 
https://delo.ua/econonomyandpoliticsinukraine/vysokie-tarify-nizkie-
zarplaty-i-pensii-glavn-350954/  
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confederation with Abkhazia in 1997-8, which the Abkhaz side had 
accepted. Moldova rejected Russia’s “Kozak Memorandum” plan for 
reintegration of Transdniestria in 2003. Most of the Ukrainian 
establishment rejects the Minsk Accords for a resolution of the 
Donbas conflict.  
All this suggests that both the political establishment and the 
public in these countries is reluctant to endorse any deal which they 
fear could weaken their country’s statehood by granting a high 
degree of autonomy to a territory with a very different geopolitical 
ideology and, in some cases, a close relationship with Moscow. Faced 
with these choices, they prefer the status quo of an unresolved 
conflict.  
 European Union 
The European Union was not a strong political actor in its eastern 
neighbourhood in the 1990s. Nowadays it is the most powerful player 
in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, alongside Russia, albeit with a very 
different modus operandi. The EU has strong bilateral relationships 
with Chisinau, Kyiv and Tbilisi, based around its Association 
Agreements, a growing relationship with the new Armenia, as well 
as a more limited agenda with Azerbaijan. All of this comes under 
the broader umbrella of the Eastern Partnership project, dating back 
to 2009. This makes for a very extensive agenda between Brussels and 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, with a strong emphasis on domestic 
reform.  
However, despite their enormous significance for the future of 
these countries, the conflicts do not sit formally within the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) agenda. Progress in their resolution is not included 
as one of the EaP’s “20 deliverables for 2020”. There is only one 
reference to the conflicts in the European Neighbourhood Policy 
review, published in 2015, “Protracted conflicts continue to hamper 
development in the region”, a statement which acknowledges the 
gravity of the issue but does not offer any new instrument for tackling 
it.9 Practically speaking, this means that the EU as a whole has 
                                                        
9 Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, November 18, 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-
communication_review-of-the-enp_en.pdf 
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downgraded conflict resolution as a priority and continues to deal 
with these disputes on an ad hoc basis.  
In each of the conflicts, the EU has a specific but circumscribed 
role. In Ukraine, it has more or less abstained from mediating, not 
least because of its perceived role as a player in the Euromaidan 
revolution, which was triggered by the decision of the government of 
Viktor Yanukovych not to sign an Association Agreement with 
Brussels. Direct mediation has been left to Germany and France (who 
form the ‘Normandy Four’ with Ukraine and Russia) and the OSCE. 
The EU is a big humanitarian donor to the conflict region and has 
spent more than €1 billion in aid for eastern Ukraine since 2014, 
according to official figures from the European Commission.10  
Otherwise it has prioritised domestic reform. The EU set up a 
European Advisory Mission (EUAM) in Ukraine, a 300-strong 
civilian mission under the Union’s Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP). However, that mission has a strategic brief, advising 
on long-term policy reform. It is flanked by the EU Support Group 
for Ukraine, a Brussels-based task force which reports to the 
President of the Commission. 
For the South Caucasus the EU has had a Special 
Representative (EUSR) since 2003. In 2008 it also formed a Monitoring 
Mission (EUMM) on the de facto boundaries of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia – but was denied access to the two territories themselves. The 
first officials to fill the role of EUSR, Heikki Talivitie and Peter 
Semneby, had a specific mandate to deal with the conflicts, and 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in particular. In 2011, the holder of the 
position was also entrusted with being a co-chair in the Geneva 
International Discussions and therefore also became representative 
for “the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia”.  
The EUSR position had greatest prominence when Peter 
Semneby had the role. In 2009, the European Council adopted a Non-
Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP) for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia devised by Semneby which set out a framework in which the 
EU could engage with the two territories.  
                                                        
10 https://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/europe/ukraine_en  
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The NREP remains in place but the EUSR has less prominence 
than before, in large part due to the much thicker agenda between 
Brussels and Tbilisi on other issues. Since the Ukraine crisis broke out 
in 2014, the emphasis of the EU has been much more in supporting 
Tbilisi than in offering conflict mediation. In a speech to the European 
Parliament in 2018, EU High Representative Federica Mogherini did 
not mention the NREP but said, “All our actions within the two 
regions are fully coordinated – and I would like to underline this 
because it is a very important point – and approved by the 
government of Georgia, and fully in line with the Georgian 
engagement policy.”11 
The EU has a very limited role in the Karabakh conflict. Since 
1997 there have been three co-chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, 
France, Russia and the United States, with a mandate to mediate on 
the conflict. (Previously there had been two co-chairs). Their activity 
is kept highly confidential. France guards its co-chairmanship 
carefully and efforts to give the EU a greater role have been rebuffed. 
In June 2007, EUSR Semneby aborted a planned trip to Karabakh and 
did not receive public support from the Minsk Group for his plans to 
visit the territory. After these setbacks, the EU publicly lends its 
support to the OSCE mediators and plays a less formal role. The 
EUSR visits Baku and Yerevan occasionally. The EU is the largest 
donor of civil society programmes, through its support of the 
programme entitled ‘The European Partnership for the Peaceful 
Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh’ or ENPK.  
In Transdniestria the EU has acquired a greater role over the 
years, thanks to the willing engagement of both Chisinau and 
Tiraspol. It joined the OSCE’s ‘Five Plus Two’ negotiations in 2005 as 
an observer, together with the United States.  
The EU’s biggest contribution has been on the economic front. 
Transdniestria has a much bigger concentration of light and heavy 
industry than right-bank Moldova and has an active interest in 
trading with the EU. This led to Transdniestria joining in part 
Moldova’s DCFTA with the EU so as to keep up its trading 
                                                        
11 https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/46383/ 
speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-european-
parliament-plenary_en  
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relationship with the EU in 2016. This is an important step in the de 
facto economic convergence of Transdniestria with the rest of 
Moldova.  
 Potential for incremental change 
All these conflicts have both a bigger political and geopolitical 
context and local dynamics. In some conflicts, such as Northern 
Ireland, change from below and economic trends have played a 
significant role in bringing peace. How important are these factors in 
the post-Soviet conflicts described here? Can incremental change 
pushed by actors on the ground transform these protracted conflicts?  
One source of gradual change could come from the negative 
factor of the hollowing out of the breakaway territories due to 
economic hardship. All of them suffer from emigration and economic 
depression even more strongly than do their parent states. Some in 
the parent states hope that harsh economic realities will make the 
breakaway territories more amenable to compromise.  
All of the breakaway territories have patrons which provide 
economic support and can somewhat cushion the territories against 
sudden downturns: Armenia in the case of Nagorny Karabakh, 
Russia in the other cases. In the South Caucasus, the fact that the 
breakaway territories are all relatively small also protects them to a 
certain extent from the prospect of severe economic depression. The 
two territories most vulnerable to economic trends are Transdniestria 
and the Donbas. Transdniestria has a shrinking population, a high 
number of pensioners, no direct access to Russia and reduced 
financial support from Moscow. This may be one reason why its 
leadership has been more pragmatic since the Ukraine crisis broke 
out. However, reports of the imminent collapse of the territory seem 
exaggerated, especially as its economic condition is only a little worse 
than that of right-bank Moldova.  
The Donbas has been hit by economic hardship since 2014, and 
the downturn was aggravated by Ukraine’s 2017 trade blockade of 
the separatist regions, which severed the industrial region’s 
remaining links to the Ukrainian economy. The absence of a new 
mass population exodus since 2017 can be explained by the fact that 
much of the working population had already left the region and by 
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the payment of sufficient compensation to workers in idling plants. 
Much of these payments as well as pensions and state sector wages 
are believed to come from Russia in the form of unofficial subsidies. 
When it comes to positive change from below – public pressure 
to make peace – the answer is different in each case and to a large 
degree is determined by how entrenched are the differences over 
political status at the heart of each dispute. Where the status issue – 
independence against integration – is contested in black-and-white 
terms, compromise is difficult and gradual change is very hard to 
achieve. Where there is more room for consensus, change from below 
is more achievable. 
In the case of Nagorny Karabakh, each side has taken 
diametrically opposite positions on the status dispute since the 
conflict began in 1988. The Armenian side insist on nothing less than 
either union of Nagorny Karabakh with Armenia (miatsum in 
Armenian) or independence – a position they have reaffirmed in 
multiple resolutions and votes. For Azerbaijan the only acceptable 
outcome is reintegration of Karabakh into their country, with some 
kind of autonomy, whose precise nature has not been specified. (The 
Azerbaijani parliament revoked the autonomy of the province in 1991 
but the authorities now say they would offer it some degree of high 
autonomy, but have not clarified what this means).  
These diametrically opposite positions are reinforced by facts 
on the ground. Since 1994, Armenian forces have occupied, wholly or 
partly, seven regions of Azerbaijan outside Nagorny Karabakh, 
which did not have an Armenian population in Soviet times and 
which constitute more than 8% of Azerbaijan’s territory.12 In the past 
decade both sides, and especially Azerbaijan, have undertaken a big 
military build-up in the area around the Line of Contact. The two 
sides fought a brief but bloody four-day conflict in 2016 which cost 
up to 200 lives and inflamed bellicose feelings on both sides.  
In this context there is little space for bottom-up initiatives, 
with only a few brave individuals and NGOs pursuing dialogue with 
one another. In Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as in Crimea, there are 
more contacts across the conflict divide, even though actual travel can 
                                                        
12 If Nagorny Karabakh is included, Armenian forces occupy 13.6% of the 
internationally recognised territory of Azerbaijan.  
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be difficult. But the political context is very difficult and allows little 
space for constructive dialogue. In all three cases Russia has altered 
the facts on the ground. It has unilaterally taken a position on status 
that is in defiance of most of the world, by recognising Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia in 2008 and annexing Crimea outright in 2014. It is hard 
to see how this will change even if and when Putin leaves office in 
2024. Of these three territories, Crimea and South Ossetia are almost 
fully closed to international organisations. Abkhazia does still receive 
internationals via western Georgia and receives modest amounts of 
funding, including from the EU under its Non-Recognition and 
Engagement Policy. Civil society activists and students from 
Abkhazia still participate in international projects. Space for 
engagement is still open, but has narrowed over the past five years.  
2.3 Scenarios 
Four of these conflicts has defied resolution for a long time. The most 
likely scenario in each case is a continuation of the status quo and 
inertia. A whole generation has grown up with very little knowledge 
of life on the other side of the conflict divide. International attention 
is mostly diverted elsewhere and neither Brussels, Moscow nor 
Washington are likely to devote big resources for a push for 
resolution of these long-running conflicts.  
Having said that, none of these conflicts experience a linear 
trajectory. In each case, years of seeming inertia are succeeded by 
sudden events which change the situation abruptly. A change of 
leadership or a political and economic crisis can have strong 
repercussions.  
What follows are different potential scenarios for the five 
conflicts under consideration here: 
 Donbas scenarios 
Reintegration 
The conflict in the Donbas is today essentially a political, not a 
military one.  
Even after five years of unsuccessfully trying to implement the 
Minsk Package of Measures, signed in February 2015, all 
governmental parties agree that Minsk is the only way forward. 
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While a political solution remained elusive because neither side was 
willing to implement the agreement’s compromises, a military 
solution is even less likely because of the potentially devastating 
consequences.  
Under Ukraine’s new President Zelenskiy, who has vowed to 
end the war in the Donbas, significant political progress was made in 
2019, notably the signing of the so-called Steinmeier Formula on 
October 1. That Formula, agreed back in 2016, solves an impasse over 
the Minsk agreement’s key issue, by defining when exactly the non-
government-controlled areas (NGCA) shall be given political 
autonomy (‘special status’). While largely symbolic, the signing of the 
Steinmeier Formula for the first time opens the door for an eventual 
implementation of the Minsk agreement, i.e. political reintegration of 
the non-government-controlled areas into Ukraine.  
The Steinmeier scenario proposes that local elections are held 
in the NGCA according to Ukrainian law. According to the Formula, 
the special status law comes into force preliminarily after polls close, 
and permanently after OSCE observers declare that the vote met the 
organisation’s standards.  
The fundamental difficulty with this scenario is how a country 
can hold democratic elections in what is basically a military 
dictatorship outside that country’s control. Because of this, Ukraine 
demands the dissolution of the ‘People’s Republics’ and control of the 
border with Russia, so that the elections can be organised by 
members of the Kyiv election commission and that Ukrainian 
politicians can participate and campaign.13 While the Minsk 
agreement does stipulate that the vote must be held under Ukrainian 
law and does not mention ‘People’s Republics’, it clearly says that 
Kyiv may begin re-establishing control of the border with Russia one 
day after the elections.14 The separatists and Russia have duly 
                                                        
13 https://journalist.today/en/ukraine-sets-conditions-for-implementation-of-
political-block-of-minsk-agreements/  
14 https://www.osce.org/cio/140156  
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rejected the conditions and President Putin has warned against a 
revision of the Minsk agreement. 15  
Moreover, surrendering political and military control to Kyiv 
before elections amounts to capitulation in the eyes of many in 
Moscow. After the ‘Normandy Format’ summit in Paris in December 
2019, Putin warned that this might prompt a massacre like in 
Srebrenica during the Bosnian war.16  
But holding democratic elections inside the ‘People’s 
Republics’ also seems highly unlikely. The deeply undemocratic 
nature of their regimes was highlighted during the manifestly 
fraudulent elections in November 2018, making it hard to imagine 
how such a vote can be approved by the OSCE’s respected election 
watchdog, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR). Also, holding democratic elections requires relatively free 
media and open debate well before the vote, something that is 
completely lacking in both Donetsk and Luhansk. 
The problems do not end here. Fundamentally, the nature of 
the ‘special status’ is meant to define the nature of the NGCA’s 
reintegration. Here the Minsk agreement is vague in that it does not 
talk about autonomy but of “decentralisation, which takes into 
account peculiarities of the Certain Areas of the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions, which need to be agreed with the areas’ 
representatives”. Putin has clearly said several times that he wants 
Kyiv to negotiate that special status with the separatists – so far an 
anathema to the Ukrainian government.  
Kyiv drafted a decentralisation law in December 2019, which 
was recalled amid criticism from western governments on 16 January 
2020. The law did not directly address the Donbas status issue but 
would make it possible to grant special political status to certain 
                                                        
15 During his annual press conference in December 2019, Putin warned that if the 
Minsk Agreements are revised, “the settlement process will hit a dead end.” 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/press_conferences/62366 
16 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-12-10/despite-talks-
putin-takes-hard-line-over-ukraine-border-control?cmpid=socialflow-twitter-
business&utm_campaign=socialflow-
organic&utm_medium=social&utm_content=business&utm_source=twitter  
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regions by a simple parliamentary majority. The Kremlin has said 
that it wants special status to be written into the constitution.17 
Moscow and the separatists have also made it clear that they 
want to preserve present power structures. Thus, while Kyiv 
demands the withdrawal of all foreign (i.e. Russian) troops, the 
separatists vowed to keep their armed formations and have aptly 
named them “people’s militias”. The footnote in the Minsk Package 
of Measures allows the “Certain Areas” to form “People’s Militias” 
to keep public order. 
The Kremlin’s vision of the ‘special status’ was spelt out in the 
summer of 2019, when Kremlin adviser Alexei Chesnakov said that 
the Donbas should exist with Ukraine like Hong Kong with China – 
one people but two systems – and not for 50 years but forever.18 
It is hard to see any Ukrainian government agreeing to such a 
scenario – even if here, unlike Hong Kong, the democracy is the 
bigger entity having to integrate a totalitarian enclave. 
Furthermore, new hurdles to reintegration have arisen in the 
past few years: 
 The issuing of Russian passports to inhabitants of the ‘People’s 
Republics’, which began in June 2019, is a clear attempt to boost 
pro-Russian sentiment. While only a small share of the local 
population (100,000 out of almost 3 million) had received 
citizenship by December, the number is bound to increase.  
 The trade blockade between government-controlled- and non-
government-controlled areas, imposed by the Ukrainian 
government in 2017, forced the separatists to build economic 
ties with Russia.  
 Separatist leaders and Russian state-controlled media firmly 
stick to the narrative that the future of the Donbas is with 
Russia, meaning that any suggestion of a return to Ukraine will 
look like an unlikely about-face. 
                                                        
17 https://atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines‐top‐five‐2020‐
reform‐priorities/ 
18 http://actualcomment.ru/chesnakov-nelzya-igrat-s-ukrainoy-v-poddavki-
1908210956.html 
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Russia has ignored calls to end its passport-programme and 
Moscow-controlled media continue to demonise Ukraine (despite a 
pledge by President Putin in October 2019 to end this).19 And an 
attempt to lift the trade blockade was put aside after Zelenskiy’s 
inauguration.20 
The fact that over time these hurdles deepen separation from 
Ukraine makes a strong argument for Kyiv to push for a political 
solution. An international peacekeeping force, which has been 
suggested multiple times, could become a crucial element by 
providing security before, during and after the local elections. 
However, agreeing on the modalities of such a force, its size and 
make-up, adds another set of profound challenges to reach a solution. 
Lifting the blockade might see a scenario of very gradual 
change in the status quo in the direction of reintegration with 
Ukraine, bearing some resemblance to what has evolved in 
Transdniestria, which has been peaceful for many years, and 
supported more recently a package of “small steps” coupled to 
partial implementation of the EU’s DCFTA agreement with Moldova 
(see below).  
While time may be on Moscow’s side, the strongest argument 
for Russia to implement Minsk is the significant cost of keeping the 
‘People’s Republics’ afloat. Russia’s non-military subsidies for the 
‘People’s Republics’ are thought to amount to €2 billion per year, 
almost one percent of Russia’s federal budget, which had 
expenditures of 16,713 billion roubles (€233 billion) in 2018.21  
Recognition Scenarios 
While more pragmatic elements in the Russian leadership may be 
eyeing a deal with Ukraine, others seem to favour the opposite – by 
arguing that recognising the ‘People’s Republics’ and integrating 
them economically with Russia reduces the need for subsidies. This 
is certainly the line popular in Russian state media and among 
                                                        
19 https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5d9648d39a7947382809d586  
https://www.civicmonitoring.org/ 
developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-28-may-10-june-2019-newsletter-58/  
21 https://www.minfin.ru/en/statistics/fedbud/  
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separatist leaders. If they succeed, political scenarios that will destroy 
the Minsk agreement become increasingly likely. 
Recognition and/or annexation would open the path to full-
fledged economic integration with Russia. It could boost trade by 
enabling producers inside the ‘People’s Republics’ to certify their 
products and legally sell them in Russia. Currently, large transactions 
are thought to be carried out via a secretive intermediary 
(Vneshtorgservis), registered in the breakaway territory of South 
Ossetia, which can be a convenient channel having been recognised 
as independent by Russia, while also having recognised the ‘People’s 
Republics’, as Russia has not done. This scenario allows the Kremlin’s 
separatist clients to save face after having regularly championed a 
union with Russia.22 
However, there are huge international downsides to this scenario, 
which make it unlikely that Moscow will pursue this option. Russia 
would have to foot the whole bill of supporting and transforming the 
local economy – which in the case of reintegration à la Minsk, would 
fall on Ukraine and her western donors. Furthermore, the standoff 
with Ukraine and the West would escalate and sanctions against 
Russia might well be stepped up, which in turn could offset the 
economic gain.  
Military scenarios 
The risk of new Western sanctions is also a restraining element for 
military scenarios. While the European Union’s support for sanctions 
has been volatile lately, the fact that the EU sanctions regime has held 
until early 2020 is ample evidence of a broad consensus in Europe 
against Russian military adventurism. 
While such scenarios cannot be ruled out altogether, the fact 
that no significant military formations crossed the Line of Contact 
since 2015 shows that neither side is currently seeking a solution by 
force.  
                                                        
22 DNR leader Denis Pushilin said on 11 September that “our main task is to 
achieve maximum integration with Russia” and that ideally Donbas should join 
the Russian Federation as another Federal District. https://denis-
pushilin.ru/news/denis-pushilin-pered-nami-stoit-odna-zadacha-
maksimalnaya-integratsiya-v-rossijskoe-prostranstvo/ 
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The ongoing standoff between Ukrainian government troops 
and separatist armed formations along the Line of Contact in eastern 
Ukraine has little military purpose, because both sides have since 
2015 largely abstained from crossing that line. While skirmishes 
intended to gain better military positions do occur occasionally, the 
main purpose of the ongoing hostilities is clearly political – to unite 
one’s people in the perceived struggle against a hostile neighbour 
(Ukraine or Russia) and to shore up support for deeply unjust, 
totalitarian regimes (in the case of the separatists).  
Russia is restrained from attacking Ukraine not only by the 
threat of sanctions. Conquering more territory, like a land bridge 
with Crimea, would create huge challenges for political control and 
economic stability. The fact that numerous recalcitrant field 
commanders and separatist leaders were assassinated or removed 
between 2015 and 2018, show the difficulties that Moscow faced in 
securing control over the ‘People’s Republics’.  
If the Kremlin’s aim is simply to prevent Ukraine from joining 
NATO and possibly the European Union, it is sufficient to keep the 
present conflict simmering. As the example of Georgia shows, this is 
enough to deter most European NATO allies from approving a 
Membership Action Plan. Similarly, there are no signs of willingness 
in Brussels to open an EU membership path for Ukraine, Georgia and 
Moldova.  
For Ukraine, the case for a military offensive can rationally only 
be made if Russia for some reason decides not to intervene. Although 
the Ukrainian Armed Forces have made significant progress in battle 
readiness, efficiency and strength, it is clear that they can never match 
Russia’s military power. Moscow’s military expenditure was $61.388 
billion in 2018, almost 13 times bigger than Ukraine’s $4.75 billion, 
according to the Stockholm-based SIPRI database.23 
Russia has no significant formal military presence inside the 
NGCAs, relying instead on a small number of regular officers who 
command the two separatist ‘army corps’ in Donetsk and Luhansk. 
                                                        
23https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all%20countries%
20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20in%20constant%20%282017%29%20USD%
20%28pdf%29.pdf 
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According to Ukrainian estimates, these formations total some 32,000 
men, of which one third are Russian citizens (mostly volunteers). 
While their military effectiveness is doubtful,24 Moscow can clearly 
muster a force strong enough to repel any attack on the ‘People’s 
Republics’ in short time. 
Thus, the case for Ukraine to seek a forceful solution is very 
weak. It is highly unlikely that Russia would not intervene to oppose 
a Ukrainian offensive, not least because by regularly vowing to 
support ‘the people of Donbas’, President Putin and other Russian 
politicians have put themselves in a position in which they cannot 
tolerate a Ukrainian military offensive without losing serious 
credibility. 
Status quo  
Given the profound difficulties for a political settlement that would 
allow reintegration, the huge international cost of annexation for 
Moscow and the massive risks of renewed war, retaining the status 
quo may be the most likely outcome.  
The Ukrainian government could profit by focusing on reforms 
and broad westernisation while avoiding the divisive and potentially 
destructive issue of rapprochement with Russia over the Donbas. 
Russia, in turn, could continue to use the ‘People’s Republics’ as a 
potentially destabilising element without having to cede any control 
over their civilian administrations (and local military formations 
would remain under direct Russian control). 
The downside of this scenario is evident every day. The biggest 
loser would be the civilian population, which would continue to 
suffer from military violence, an arbitrary division into two hostile 
camps and political repression in the ‘People’s Republics’, while the 
prospects for economic recovery remain extremely bleak. 
This scenario is also supported by the fact that much of the 
Ukrainian and/or European-orientated population of the NGCA 
have left for Ukraine or further west. Those who remain or went to 
Russia are much less likely to champion re-integrating the Donbas 
                                                        
24 Russian veteran FSB agent and early separatist field commander Igor Girkin 
argued in August 2019 that the two corps would be quickly defeated if Ukraine 
attacked: http://nvo.ng.ru/realty/2019-08-23/16_1058_interview.html 
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with Ukraine. Furthermore, there is little evidence of any significant 
local opposition to the repressive political-military systems inside the 
‘People’s Republics’. 
 Transdniestria scenarios 
Reintegration 
Integration between Transdniestria and right-bank Moldova within 
a single state is the only status option on the table in negotiations. 
Even though the de facto authorities in Tiraspol argue that the 
territory has voted for independence in two referendums, no 
international actors – and far from all Transdniestrians – believe this 
outcome is possible. Tiraspol’s patron, Russia, openly favours 
reintegration with Moldova. No one would be likely to lay down 
their life to oppose such a plan in the future. This is thus by far the 
most likely long-term outcome.  
In many everyday respects, Transdniestria is already part of 
Moldova. Crucially that includes its external economic activity. 
Transdniestrian businesses operate abroad with Moldovan 
registration and trade with the EU (mostly) under the terms of the 
DCFTA with Moldova. However, no one is in any rush to achieve full 
political integration in the near future. There is little urgency in 
political talks and no consensus on what kind of special status 
Transdniestria should be given. Russia evidently would like to see a 
deal which increased its influence in Moldova by having a friendly 
loyal territory inside the Moldovan state, not outside it, as at present.  
The peace plan which came closest to fruition, the so-called 
Kozak Memorandum of 2003, was eventually rejected by Chisinau, 
with Western support. It gives some clues to how a deal designed by 
Moscow could enhance Russian influence. The draft plan for a 
“Federative Republic of Moldova” was seen at the time in Chisinau 
and Western capitals to be giving unacceptable veto powers to 
Transdniestria in an upper house of parliament, set to be created by 
the amended constitution of a reunified Moldova. Moreover, later 
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additions to the draft text provided for a Russian peacekeeping force 
in Transdniestria after the settlement and up until the year 2020.25 
Despite friendly interactions between the population on each 
side of the Dniester River, neither side currently sees union as an 
attractive proposition. Transdniestria would comprise around one 
eighth of the population of a reunited Moldova. Proportionally, this 
is a much higher figure than in any of the other conflict zones under 
discussion. Moldovan elections tend to closely fought affairs, with 
voters opting fairly equally between parties which call themselves 
pro-European and those that support Russia. Introducing 
Transdniestria into this picture and giving voting rights to hundreds 
of thousands of residents from that territory would instantly tilt the 
balance back towards Moscow.  
As a result, reintegration is viewed with suspicion by those 
Moldovans (estimated to be up to 20%) who favour union with 
Romania and have almost no interest in allowing Transdniestria to 
join a re-constituted Moldovan state. The historically minded point 
out that Transdniestria was first made part of Soviet Moldova in 1940 
and has few ties with modern-day Romania.  
In Transdniestria itself the public discourse remains firmly for 
independence and close ties with Russia, but there is almost certainly 
more support for reintegration than is visible. There is little agitation 
for recognition by Russia. In the last few years, tens of thousands of 
Transdniestrians have taken Moldovan passports, enabling them to 
travel visa-free to the European Union. However, this pro-settlement 
constituency is also the most mobile and most likely to ‘vote with 
their feet’ by emigrating. Transdniestria has a serious demographic 
problem in that around one third of its population are pensioners and 
the most active members of society are the ones most likely to leave.  
Status quo with Europeanisation  
As discussed above, the Transdniestria conflict is unusual in the post-
Soviet space in being susceptible to incremental change. One benign 
medium-term scenario is that, despite the core political issues of the 
                                                        
25 William H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad and the West, Lessons from the Moldova-
Transdniestria Conflict, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C/The 
John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2012, p. 139-148. 
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conflict remaining unresolved, the de facto authorities in 
Transdniestria pursue a gradual transition of their territory towards 
being a more respectable and predictable ‘de facto state’ with 
stronger links to the European Union.  
A more pragmatic business-minded group headed by de facto 
president Vadim Krasnoselsky, supported by Sheriff, the main 
business conglomerate of Transdniestria, has been in office in 
Tiraspol since December 2016. Economic pressures, resulting from 
the Ukraine crisis, reduced Russian financial support and declining 
budget revenues, are compelling the de facto authorities in 
Transdniestria to rely more on trade with Moldova and the EU. 
Rhetoric on independence has been downplayed and the authorities 
are keen to distance themselves from the pro-Russian forces who 
have taken power in the Donbas. In theory this could lead to a 
stronger rapprochement with the EU in more than just trade issues.  
In practice this Europeanisation trajectory is not yet a likely 
scenario for various reasons. The political culture of Transdniestria 
still anchors it firmly in the ‘Russian World’, even if geography and 
economics temper that considerably. As noted above, more 
Europeanised citizens are those most likely to emigrate. Perhaps 
most importantly, both Chisinau and Brussels (acting in coordination 
with Chisinau) are very cautious about direct engagement on 
domestic issues with the de facto authorities in Transdniestria. There 
is strong resistance in large parts of Moldovan society to any 
engagement that is seen to ‘legitimise’ the de facto authorities in 
Tiraspol, even if it leads to internal reforms that will align 
Transdniestria more closely with right-bank Moldova.  
Political entrenchment, isolation 
A third scenario for Transdniestria sees the territory doubling down 
on its status as a regional ‘black hole’, an unrecognised space which 
receives enough support to survive from the Russian nationalist and 
security establishment and continues to benefit from shadowy 
schemes involving smuggling and counterfeit goods in collusion 
with powerful figures in both Moldova and Ukraine.  
This scenario would be most likely to derive from a situation of 
economic and political stagnation in both Moldova and Ukraine. It is 
more probable if the government in Moldova fails in its avowed 
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efforts to crack down on illicit trade with Transdniestria and if the 
administration of Volodymyr Zelenskiy in Ukraine does not exert 
power over the regional elites in Odessa that have enjoyed a mutually 
beneficial arrangement with Transdniestria in trading contraband 
goods.  
A retreat by Transdniestria into full rogue status is not likely 
however, as few in the territory itself seem to want it. Ordinary 
people in Transdniestria are now connected to the Moldovan state, 
travelling and trading there, and by possessing a variety of basic 
documents, such as passports and driving licences. The Sheriff group 
which now dominates Transdniestria both economically and 
politically may have acquired much of its wealth in the past by 
exploiting the region’s unrecognised status. Nowadays, however, it 
appears more focused on becoming a legitimate business actor with 
a good trading relationship with the EU. The door to the rest of the 
world, now half-open, is unlikely to close again fully.  
 Abkhazia scenarios 
The Abkhazia conflict is highly complex and multi-layered. Despite 
the deepening of divisions in 2008, it still does not fit neatly within a 
geopolitical framework. We can therefore see several scenarios for its 
evolution, even though some are much more likely than others.  
Integration with Georgia  
As with South Ossetia, there is a theoretical possibility that Russia 
might change its policies and push for Abkhazia to be reintegrated 
into Georgia – the outcome that most of the international community 
still urges, albeit without much conviction. However, the prospects 
for this are even more remote than in the case of South Ossetia for 
several reasons: the Abkhazia conflict has deeper roots than the one 
in South Ossetia and there is much greater hostility to Georgia on a 
public level; Russia has a stronger intrinsic strategic interest in 
Abkhazia and in the potential of its Black Sea coastline; the price that 
Russia would seek to extract from Tbilisi for such a deal – the return 
of Georgia to a Russian sphere of influence in some form – would 
almost certainly be too high.  
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Annexation by Russia  
Russia, which exercises control of several aspects of political and 
economic life in Abkhazia, could seek to formally annex the territory, 
as it has done to Crimea. Again, this seems highly unlikely. As 
discussed below in relation to South Ossetia, such a move would 
burn bridges with Georgia and the West for a questionable return of 
investment. The Abkhaz elite still aspires to independence rather 
than union with Russia and most of it would not welcome formal 
union with Russia. The Georgians of the Gali region would also 
strongly object to such a step. It seems far more likely that Russia will 
seek to continue to exercise informal rather than formal control in 
Abkhazia.  
International recognition  
The Abkhaz themselves continue to ask foreign interlocutors to 
recognise their bid for independence. Currently only Russia and a 
small group of countries unconnected to the region but loyal to 
Russia (Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela) recognise Abkhazia 
as independent. The unlikely scenario of wider recognition would 
only be possible if Georgia itself were to take the radical step of 
allowing Abkhazia to break away de jure – as Indonesia did with East 
Timor and Ethiopia did with Eritrea. A small number of voices in 
Georgia have raised the idea that their country would be better off 
without Abkhazia and that the best way to resolve the dispute would 
be to recognise it as independent and formalise a new relationship 
with a country which had won the protection of international 
sovereignty and was less dependent on Russia. This remains an 
extreme minority view in Georgia, however, although it might gain a 
little more currency with time. It is not a topic of discussion among 
Georgia’s Western partners which are sensitive to Tbilisi’s concerns 
and which moreover do not regard Abkhazia as a strategic priority 
(in contrast to the way they saw Kosovo in the 2000s). Even if this 
scenario were to be considered, it might also meet resistance in 
Abkhazia itself – as justice would require the right of return of more 
than 200,000 Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia who were displaced (or 
their parents were) in the conflict of 1992-3. There would also be the 
question of the Gali region, whose population is overwhelmingly 
Georgian, and which would almost certainly seek to remain part of 
Georgia in such a scenario. In short, this is more of an interesting 
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intellectual exercise than a credible scenario at the moment – even 
though discussion of it is undoubtedly helpful for all sides in 
clarifying what it is they actually seek as a beneficial outcome of this 
conflict.  
Softening of border/internationalisation  
Abkhazia’s border with western Georgia has remained open to 
foreign visitors and international NGOs, as well as Georgian 
residents of the Gali region, since the conflict of 2008. It is now 
manned by Russian border guards and FSB officers as well as Abkhaz 
guards. In the summer of 2019, the border was closed for a long 
period after the escalation of a row between Moscow and Tbilisi. 
Abkhaz officials still say they seek international contacts and that 
they welcome international engagement, although their actions – 
such as sometimes insisting on putting Abkhaz stamps in visitors’ 
passports – can tell a different story. Self-isolation is increasingly an 
issue for Abkhazia’s future. 
The EU, working in the framework of its 2009 Non-Recognition 
and Engagement Policy implements a number of programmes in 
Abkhazia, mainly through UNDP, in fields such as health and 
environmental protection. Officials from Brussels have travelled to 
Abkhazia to explore whether there is interest in the territory signing 
up to Georgia’s DCFTA with the EU, as Transdniestria has. This 
seems unlikely – Abkhazia’s economic links with Georgia are small 
and there are few incentives for it do so. However, given Abkhazia’s 
economic malaise and the Russian economy’s persistent problems, 
some more modest economic opening with Georgia could be an 
attractive option in the future.26 
A ‘soft internationalisation’ of Abkhazia would be popular 
with many circles in the territory. They include its civil society and 
professional class which wants to recover the traditionally 
cosmopolitan character of Abkhazia and avoid de facto absorption 
into Russia; businesspeople who would welcome chances to trade 
legally with both Georgia and Russia; the Georgians of Gali who face 
restrictions crossing the Administrative Boundary Line and visiting 
relatives in Zugdidi region. However, these groups do not have a 
                                                        
26 https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/249-
abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-time-talk-trade  
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strong political voice in Abkhazia and operate in an environment of 
shrinking civic space and a media landscape dominated by Russia.  
For this to happen there would also need to be a conceptual 
shift in Tbilisi. The Georgian Dream government has adopted a more 
open policy towards Abkhazia than its predecessor. It has pioneered 
a scheme, welcoming Abkhaz to cross the border to access free 
Georgian healthcare and unveiled an ambitious plan entitled Step for 
a Better Future, offering Abkhaz many benefits of Georgian 
citizenship. However, the Law on Occupied Territories, adopted by 
the previous government in 2008 remains in place and there is a 
reluctance to allow international engagement in Abkhazia if it does 
not specifically further the cause of ‘reconciliation’ with Georgia. 
Without a green light from Tbilisi, the EU is unlikely to pursue a more 
ambitious policy of this kind on its own.  
Status quo with more stagnation/isolation 
The most likely scenario in the medium term is a continuation of the 
current status quo, of Abkhazia being internationally isolated, 
despite a few small connections to the outside world, and of increased 
Russian influence. De facto president Raul Khajimba was forced from 
office in January 2020 only four months after his election, after 
protests from the opposition that he had been elected unfairly. His 
successor may try to assert a more autonomous line from Moscow, 
but the parameters for action are limited. In September 2019, the 
decision was made in Moscow to ‘modernise’ Abkhazia’s armed 
forces, putting them even more strongly under Russia’s control. 
Abkhazia will retain some autonomy from Russia in many areas of 
domestic policy but has all but lost its power to make decisions over 
its security and borders. A ‘soft integration’ with Russia is set to 
continue, as there is no concerted outside effort to balance it with 
strong engagement from other countries.  
 South Ossetia scenarios 
Integration with Georgia 
In the 1990s, South Ossetia was regarded as the least dangerous and 
most resolvable of the post-Soviet conflicts. Much as in 
Transdniestria today, there was free traffic back and forth between 
South Ossetia and neighbouring Georgian regions, many Georgians 
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continued to live in the territory and there were still many mixed 
Georgian-Ossetian marriages. In terms of trade, South Ossetia was 
much more integrated with Georgia than with Russia – even though 
this trade was almost entirely untaxed.  
This all began to change in 2004 after the government of 
Georgia’s new president Mikheil Saakashvili closed the Ergneti 
market, where Georgians and Ossetians traded, breaking economic 
links between the two sides. A summer of violence followed and the 
security situation in the region deteriorated. In 2008, the Georgia-
Russia war and Russian recognition of South Ossetia severed 
relations completely. Almost all the remaining Georgians in South 
Ossetia fled or were expelled and their villages were subsequently 
destroyed. The Georgian government, having attacked Tskhinvali, 
was declared to have committed ‘genocide’ against the Ossetian 
people by the de facto authorities. Since then, Russian ‘borderisation’ 
policies have reinforced the boundary around the territory, cutting it 
off. South Ossetia has been depopulated and its population may now 
be less than 40,000 people.  
If it were merely up to ordinary South Ossetians, a close 
relationship with Georgia, possibly with a view to eventual 
reintegration in the future, would be a very plausible scenario. 
However, this looks almost impossible in the near future. Ordinary 
people have lost a voice in this conflict, even if that means that 
families are divided. Official South Ossetian ideology focuses on 
stronger relations and possible union with Russia.  
For Russia, the main strategic utility of the territory is now as a 
base for at least 4,000 Russian soldiers. In the past – including, 
reportedly, at the first meeting between Putin and Saakashvili in 2004 
– Russia has indicated that it might want to do a bargain over the 
future of South Ossetia in which it was returned to Georgian control 
in exchange for concessions from Tbilisi such as a commitment to no 
longer seek NATO membership. However, such a bargain now looks 
less attractive to both Moscow and Tbilisi. Russia has built up South 
Ossetia as a military base and is unlikely to relinquish it. Although it 
does not abandon its claims, Tbilisi has learned to live without South 
Ossetia and puts a much bigger priority on making its own foreign 
policy choices.  
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Union with Russia  
In 2015, South Ossetian leaders raised the issue of a referendum on 
their territory joining North Ossetia, the much larger autonomous 
republic in the Russian Federation – and hence Russia. However, this 
initiative was politely rebuffed by the Kremlin, which still insists that 
it recognises South Ossetia as an independent country. Evidently 
Moscow does not see any advantage in what would amount to a 
formal annexation of South Ossetia, a move that would destroy any 
prospects of rapprochement with Georgia and further damage 
relations with Western countries. This could of course change but 
only if the confrontation between Russia and the West dramatically 
worsens and if this step were seen as an acceptable risk in Moscow.  
Partial opening of border/international engagement  
Ordinary Ossetians and Georgians would almost certainly welcome 
a relaxation of border controls, enabling families and neighbours to 
travel more freely back and forth and trade to be resumed. (Currently 
this is only possible in very limited fashion, mainly via the town of 
Akhalgori). This would benefit the South Ossetian economy and that 
of neighbouring Georgian regions. The EU’s 2009 Non-Recognition 
and Engagement Policy formally applies to South Ossetia as well as 
Abkhazia but in practice is not being implemented there, as access is 
so restricted. If there were a political opening, the EU would have a 
framework in which to engage, however.  
The implementation of the 2011 Swiss-brokered deal opening a 
transit corridor across South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia 
would provide only modest economic benefits as freight traffic 
would only be in transit (one reason why the agreement is politically 
unpalatable to the local leadership), but it would also open up South 
Ossetia internationally. Such an opening-up would restore some of 
the contacts across the conflict divide which were lost in 2008 but 
would still leave the situation a long way from conflict resolution. It 
would move the dispute closer to the situation in Transdniestria, 
leaving more options open in the future. However, this would require 
a change in thinking in Moscow and amongst the Russian military, 
which looks unlikely as long as the current Putin administration 
remains in power.  
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Status quo with more stagnation  
The most likely scenario thus remains a situation for South 
Ossetia defined by negatives: the region is not joined to Russia, not 
reintegrated into Georgia, the de facto border does not open, and 
South Ossetia does not develop into anything more than a large 
Russian military base. This means a perpetuation of the status quo, 
accompanied by deepening economic and political stagnation and 
very restricted opportunities for the residents of South Ossetia.  
 Nagorny Karabakh scenarios  
Peace agreement  
There have been many attempts at a peace plan for the Karabakh 
conflict. The most serious initiative in recent times was the effort 
which culminated in a meeting in Kazan in June 2011, presided over 
by then Russian president Dmitry Medvedev.  
Since 2007 peace plans have been based on the six so-called 
Madrid Principles, whose main points have been set out in three 
declarations by the presidents of the three co-chair countries, France, 
Russia and the United States, at three G8 summits at L’Aquila, 
Muskoka and Deauville in 2009-11.27  
The draft plan aims to get round the thorny issue at the heart 
of the conflict, the final status of Nagorny Karabakh by tackling other 
issues first in a phased approach. Azerbaijan gains the return of the 
territories outside Nagorny Karabakh currently held by Armenian 
forces (with the exception of the ‘Lachin Corridor’ connecting 
Karabakh and Armenia) and international peacekeepers are 
deployed. The status issue is determined by a “binding expression of 
will”, some kind of referendum to be held at some point in the future, 
thus leaving the hope to the Armenian side that they could achieve 
an internationally sanctioned separation from Azerbaijan; in the 
meantime, the territory of Karabakh is granted “interim status” 
before a vote is held, a status that gives it greater international 
legitimacy than it has now but not independence.  
In recent years Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has 
taken the lead in pushing forward this initiative, reportedly with 
                                                        
27 https://www.osce.org/mg/51152 
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certain new elements added, chiefly the idea that transport routes 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan, linking Russia and Turkey, could 
be opened at an early stage.  
No one has yet devised a better way of overcoming the almost 
irreconcilable differences on status held by the sides than this plan. It 
artfully seeks to resolve the conflict by postponing for many years a 
decision on this issue and promising the Karabakh Armenians an 
improved version of their current status. That the plan has not 
worked derives first of all from the fact that the conflict parties lack 
the political will or resources to engage in an ambitious peace 
process, which will encounter fierce opposition in the region. Both 
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders see that there is much more to lose 
than gain from embarking on a peace settlement. Their public 
rhetoric remains implacable.  
A peace settlement is thus most likely only far in the future if 
either there is a big societal transformation and a new generation 
takes a different view on the issue or if, in a currently unforeseen way, 
there is a big international push to resolve the conflict. In the shorter 
term, the most likely prospect of an agreement comes from a risky 
and tragic scenario: that an outbreak of fighting even worse than that 
of 2016 reminds the world of the dangers of the conflict, compels the 
big powers to bring the warring parties together and force them to 
make a deal.  
Return to war  
Armenia and Azerbaijan are always one step from renewed war over 
Nagorny Karabakh. Around 10,000 men on each side are stationed 
along the so-called Line of Contact the 200km-long line that cuts 
through de jure Azerbaijani territory north and east of Nagorny 
Karabakh which was established after the ceasefire of May 1994. 
More troops are deployed along two stretches of the Armenia-
Azerbaijan international border in the north and adjoining the 
exclave of Nakhichevan. In each zone, the soldiers, mainly conscripts, 
are backed up by heavy weaponry which includes artillery, long-
range missiles, aircraft, helicopters and military drones. The only 
international presence on the ground constraining these two armies 
is the mission headed by the Personal Representative of the Chairman 
in Office of the OSCE, consisting of six monitors. Set up in 1994 with 
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a very limited mandate, it has been headed since 1996 by Ambassador 
Andrzej Kasprzyk. His team monitors the ceasefire twice monthly in 
pre-arranged visits.  
The two sides fought a limited war for four days in April 2016 
that claimed about 200 lives (although estimates vary). After Russian 
high-level intervention, the two sides stopped fighting. This outbreak 
of fighting demonstrated that the only thing stopping a new full-scale 
war is the calculations of the parties themselves. To be more precise, 
only one side, Azerbaijan, the losing side in the war of the 1990s, has 
an incentive to initiate a new war, so as to reconquer the territory it 
lost. The Armenian side has an interest in the normalisation of the 
status quo on the ground and a permanent ceasefire that preserves its 
territorial gains.  
A war could start for a number of reasons. A domestic crisis in 
Azerbaijan caused by political feuding or a fall in the oil-price could 
lead the president to decide that he needed to reaffirm his power by 
resorting to conflict with the enemy – the only national cause that can 
unify opposition and government in Azerbaijan. A domestic crisis in 
Armenia could lead to the recognition by Yerevan of Nagorny 
Karabakh as an independent state for similar reasons – a move that 
would tear up the current peace process and could provoke military 
action by Baku.  
Military action is also possible through miscalculation. The 
armies are very close and if a bad incident happens, there can be little 
time to refer it upwards. A medium-ranking officer could thus 
theoretically escalate a situation which could get quickly out of hand. 
However, it is worth noting that ceasefire violations went down 
markedly in 2017 and 2018, when there were political messages from 
above. This suggests that military discipline is quite tight and that 
soldiers by themselves are unlikely to start a conflict.  
Full-scale war is therefore only one step away but has so far 
been avoided. Three things can be said with certainty about any 
future military action: it would be far more destructive and extensive 
than the war of the 1990s, given the huge military power now 
accumulated on both sides, and the fact that the conflict has become 
a full inter-state dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan; its 
outcome would be extremely hard to predict, as the two armed forces 
have changed considerably over the last two and a half decades, 
50  BEYOND FROZEN CONFLICT 
 
meaning that either side could prevail militarily or there could be a 
bloody stalemate ; finally, war would not solve anything as the two 
sides would still be compelled to return to diplomacy. 
Status Quo  
As peace is elusive and war very dangerous and risky, continuation 
of the status quo is thus most likely in the medium term.  
The status quo could continue to evolve in different ways. It 
could be relatively peaceful. This would only be the case if Azerbaijan 
saw the benefits of agreeing to a protracted ceasefire, in which its 
occupied territories remained under Armenian control. That is only 
conceivable if there was more dynamism in the negotiating process. 
It could also be violent, with the regular ceasefire violations and 
casualties which were characteristic of the years leading up to the 
fighting of 2016.  
Unfortunately, the status quo, although mostly without 
violence, is not conducive to positive incremental change. 
Confidence-building measures are difficult to achieve when the two 
sides are so close to conflict on the ground and levels of aggressive 
rhetoric are so high. There is little contact between populations. In 
January 2019 the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan issued 
a positive statement which mentioned the need for “concrete 
measures to prepare the populations for peace”. However, it has 
proved hard to find measures which can fulfil that intention.  
Instead, the status quo entrenches positions. The Karabakh 
issue remains a central issue in the nation-building story of both 
peoples. Azerbaijanis will not be persuaded to ‘forget’ about the loss 
of large parts of their country and the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of Azerbaijani citizens. On the other side, as the years pass, 
ordinary Armenians are less inclined to countenance the return even 
of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorny Karabakh. To give 
up Nagorny Karabakh itself is unthinkable to almost all of them. 
Even though the occupied territories outside Nagorno Karabakh 
remain mostly depopulated, some Armenians settlers now live there, 
some lands are used for agriculture, and many of the places have 
been given Armenian names. Maps routinely show these Azerbaijani 
territories to be part of a single Armenian territory, including the 
Republic of Armenia, and Nagorno-Karabakh (now renamed 
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Artsakh by the Armenians). The conflict remains both very damaging 
to both sides and extremely intractable. 
2.4 Conclusions 
It is not productive to apply a single template to the all the conflicts 
in the former Soviet Union. The conflicts that began before and after 
the break-up of the USSR in 1991 had similar causes, but very specific 
characteristics, and all have diverged further in the last 25 years. The 
Ukraine conflict, beginning much later in 2014, provides a newer and 
still more different case. A common thread in all of them is Russian 
involvement, but again the role of Moscow is very different in each 
case – from being the prime conflict participant in Ukraine to a more 
detached international mediator in the Karabakh conflict.  
The four conflicts dating from the 1990s are widely regarded as 
intractable – even the relatively peaceful Transdniestria dispute. Few 
involved in the mediation processes around them talk of ‘conflict 
resolution’. A geopolitical shift – meaning in several of these cases an 
end to Russia’s instrumentalisation of the unrecognised territories for 
its own strategic purposes – is needed before change can occur, but 
this could take years or decades to come. Change is also vital in the 
local and regional context. In the shorter term the emphasis is on 
‘managing’ the situation – in the case of Karabakh seeking to prevent 
a return to war, while keeping up immediate diplomatic engagement 
with the conflict parties. In the longer term the goal is 
‘transformation’, working to change attitudes and provide more 
options for resolution in the future.  
Here the EU may find a role. The EU has not had a formal role 
in any of the mediation formats for these conflicts. Back in the 1990s, 
its foreign policy mandate was much more limited. The EU did 
acquire observer status in the ‘Five Plus Two’ OSCE process for 
Transdniestria in 2005 and became a co-chair of the Geneva 
discussions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia following the 2008 
conflict. But in Ukraine in 2014 the EU was perceived as being too 
closely associated with Kyiv, so it again took a back seat on conflict 
issues, while the OSCE became the prime mediator. With regard to 
Nagorny Karabakh, the EU Special Representative has a modest 
supporting role to the OSCE process. 
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Lack of a strong mediating mandate should not preclude the 
EU from playing a stronger role, where it can, however. In some cases 
it can even be an advantage, as the EU is not tied to negotiating 
processes which are widely seen as dormant and have little interest 
for the wider population. There is most scope where the EU’s 
normative economic power can be transformative, in the 
Transdniestria conflict. In Georgia and Ukraine, this is also possible 
in more limited fashion, as those countries pursue closer economic 
links with the EU under the umbrella of the DCFTA. If and when that 
economic convergence brings benefits to the local population, it can 
be an object of attraction for Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the eastern 
Ukraine territories.  
Moreover, in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova the EU has a 
much more positive image than in some of its member states. This 
gives it considerable soft power leverage vis-à-vis Russia, which is 
widely underused. In eastern Ukraine, the hitherto feeble attempts by 
the government in Kyiv to reach out to the local population, which 
traditionally prefers Russian media to Ukrainian, could well benefit 
from more proactive EU support. 
More broadly, a key reason for the intractability of these 
conflicts is that societies on either side of the conflict divide are not 
ready for change or compromise. This requires a different approach 
in the recognised states on the one hand and the unrecognised 
breakaway territories on the other. In the sovereign nation-states, 
these territorial conflicts are still strongly tied to the national identity 
of the new countries forged after the end of the USSR. There is still a 
strong feeling of trauma from the conflicts and many contradictory 
attitudes. It may take a new generation to reassess strategic priorities 
on these conflicts and what Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine are or are not prepared to offer the other side in the name 
of a conflict settlement. This kind of domestic debate and societal 
transformation can be assisted by friendly outside actors such as the 
EU. 
The breakaway territories – two of which, Abkhazia and 
Transdniestria have good reason to be called ‘de facto states’ – are 
unlikely to disappear. They are entrenched, not only thanks to the 
support of their external patrons, Armenia and Russia, but also 
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thanks to the passage of time and consolidation of identity, in large 
part around the conflict fought with a parent state.  
There is a consensus that international engagement with most 
of these territories (the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’ in 
eastern Ukraine being a more difficult case) is needed, partly to 
prevent the people who live there from being completely isolated 
from the rest of the world, partly so as to keep open channels of 
communication that are needed for eventual conflict resolution.  
However, there is no consensus on what form that engagement 
can take. Some advocate more ambitious engagement, up to the level 
of the international community’s dealings with Taiwan – with trade 
and transport links and direct contacts with de facto institutions. 
Others, especially in the parent states, are far more cautious. These 
Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Moldovans and Ukrainians see isolation of 
the territories as leverage and only support engagement on 
humanitarian grounds or if it can be seen to directly facilitate 
reunification of the territories. Concerns are raised that engagement 
with unrecognised territories can lead to ‘creeping recognition’. 
These fears have no legal basis but are grounded in domestic political 
anxieties and societal concerns about giving legitimation to an 
adversary in a conflict. EU policy tend to default towards the more 
cautious approach, respecting the sensitivities of the parent state. If 
the EU does regard the transformation of these conflicts as a priority, 
then a rethink of its engagement policy is required. Sectors such as 
education, the environment and healthcare are potential areas where 
international assistance would be helpful. This kind of assistance 
would also contribute to the de-isolation of these territories and 
indirectly further the cause of conflict resolution.  
All of these recommendations speak to a longer-term approach 
in which transformation of the conflicts is made a strategic goal in 
tandem with initiatives to effect positive societal change and 
economic development of the Eastern Partnership countries, and 
also, where possible, of the unrecognised territories. The cause of 
conflict resolution and of socio-economic transformation should be 
seen more as parts of a single integrated policy, if change is to occur 
in the long run.  
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The conflict in the Donbas, which enters its seventh year in 2020, is among 
Europe’s biggest security challenges. This study offers a first comprehensive 
political, economic and societal assessment of the ‘People’s Republics’ of 
eastern Ukraine, on which information is scarce since they cannot be safely 
visited by Western analysts. It looks at the nature of Russian control over 
the separatist regions and at the prospects of their further existence. It argues 
that reintegration with Ukraine is becoming more difficult as their 
dependence on Russia has deepened over time. The study also discusses 
possible scenarios for a non-military solution, including an international 
peacekeeping force.  
3.1 Introduction  
This report documents the state of the politics, economy and society 
of the separatist-held areas of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions. Its aim is to analyse the developments that have 
taken place in these regions since 2014 in order to better understand 
them in the future. The report also looks at Russia’s role in the conflict 
and the implications for Ukraine’s development in the framework of 
the Association Agreement with the European Union.  
The areas covered by this report are legally part of Ukraine, but 
have not been controlled by its government since 2014 when the 
conflict broke out between armed groups (separatists) and 
government forces. Their territory was defined in September of that 
year and February 2015, when the 457km Line of Contact, that divides 
the areas under government control from those outside government 
control, was established in the framework of the Minsk agreements. 
The non-government-controlled areas in the Donetsk region 
are also known as the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (DNR) and those 
in the Luhansk region as the “Luhansk People’s Republic” (LNR). 
Both separatist entities were proclaimed by activists in April 2014 and 
have been recognised by no other country save South Ossetia, itself a 
little-recognised separatist region. The Minsk agreements do not 
recognise them either, speaking instead of “Certain Areas” of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 
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These areas make up just a third of the two regions’ territory,1 
but they include densely inhabited areas that were home to almost 
half of the combined population of 6.64 million and contain many of 
the big industrial assets that make up the Donbas mining region. 
Their exact current population is not known and the separatists’ 
official figures of 2.29 million (Donetsk)2 and 1.46 million (Luhansk)3 
– which add up to 3.75 million – are most certainly exaggerated. 
Realistic estimates put the current number of inhabitants at between 
two and three million people – assuming that a large share of 
Ukraine’s 1.5 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 600,000 
Ukrainian asylum seekers abroad are from the non-government-
controlled areas.4 
It is safe to say that the ‘People’s Republics’ are almost fully 
dependent on Russia, which has been instrumental in their set-up 
and in the continued supply of money, know-how as well as arms 
and ammunition. This, and the fact that separatist leaders regularly 
state that they ultimately want to join Russia rather than being 
independent, elevates Moscow’s role in Donetsk and Luhansk to 
more than hegemonial. However, Russia’s control is far from 
complete. It has been challenged by insubordinate field commanders, 
separatist infighting and organised crime, as well as by conflict 
within Moscow – among the “curators” who oversee rival factions in 
the Donbas. 
These challenges arguably escalated in November 2017, when 
Luhansk separatist leader Igor Plotnitsky was ousted in a coup 
backed by forces loyal to Donetsk separatist leader Alexander 
Zakharchenko. Power in Luhansk was transferred to Leonid 
                                                        
1 A 2006 Radio Liberty report estimates the combined territory to be between 
16,000-18,000 square km, less than three percent of Ukraine’s territory: 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/27797444.html 
2 http://glavstat.govdnr.ru/pdf/naselenie/chisl_naselenie_1018.pdf  
3 http://www.gkslnr.su/files/chisl_261018.pdf  
4 The Ministry of Social Policies registered 1,520,531 IDPs nationwide in 
November 2018. In addition, some 600,000 Ukrainians had by 2015 sought 
asylum or other forms of legal stay in neighbouring countries, particularly the 
Russian Federation, but also Belarus, Moldova, Poland, Hungary and Romania, 
since February 2014. https://www.msp.gov.ua/news/16197.html and 
http://www.unhcr.org/54d4a2889.html  
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Pasechnik, a career intelligence officer said to be linked to Russia’s 
Federal Security Service (FSB). In Donetsk, a more violent power 
change occurred in 31 August 2018, when Zakharchenko was killed 
by a bomb and the leadership was subsequently taken over by Denis 
Pushilin, who is widely seen having close ties to Vladislav Surkov, 
the Kremlin’s point man for Ukraine. 
The ‘People’s Republics’ of the Donbas are by far the biggest of 
the separatist territories controlled by Russia in its neighbourhood – 
followed by the Moldovan region of Transdniestria, which has less 
than 500,000 inhabitants (see Chapter 4). They also differ significantly 
from the others in that ethnic or religious allegiances do not play 
identifying roles and that their boundaries have little historic 
relevance. Their strongest identity marker is probably economic – the 
common heritage of coal mines and steel mills. However, their heavy 
industry orientated economy makes the Donbas ‘Republics’ less self-
sufficient, which in turn poses challenges for their survival without 
the Ukrainian economy, from which they remain severed by trade 
blockade since 2017. They present a significant financial burden to 
Russia, which is assumed to spend almost €1 billion per year in non-
military subsidies for them. 
Despite this, there are no signs that Russia will reduce its 
influence anytime soon. While Moscow remains unwilling to annex 
or even recognise them (despite recurring demands from 
nationalists), it took a significant step towards russification when it 
began handing out Russian passports to locals in 2019. And despite 
the political progress that culminated in the ‘Normandy Format’ 
summit of December 2019, the rhetoric inside the ‘People’s Republics’ 
remains centred on their economic integration with Russia, pro-
Russian orientation and the demonisation of Ukraine as a hostile 
aggressor. 
3.2 Politics 
 The People’s Republics’ creation 
The creation of the ‘People’s Republics’ in April 2014 is often claimed 
to have been coordinated in Moscow. Russia denies this, but there are 
numerous and strong indications that the pro-Russian protests in 
Donetsk and Luhansk were not spontaneous and would have never 
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led to the collapse of central government control without targeted 
Russian intervention.  
While the Kyiv Euromaidan was never popular in eastern 
Ukraine, no massive protests broke out immediately after President 
Viktor Yanukovych fled to Russia (via his native Donetsk) on 
February 22, 2014. It took a whole week until Donetsk saw its first 
pro-Russian rally on March 1. Notably, during that week Russian 
forces (the ‘green men’) appeared in Crimea, marking the beginning 
of the operation that led to the Black Sea peninsula’s annexation. The 
March 1 rally in Donetsk was actually organised by officials from 
Yanukovych’s Party of Regions – who opposed the new government 
in Kyiv but were not prepared to resist by unconstitutional means. 
However, it was hijacked by the more radical activist Pavel Gubarev, 
who had himself proclaimed “people’s governor” by a pro-Russian 
flag-waving crowd.5 
In Luhansk, the first such rally was held on March 2. The pro-
Russian protests continued in both cities throughout March, but 
remained relatively small: There were never more than 5,000 
participants in Donetsk, a city of one million inhabitants. The 
protesters repeatedly failed to seize administration buildings in order 
to take political power. In a major setback, Gubarev was detained and 
imprisoned on March 6. 
Ukrainian politicians and media very early on accused Russia 
of fuelling those protests. Serhiy Taruta, the newly-appointed 
governor of the Donetsk Region, demanded on March 3 to close the 
border with Russia in order to prevent “subversive acts” committed 
by Russian citizens.6 Such allegations were backed by Ukrainian 
media reports at the time, who also pointed out that Russian 
                                                        
5 Report on the local ostro.org website 
http://www.ostro.org/general/politics/articles/438957/ Video 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rOTNZyCvOEs  
6 Taruta-interview with Zerkalo Nedely 
https://zn.ua/columnists/podavlyayuschee-bolshinstvo-zhiteley-Donbasa-za-
sohranenie-celostnosti-ukrainy-140268_.html  
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nationalists were actively campaigning on social media for 
volunteers to travel to eastern Ukraine and take part in the protests.7 
 Operation Girkin 
The phase of a largely peaceful standoff ended in early April, when 
the protesters managed to seize some key administration buildings. 
On April 6 and 7, they captured the regional headquarters of the SBU 
State Security Service in Luhansk and Donetsk respectively, which 
both contained sizeable stocks of arms and ammunition. On April 7, 
for the first time, armed men were spotted outside the Donetsk 
regional administration building, which had been captured a day 
earlier.8 
The situation dramatically escalated on the early morning of 
April 12, when a commando of more than 50 armed men suddenly 
appeared in Sloviansk, a city of 111,000 more than 100 kilometres 
north of Donetsk, and seized the headquarters of the police and the 
SBU. The next day, they seized more buildings in the neighbouring 
city of Kramatorsk. They also captured significant amounts of arms 
and ammunition, which proved decisive for turning the protests into 
an armed struggle. 
The operation was led by Igor Girkin, a Russian citizen and 
former member of the Federal Security Service (FSB). Also known by 
his nom de guerre Igor Strelkov, Girkin later admitted that his 
commando contingent was made up of volunteers from Russia and 
Ukraine and had been put together in Crimea, where he had taken 
part in the Russian military intervention that prepared the 
peninsula’s annexation on March 18.9 Ukrainian media have also 
                                                        
7 Reports by Obozrevatel on 3 March 2014 
https://www.obozrevatel.com/politics/45832-v-sotssetyah-verbuyut-
dobrovoltsev-iz-rossii-dlya-poezdok-v-ukrainu.htm and Novosti Donbasa, 21 
March 2014 http://novosti.dn.ua/article/4821-putevodytel-po-russkomu-
buntu-v-donecke 
8 https://www.ostro.org/general/politics/news/441967/  
9 Girkin-interview with Komsomolskaya Pravda, 26 April 2014 
https://www.kp.ru/daily/26225.7/3107725/ and Neuromir TV 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YWw15dIrhHQ 
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pointed out that the attackers’ language contained Russian idioms 
uncommon in Ukraine.10 
It has been argued that by dispatching an armed commando to 
the Donbas, Moscow switched to a ‘Plan B’ scenario after its initial 
tactic to subvert and/or overthrow local Ukrainian authorities 
through unarmed protests failed to work.11 
The operation marked the beginning of the hottest phase so far 
of the war in the Donbas. On April 13, armed men thought to be from 
Girkin’s group opened fire on Ukrainian paratroopers and SBU 
officers just outside Sloviansk. The ensuing gun battle left one 
Ukrainian officer dead and two more injured.12 One day later, 
Ukrainian interim President Oleksandr Turchynov signed a decree 
starting the “Anti-terrorist Operation” in eastern Ukraine.13  
In the following weeks, the conflict steadily escalated, as 
Ukrainian government troops advanced and the separatists 
improved their fighting capabilities – not only by capturing police 
and security services’ stations but increasingly thanks to arms and 
ammunition brought across the border with Russia. The fighters’ use 
of RPG-26 Rocket-Propelled-Grenades in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk 
has been quoted as early evidence of this.14 
                                                        
10 Ukrainskaya Pravda report about the storming of Kramatorsk police 
headquarters, 13 April 2014 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2014/04/13/7022247/ based on 
footage uploaded by YouTube user “Arlo Givens” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmxBjsU2rig 
11 What is the nature of the “Ukraine crisis”? Andreas Umland 15 November 
2016 https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/andreas-umland/glazyevs-
tapes  
12 Interview with SBU-officer Andriy Dubovyk, 13 April 2016 
https://censor.net.ua/resonance/384081/istoriya_pervogo_boya_ato_13_aprel
ya_2014go_pod_slavyanskom_glazami_podpolkovnika_alfy_andreya_dubovik
a  
13 https://www.president.gov.ua/documents/4052014-16886  
14 Remarks by Ukrainian military analyst Dmytro Tymchuk on 10. May 2014 
https://www.ostro.org/general/society/news/444361/  
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 Russification and de-russification 
Soon, more ‘separatists’ of Russian origin appeared. The fighters in 
Kramatorsk were led by a man who went by the call sign of 
“Khmury”. That commander was later identified by the Bellingcat 
investigative group as Sergei Dubinsky, a senior officer of Russia’s 
GRU military intelligence service, who used the alias name Sergei 
Petrovsky.15 
The ‘referendums’ on May 11 in Donetsk and Luhansk, in 
which supposedly large majorities (89% in Donetsk, 96% in Luhansk) 
voted for independence, were another sign of growing Russian 
influence.16 The referendums, which were condemned as illegal by 
Ukraine and the West, were the first in a series of votes that were held 
in parallel in both ‘Republics’ without official coordination, which 
points to a third power (Russia) orchestrating them. 
On May 16, Alexander Borodai, a Moscow-based political 
consultant and Russian nationalist, was declared the ‘Prime Minister’ 
of the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’, while Girkin (Strelkov) was made 
Defence ‘Minister’.17 Another Russian, Vladimir Antyufeyev, who 
had been an Intelligence Chief in Moldova’s unrecognised Moscow-
backed Transdniestria region, became a deputy of Borodai in July.18 
In Luhansk, local separatist strongman Valery Bolotov was joined by 
Marat Bashirov, a Russian political consultant and former spokesman 
of the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, as ‘Prime Minister’ on July 4.19 
However, during August 2014, most Russians and the 
independent-minded Bolotov disappeared – as Moscow seemed 
                                                        
15 Identifying Khmuryi, the Major General Linked to the Downing of MH17 – 
Bellingcat 15 February 2017 
 https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/02/15/identifying-
khmuryi-the-major-general-linked-to-the-downing-of-mh17/  
16 Interfax report, 12 May 2014 https://www.interfax.ru/world/375853  
17 https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/-premer-ministrom-
samoprovozglashennoy-dnr-izbran-grazhdanin-16052014153100  
18 The EU in 2004 listed him as a Russian citizen under his alias name of Vadim 
Shevtsov (“Sevtov”) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:32004E0179&from=EN 
19 https://russian.rt.com/article/39354  
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eager to disassociate itself from the separatists while ensuring that 
local leaders cooperated with the Kremlin. Borodai resigned on 
August 7, claiming that he wanted “to make room” for Alexander 
Zakharchenko, a local businessman turned activist, who would lead 
the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ until his August 2018 assassination.20 
Girkin (Strelkov), who had fled to Donetsk after Sloviansk was 
recaptured by government troops on July 5, followed suit in 
resigning on August 12. He later openly admitted that he was forced 
to leave after the Kremlin cut off all his (military) supplies – thus 
acknowledging that Russia was supporting the separatists with arms 
and ammunition and blamed Kremlin aide Surkov for this.21 
Next in line was Bolotov, who disappeared from Luhansk on 
August 14, officially because of non-specified injuries. He was 
replaced by Igor Plotnitsky, who hitherto had served as ‘Defence 
Minister’.22 Plotnitsky would remain in this post until November 
2017, when he was overthrown in a putsch backed by forces from 
Donetsk. Bolotov suddenly died in January 2017, two months after he 
announced an initiative to unite the Donbas with Russia and 
criticised Plotnitsky for being being too soft on Ukraine – after more 
than two years’ silence.23 
The exodus of the first generation of separatists also meant the 
weakening of their so-called ideological wing – basically hardline 
Russian nationalists. Their goal of joining Russia swiftly was spoilt 
by the Minsk agreements, signed between September 2014 and 
February 2015, which stipulate that the Donbas remains part of 
Ukraine.  
                                                        
20 Borodai said that he had come as a “crisis manager” and that the DNR by now 
had become a real state: https://ria.ru/world/20140807/1019193894.html  
21 Interview with Girkin in Serbian magazine Pecat, 5 December 2014 
http://www.pecat.co.rs/2014/12/igor-strelkov-primirje-u-novorusiji-je-bilo-
svesna-sabotaza-2-deo/  
22 RIA Novosti report, 20 August 2014 
https://ria.ru/world/20140820/1020761533.html  
23 Bolotov-interview with “Sovyetskaya Rossiya” 12 November 2016 
http://sovross.ru/articles/1479/28231  
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 Agents rather than actors 
Russia’s role in the creation of the ‘People’s Republics’ should neither 
be underestimated nor overestimated. On the one hand, without it, 
local opposition to the Euromaidan revolution, despite being 
undeniably strong, would have never led to a separatist uprising of 
the proportions seen in 2014. Surveys conducted in the spring of 2014 
showed that less than 30% of the local population favoured a break 
with Kyiv through “federalisation” or joining Russia.24 
On the other hand, Moscow did not send large numbers of 
troops – like in Crimea – to achieve its goals. Instead, it deployed a 
limited number of agents in order to “incite, support and protect local 
elites and paramilitaries”.25 Larger numbers of regular Russian forces 
were deployed only when Ukrainian government troops had become 
too strong – in Ilovaisk in August 2014 and in Debaltseve in February 
2015. These tactics did not only save resources, they remain vital for 
Moscow’s continued denial of its direct subversive and military 
aggressive role inside a neighbouring sovereign country. On the 
downside, the poorly organised influx of volunteers from Russia 
proved a challenge for political and military control – a problem that 
became especially acute in the Luhansk region. 
Russia has stubbornly stuck to its affirmation that it has no 
military hardware or personnel in Ukraine, despite numerous media 
reports to the contrary.26 Moreover, Dutch-led international 
                                                        
24 Survey by the International Republican Institute, March 2014 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2014%20April%205%20IRI%20Public%
20Opinion%20Survey%20of%20Ukraine%2C%20March%2014-
26%2C%202014.pdf and by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, April 
2014 https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mneniya-i-vzglyady-zhiteley-yugo-vostoka-
ukrainy-aprel-2014-143598_.html 
25 Mark Galeotti: Are Russian troops in eastern Ukraine? 
https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/04/13/are-russian-troops-
in-eastern-ukraine-some-probably-but-i-dont-think-thats-really-the-point/ 
26 In August 2014, journalists from the Daily Telegraph 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/11035401/
Russian-armoured-vehicles-and-military-trucks-cross-border-into-
Ukraine.html, the Guardian 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/14/russian-military-
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investigators have concluded that the BUK missile system that 
downed Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in July 2014, killing all 298 on 
board, had come from Russia, while the Bellingcat group has found 
that the BUK was operated by Russian soldiers.27 And Russian 
journalists uncovered the identities of numerous Russian fighters, 
including a senior military commander who was later killed in 
Syria.28 
Following the signing of the Minsk Protocol and Memorandum 
in September 2014, the ‘People’s Republics’ consolidated somewhat, 
culminating in elections in both Luhansk and Donetsk on November 
2, which were duly won by the Moscow-backed leaders, 
Zakharchenko in Donetsk and Plotnitsky in Luhansk, by 79% and 
63% respectively.29 The elections were hardly democratic as the 
‘competing’ candidates (two in Donetsk and three in Luhansk) were 
staunchly pro-Russian and no pro-Ukrainian parties were allowed to 
take part. Just like the referendums in May, Ukraine and the West 
condemned the vote on Ukraine’s sovereign territory as illegal, while 
Russia said that it “respects the expression of the people’s will”.30 
The West’s unambiguous position on this – no new state can be 
declared on the territory of an existing sovereign country without the 
explicit consent by the latter’s legitimate government – is reflected in 
the Minsk agreements, which do not mention “People’s Republics” 
and speak of “Certain Areas” of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions 
                                                        
vehicles-enter-ukraine-aid-convoy-stops-short-border and the FT witnessed 
regular Russian troops inside Ukraine 
https://www.unian.info/politics/1000366-russian-soldiers-ordered-to-go-to-
luhansk-as-volunteers.html 
27 Joint Investigation Team report of May 2018 
https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/mh17-crash/@103196/update-criminal-0/ 
Bellingcat investigations https://www.bellingcat.com/tag/mh17/  
28 Report about Russian General Valery Asapov 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-syria-insight/fog-of-
ukraines-war-russians-death-in-syria-sheds-light-on-secret-mission-
idUSKBN1FI12I  
29 RIA Novosti report on the results https://ria.ru/20141103/1031547731.html  
30 Statement by EU High Representative Federica Mogherini 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-14-348_en.htm Russian 
Foreign Ministry statement http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-
/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/792207  
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respectively (sometimes referred to by the English acronyms CADR 
and CALR). Zakharchenko and Plotnitsky signed the agreements 
without any mention of their respective functions. 
 Parties and parliaments  
The separatists and their Russian backers continued to build their 
‘People’s Republics’, ignoring calls from Ukraine and the US for their 
dissolution.31 On paper, they set up state-like institutions that 
resemble a Russian federal region with republican status – led by a 
president (called “Leader” – Russian глава) and oversees a 
government with a ‘Prime Minister’ (in Donetsk until 2018 this 
position was called “Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers” and was 
held by Zakharchenko as an additional office). In reality, such 
democratic institutions are mere window-dressing and the ‘People’s 
Republics’ are characterised by the nearly complete absence of 
political pluralism and rule of law. 
Each ‘Republic’ has a unicameral parliament with a tightly 
managed two-party system. The parties are called “movements”, 
apparently to mark a break from the “discredited” Ukrainian party 
system.32 However, those movements differ only in nuances from 
each other and no other political force has been allowed to participate 
in the politics of the ‘People’s Republics’ since November 2014.33 Each 
‘ruling’ movement has a huge (75%) majority in either parliament, 
while the smaller movement acts as a ‘systemic’ opposition, 
occasionally criticising the government. Pavel Gubarev, the founder 
of the Free Donbas party and one-time Donetsk “People’s Governor” 
                                                        
31 The Ukrainian delegation to the Minsk talks demanded this in October 2019 
https://www.facebook.com/darka.olifer/posts/2459621057491315, US Special 
Representative Kurt Volker did so in 2018 
https://twitter.com/SpecRepUkraine/status/1061606971239948289  
32 Oleg Akimov: Political parties completely discredited themselves in Ukraine 
– LIC, 22 September 2016 http://lug-info.com/news/one/lnr-otkazalas-ot-
partii-tak-kak-imenno-oni-razvalili-ukrainu-predsedatel-fp-17435  
33 Local Communist Party leader Boris Litvinov was forced to join Donetsk 
Republic in order to stand in the 2014 election. He was elected, but expelled 
from parliament in 2016 
https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/05/19_a_8254373.shtml  
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said in December 2018 that “there is no opposition in wartime”, only 
alternative views.34 
In the November 2018 elections, the Donetsk Republic party 
won 74 of 100 parliamentary seats, while Free Donbas got the 
remaining 26 seats. In Luhansk, the Peace for Luhansk party took 37 
of 50 seats, while the Luhansk Economic Union got 13. The ruling 
movements are invariably chaired by the leaders of the ‘Republics’ 
(both Pasechnik and Pushilin took the chair from their predecessors), 
while their efforts to recruit new members show similarities to the 
Soviet Communist Party.35 In 2018, Donetsk Republic claimed to have 
more than 200,000 ‘participants’, Peace for Luhansk more than 
100,000.36 
Peace for Luhansk says in its programme that its aim is to 
“peacefully build an independent democratic Luhansk ‘People’s 
Republic’”. Donetsk Republic has not published a programme but 
has the same sentence with Donetsk instead of Luhansk prominently 
on its website. All four movements stress that they want to achieve 
maximum integration with Russia.37 
 Large bureaucracies with little control  
From early on, both ‘People’s Republics’ claimed large government 
bureaucracies. A list of ‘Cabinet’ members circulated in Donetsk in 
May 2014 contained 28 names. The number of ministries in both 
‘Republics’ has not decreased since: As of January 2020, the Donetsk 
‘People’s Republic’ had 20 ministries and 18 agencies, excluding the 
                                                        
34 Interview by the DNR-live portal http://dnr-live.ru/intervyu-gubareva/  
35 November 2018 report about workers of the Komtel state enterprise joining 
“Donetsk Republic” https://dan-news.info/bez-rubriki/desyat-sotrudnikov-
gosudarstvennogo-predpriyatiya-komtel-popolnili-ryady-od-doneckaya-
respublika.html August 2017 report about Krasnodon miners joining “Peace for 
Luhansk”http://lug-info.com/news/one/bolee-200-gornyakov-
krasnodonuglya-za-mesyats-prisoedinilis-k-od-mir-luganschine-27739  
36 Donetsk Republic has a counter on its website http://oddr.info/ Peace for 
Luhansk numbers http://lug-info.com/rubric/32  
37 “Наша главная цель – мирное строительство самостоятельной 
демократической Донецкой/Луганской Народной Республики.” 
http://oddr.info/ and https://mir-lug.info/programma-od-mir-luganshhine/  
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sizeable military. The Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’ had 18 ministries 
and 16 agencies.38 
Unsurprisingly, size does not reflect government efficiency. 
Especially in their early months, both ‘People’s Republics’ had 
considerable trouble to project authority over their whole territory. 
During the spring and summer of 2014, the Donetsk separatists had 
little control outside their ‘capital’. Horlivka, the second-biggest city 
claimed by them, was firmly controlled by local field commander 
Igor Bezler until his sudden departure in October. And Girkin, 
despite calling himself Defence Minister, was really just the field 
commander of Sloviansk, while the neighbouring city of Kramatorsk 
was controlled by GRU operative Dubinsky, aka “Khmury”. 
While Zakharchenko had centralised power in Donetsk by late 
2014, Luhansk separatist leader Plotnitsky faced formidable 
opposition from recalcitrant field commanders. Outside Luhansk, 
much of his ‘People’s Republic’ is believed to have been controlled 
by Russian Cossacks until late 2015. Their senior leader, Nikolai 
Kozitsyn, did leave his stronghold of Antratsyt and returned to his 
base in the neighbouring Russian Rostov region in late 2014.39 Other 
commanders, however, continued to openly criticise Plotnitsky as 
corrupt and too compromising towards Ukraine.  
In consequence, by 2017 at least seven prominent Plotnitsky 
opponents died under suspicious circumstances, four alone during 
2015: field commanders Alexander Bednov, Yevgeni Ishchenko and 
Alexander Mozgovoi were killed in ambush attacks on their cars. On 
12 December, Cossack leader Pavel Dryomov died when a bomb 
exploded in his Range Rover. 
Nikolai Minin, a close associate of Dryomov, was reportedly 
killed in August 2016. And in September of that year, Gennady 
Tsypkalov, a former Prime Minister, died in a prison cell after being 
                                                        
38 DNR list of May 2014 https://photos.app.goo.gl/P1Vb5S1hJJ2Yr9Yc6, 
current DNR list (the Defence Ministry was dissolved in September 2018) 
https://dnronline.su/sovet-ministrov/#1521114467247-717373a7-c568 current 
LNR list https://sovminlnr.ru/ministerstva.html 
39 https://lenta.ru/articles/2014/12/01/cossacks/  
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arrested in connection with an attempted coup against Plotnitsky.40 
The death of Valery Bolotov, Plotnitsky’s predecessor as LNR leader, 
in January 2017 – officially of heart failure – has also raised 
suspicion.41 
The Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ also saw the assassination of 
two prominent field commanders. Arseny Pavlov, nicknamed 
“Motorola”, died when a bomb exploded in the elevator of his house 
in October 2016. And Mikhail Tolstykh, better known as “Givi”, was 
killed in a brazen attack with a rocket propelled grenade fired into 
his office in Makiivka in February 2017. The separatists blamed 
Ukrainian agents for both killings, although neither Pavlov nor 
Tolstykh had significant political or military influence, raising the 
question why Ukraine would risk attacking lesser field commanders. 
And unlike their peers in the Luhansk region, the two had not openly 
criticised the separatist leadership and were duly elevated to ‘cult’ 
status after their deaths, making acts of political revenge unlikely. 
While the series of assassinations in the LNR most probably 
served to stabilise Plotnitsky’s authority (although ultimately 
insufficiently), the killings in Donetsk must have had other motives – 
like conflicts over profits from illicit businesses, e.g. smuggling, or the 
urge to remove hardline commanders accused of war crimes in order 
to reach a possible peace agreement.42 
                                                        
40 Kyiv Post report on the killings https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-
politics/list-separatist-leaders-killed-donbas-motorola.html Report about 
Minin’s death https://www.dialog.ua/news/94304_1471018715 After 
Plotnitsky’s ouster, Tsypkalov’s death was officially explained with torture 
ordered by the former separatist leader 
https://lenta.ru/news/2017/11/22/premier/ 
41Bolotov’s widow expressed suspicion that he drank poisoned coffee 
https://life.ru/t/%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0
%B8/966853/zhiena_piervogho_ghlavy_lnr_bolotova_podozrievaiet_chto_iegh
o_otravili_chashkoi_kofie  
42 Novaya Gazeta, 15 December 2015 
https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2015/12/15/66803-zachistka-voshla-
v-finalnuyu-stadiyu, RBC, 8 February 2017 
https://www.rbc.ru/politics/08/02/2017/589ac2229a7947bada2e35d2  
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 Leadership changes – the Luhansk putsch 
However, these killings fade in comparison with the subsequent 
shakeups in the ‘People’s Republics’ – Plotnitsky’s ousting in 
November 2017 and the assassination of Zakharchenko in August 
2018. Both events proved the presence of serious conflicts among 
separatists and triggered purges among their elites, but they were not 
necessarily inspired by Moscow. While the Luhansk putsch showed 
the Kremlin’s lack of control over its proxies in the Donbas, the 
Donetsk killing was followed by a re-establishment of Kremlin 
dominance. 
On 24 November 2017, Luhansk intelligence chief Leonid 
Pasechnik declared himself the new leader of the ‘People’s Republic’, 
explaining that Igor Plotnitsky had resigned for “health reasons”.43 
Four days earlier Plotnitsky tried to fire ‘Interior Minister’ Igor 
Kornet. But instead of resigning, Kornet declared the next day that 
high-ranking republican officials had been arrested for being part of 
a Ukraine-inspired conspiracy.44 
More importantly, masked soldiers without insignia appeared 
on the streets of Luhansk on 21 November and apparently prevented 
Plotnitsky’s people from taking over Kornet’s ministry. Plonitsky 
made one last public appearance on the next day, in which he accused 
Kornet of an armed overthrow and promised that the minister would 
be prosecuted. However, the unmarked soldiers stormed the 
Prosecutor-General’s office and arrested senior staff loyal to 
Plotnitsky.45 The Luhansk separatist leader has not been seen since 
and is believed to be hiding in Russia.46 
The soldiers who supported the putsch were soon confirmed 
to be from Donetsk, most likely from formations loyal to separatist 
                                                        
43 http://lug-info.com/news/one/zayavlenie-pasechnika-li-30162  
44 Report on ostro.org https://www.ostro.org/general/society/news/536784/  
45 Report by Realnaya Gazeta https://realgazeta.com.ua/prokuratura-
zakhvachena-22-11/  
46 A Russian journalist claimed to have seen him in a Moscow café in late 2018 
https://www.facebook.com/kristina.melnikova.7739/posts/1961325187295303
?__tn__=-R  
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leader Alexander Zakharchenko.47 While it seemed at the time that 
Moscow was using troops from Donetsk to disguise its own role, 
Russian journalist Pavel Kanygin, who has covered the conflict for 
the Novaya Gazeta newspaper, has suggested that both the 
putschists and Zakharchenko acted without Kremlin approval.48 
This supports the theory that the conflict in Luhansk reflected 
another one in Moscow. The “war of the curators” scenario suggests 
that the FSB and the Kremlin – namely Putin’s aide Surkov – were 
backing rival factions in the Donbas. The FSB is believed to control 
the ‘State Security Ministries’ and Interior ‘Ministries’ in both 
Donetsk and Luhansk. Pasechnik, a career intelligence officer who 
served in the Ukrainian SBU before switching sides in 2014, clearly 
fits into this group, while Plotnitsky was believed to be backed by 
Surkov, who at least until January 2020 was in charge of the Kremlin’s 
overall policy vis-à-vis the Donbas. 
To be sure, there was serious infighting in Luhansk. Plotnitsky, 
who regularly humiliated his ‘ministers’ in front of TV cameras, had 
clearly fallen out with many in the separatist leadership.49 His conflict 
with the security services dates back to October 2015, when 
Pasechnik’s State Security ‘Ministry’ (known by its Russian acronym 
MGB) arrested Energy ‘Minister’ Dmitry Lyamin, a Plotnitsky ally 
accused of corruption and of having links to Ukrainian oligarchs. 
Plotnitsky then tried to sack Pasechnik but backed down after 
apparently being summoned to Moscow for talks.50 
Plotnitsky’s swift and non-violent ouster demonstrated that the 
former artillery officer had no support among the Luhansk security 
                                                        
47 Inscriptions on the armoured vehicles point to the “DNR Special Forces 
Brigade” (Polk Spetsialnogo Naznachenia) 
https://twitter.com/666_mancer/status/932994937662078977  
48 Kanygin interview with meduza.io, 4 September 2018 
https://meduza.io/feature/2018/09/04/pochemu-ubili-zaharchenko-konflikt-
dnr-s-Kyivom-snova-obostritsya?  
49 In November 2015 Plotnitsky got into a bitter argument with Health 
‘Minister’ Larisa Airapetyan 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_YHWWShkfF0  
50 Chronology in Realnaya Gazeta https://realgazeta.com.ua/perevorot-lnr/  
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forces, let alone the separatist armed forces, the “People’s Militia”.51 
Thus, it is entirely likely that the Kremlin decided to back the 
putschists when Plotnitsky’s lack of authority became clear. 
 The killing of Alexander Zakharchenko  
While the Luhansk power change resulted in a weak leader being 
replaced with one with more authority, the assassination of Donetsk 
leader Zakharchenko on 31 August 2018 had the opposite result.  
Under Zakharchenko, the Donetsk separatists had retained 
significant military and economic autonomy vis-à-vis Moscow. The 
Donetsk leader, who liked to wear fatigues, had several armed 
formations under his personal command – among them a Special 
Forces Brigade, the “Republican Guard” and a formation of – 
apparently homemade – multiple rocket launchers.52 In addition, 
some ministries had their own armed formations. Notably the 
Revenue Ministry, led by Zakharchenko’s close ally and powerful 
deputy Alexander Timofeyev, was infamous for sending armed 
emissaries to demand taxes and even ownership from companies. 
Zakharchenko’s Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ also controlled 
dozens of industrial enterprises, the bulk of which was seized (put 
under “external administration”) in March 2017, following the 
economic blockade imposed by Ukraine. 
Last but not least, Zakharchenko was politically erratic. Thus, 
in July 2017 he suddenly announced the formation of a new state 
called “Malorossiya” (the name for Ukraine in Tsarist Russia) made 
up of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s Republics’ plus the rest of 
Ukraine. However, it quickly turned out that neither Luhansk nor 
Moscow and not even Pushilin, nominally Zakharchenko’s closest 
                                                        
51 Nikolaus von Twickel: Explaining the coup in Luhansk, OpenDemocracy 
Russia, 24 November 2017 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/nikolaus-von-
twickel/explaining-coup-in-luhansk  
52 KP report about the launch of the MRLS formation, 11 May 2018 
https://www.donetsk.kp.ru/online/news/3111655/  
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ally, were aware of this idea, which was quietly dropped weeks 
later.53 
All this changed after Zakharchenko’s death.  
In a quiet military overhaul, all hitherto independent 
formations were forcibly integrated into the “First Army Corps”, 
thought to be under the command of Russian military officers, or into 
the Interior or State Security Ministries, believed to be controlled by 
the FSB (Chapter 4). Control over the economy was handed to a new 
and powerful ‘Prime Minister’: Alexander Ananchenko, an obscure 
industrialist with apparently close links to Vneshtorgservis, a 
secretive holding company thought to act as a financial and legal 
intermediary between Russia and the ‘People’s Republics’. 
Initial attempts by Zakharchenko’s entourage to install his 
deputy Dmitry Trapeznikov as his successor were thwarted when 
Moscow publicly endorsed Denis Pushilin, the chief Minsk 
negotiator and parliamentary Speaker, who was duly installed 
interim leader by a parliamentary vote on September 7. In a sign that 
the Kremlin was taking back control, all major political decisions 
following Zakharchenko’s death – the choice of Pushilin as interim 
leader and the holding of elections on 11 November – were first 
announced by Alexei Chesnakov, a Moscow-based political scientist 
with close ties to Surkov. 
The decision to hold elections was somewhat surprising, 
because separatist media had in August campaigned for postponing 
the vote, apparently in order not to derail negotiations with the 
West.54 The about-face was likely motivated by the necessity to boost 
Pushilin’s political authority: Unlike Zakharchenko, Pushilin has 
never taken part in fighting, as the long-time chief negotiator he is 
closely associated with the Minsk agreement, which many separatists 
see as unnecessary compromise with Ukraine. He has no experience 
in economic policymaking and his political authority is tarnished by 
the fact that until 2014 he worked as a senior representative for the 
                                                        
53 The “Malorossiya” affair: http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-
in-dnr-and-lnr-24-may-22-august-2017-newsletter-23/  
54 No elections in Donetsk and Luhansk this year? 
http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-04-28-august-
2018-newsletter-40/  
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Ukrainian branch of “MMM”, a Russian Ponzi scheme under which 
millions of people lost their savings.  
Pushilin’s 60.8% ‘win’ in the November 11 election cannot be 
explained by the absence of credible competitors alone (the most 
promising opposition candidates, Pavel Gubarev and Alexander 
Khodakovsky were prevented from participating). An analysis of the 
official turnout revealed that if the 408 polling stations worked at 
normal capacity, they could have serviced no more than 59,000 voters 
– less than 5% of the official figure of 1.3 million.55 
The widespread purges of Zakharchenko loyalists following 
Pushilin’s accession to power are consistent with the suspicion that 
the Kremlin ordered the separatist leader’s assassination because it 
felt that he was overstepping his competences. However, there is no 
immediate evidence to prove this and the motive may well have been 
connected with shady business practices that are said to have 
flourished under Timofeyev, whom Zakharchenko more or less 
entrusted running the economy. Timofeyev was also seriously 
injured in the explosion, which went off when Zakharchenko entered 
the “Café Separ” – a popular place for the separatist elite in central 
Donetsk. 
Moreover, Pushilin’s links to the café’s owner have never been 
subject to public debate. The bomb was hidden in the ceiling above 
the entrance and must have been installed by people with privileged 
access and/or the proprietors’ knowledge. The reported owner, 
senior separatist MP and former Zakharchenko bodyguard 
Alexander Kostenko said afterwards that he was giving evidence to 
investigators. As head of the Donetsk Republic faction in parliament, 
Kostenko worked closely with Pushilin, who was both parliamentary 
Speaker and Donetsk Republic’s executive officer. Kostenko resigned 
from his job as faction head without any explanation and 
disappeared from public view later in September. He was not re-
elected to parliament in November.56 
                                                        
55 http://novosti.dn.ua/article/7183-skolko-chelovek-progolosovalo-na-
vyborakh-dnr-spoyler-menshe-chem-utverzhdaet-dnr  
56 http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-11-20-
september-2018-newsletter-43/ The Donetsk deputies were chosen from party 
lists which were kept secret from voters. 
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 External Relations 
The separatists’ professed goal of achieving international recognition 
has proven elusive. The only country to formally recognise them has 
been South Ossetia – itself a little-recognised separatist region in 
Georgia. Notably, South Ossetia’s June 2014 decision to recognise 
first the Luhansk then the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’, was not even 
matched by Abkhazia and Transdniestria, the other Russia-backed 
separatist entities in Georgia and Moldova.57  
Instead, the separatists celebrated the opening of 
“representative offices” in European countries, typically run by local 
activists from the far right or the far left, as steps toward recognition. 
By early 2020, the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ claimed to have 
representations in seven countries, including Greece, Finland and 
France. However, an office in Olomouc, Czechia, was closed by local 
authorities in April 2018.58 The Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’, which 
only created a ‘Foreign Ministry’ in late 2017, claims an office in the 
Italian city Messina and one in Congo.59 
South Ossetia’s recognition later turned out to be based on 
more than political sympathy. Because Russia recognises South 
Ossetia this opens the road for Moscow to transfer money and do 
business with the ‘People’s Republics’ without violating the letter of 
Russian laws that ban trade with non-recognised countries (see 
section 3.3.7). 
 Relations with Russia  
The separatists’ relations with Russia, on the other hand, are crucial, 
but are distorted by the fact that Moscow, having signed the Minsk 
                                                        
57 Abkhaz MP Batal Tabagua has suggested that Sukhumi won’t recognise 
Donetsk and Luhansk as long Russia has not done so 
https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/29519837.html  
58 https://korrespondent.net/world/3965385-v-chekhyy-lykvydyrovaly-
konsulstvo-dnr  
59 http://lug-info.com/news/one/otkrytie-predstavitelstva-lnr-v-italii-stalo-
shagom-k-priznaniyu-respubliki-deinego-36530 The opening of a centre in 
Kolwezi, southern Congo, announced in February 2019, has not been confirmed 
https://civicmonitoring.org/newsletter52/  
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agreement, refuses to recognise the ‘People’s Republics’ and denies 
having any direct links to them. While some Russian 
parliamentarians are regular visitors, no federal government official 
has openly visited Donetsk or Luhansk since 2014. Separatist leaders 
show up in Moscow, but not officially for high-level talks. This rule 
was broken for the first time in October 2018, when the Tass state 
news agency reported that Surkov promised Pushilin during talks in 
Moscow that wages in Donetsk would rise.60 
Russia’s role is so hegemonic that referring to the ‘People’s 
Republics’ as puppet states is not inappropriate. While the killings 
and power changes in Luhansk and Donetsk strongly suggest that 
relations between the puppets and their masters are far from smooth, 
Moscow will always prevail, not just because of sheer size and power 
but also as it provides the financial and military backing essential for 
the existence of the ‘People’s Republics’. 
Over the years, the Kremlin has either initiated, aided or 
tolerated the ruthless suppression of separatist dissenters, many of 
whom were either killed or forced into exile in Russia. The victims 
were mostly members of the separatist ‘ideological wing’ like Igor 
Girkin and former Donetsk parliamentary Speaker Andrei Purgin, 
who champion immediate unification with Russia and condemn the 
Minsk agreement. The ouster of Luhansk leader Plotnitsky looks 
more like an aberration or accident, because it brought to power a 
group of separatists with strong links to the ‘ideologues’.61 
This does not, however, mean a softening of the dominant 
narratives inside the ‘People’s Republics’. Both separatist leaders and 
their official media tirelessly promote the idea that integration and 
eventual union with Russia is the only way forward. The Minsk 
agreement is honoured only in passing, usually with the caveat that 
a return to Ukraine only makes sense after a pro-Russian government 
comes to power in Kyiv. 
                                                        
60 “Wages in Donetsk being raised in Moscow” 
http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-3-16-october-
2018-newsletter-46/  
61 “Pasechnik wins the war of the Igors” http://www.civicmonitoring.org/ 
developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-21-october-28-november-2017-newsletter-25/  
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 Relations with the rest of Ukraine 
Under these circumstances, Ukraine’s policy options are limited. 
Direct contacts with separatist leaders are widely seen as 
inacceptable. When Nadya Savchenko, a former member of Ukraine’s 
Aidar volunteer battalion who was elected to the Ukrainian 
parliament while being imprisoned in Russia, met Zakharchenko and 
Plotnitsky in December 2016 for talks over releasing more prisoners, 
she was widely ostracised by the political establishment in Kyiv.62 
The only accepted platform for such contacts remains the Minsk 
Trilateral Contact Group, which meets under OSCE mediation once 
every two weeks in the Belarusian capital. However, Ukraine does 
not send government members to these talks, but emissaries 
appointed by the President.  
The administration of President Volodymyr Zelenskiy, which 
took office in 2019, has signalled that it is ready to engage with the 
civilian population more directly. However, the projects announced, 
such as a new Russian-language TV channel, had not been 
implemented by publication. Previous initiatives, like long-distance 
tuition and examination of pupils in separatist-held areas have had 
little impact.63 
A special aspect of the conflict in the Donbas that might present 
positive potential in this respect is the very high number of civilian 
crossings of the Line of Contact. According to the United Nations, one 
million people on average crossed every month between January and 
May 2018 – a 31% increase over the same period of 2017.64 
While these figures are high, they do not genuinely represent 
the level of civil interaction and people-to-people contacts. Rather, 
they are to a large extent the product of Ukraine’s social policies, 
especially regarding pensions: residents of the separatist-controlled 
                                                        
62 Savchenko was arrested in March 2018 and accused of plotting to overthrow 
the government https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43504396  
63 The rules for sitting exams distantly (“eksternat”) were eased in April 2017 
https://censor.net.ua/news/435888/minobrazovaniya_uprostilo_pravila_zach
isleniya_na_eksternat_dlya_jiteleyi_okkupirovannogo_kryma_i_zony  
64 UN Briefing Note, July 2018 https://www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-
content/uploads/sites/38/2018/09/Freedom-of-movement-across-the-line-of-
contact-in-eastern-Ukraine-2.pdf  
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areas risk the suspension of payments when they do not register on 
government-controlled territory at least every 60 days. 
Thus, most people crossing the Line are elderly residents of the 
separatist-controlled areas. A UNHCR survey in November 2018 
found that 90% of the people crossing permanently reside in the 
‘People’s Republics’ and that 63% of them were over 60 years old.65 
Crossing the Line of Contact is dangerous and time-consuming, 
involving waiting for many hours and sometimes days on roads that 
lead through heavily mined areas and are frequently subject to 
shelling. It is safe to say that without the current rules for collecting 
pensions many fewer people would make the tedious journey. 
Other ways in which Ukraine could project cultural, political 
and economic soft power into the areas outside its control will be 
discussed in the conclusions of this report.  
3.3 Economy 
 Decline set in long before 2014 
The importance of the economy for the Donbas is hard to 
underestimate, because it is essential for regional identity. The 
discovery of coal resources, the subsequent development of industry 
and the settlement of workers transformed the little populated “wild 
lands” in the 19th century into one of the world’s largest coal 
producing regions and became one the Soviet Union’s major 
industrial centres. 
However, after 1991 the Donbas suffered heavily from the 
collapse of state support for the coal industry following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Ukraine was among the hardest-hit 
former Soviet economies transiting to a free-market system in the 
1990s, when falling prices and falling demand for coal put thousands 
out of work. In 1995, the Donbas produced 83 million tonnes of coal, 
less than half of the 200 million tonnes produced annually in the 
                                                        
65 https://www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-
content/uploads/sites/38/2018/12/Report_EECP_November-2018_ENG.pdf  
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1970s. In 1996, deep economic crisis provoked a massive strike in 
which some 800,000 miners protested unpaid wages and benefits.66 
Almost 20 years later, in 2013, the Donbas was still home to 15% 
of Ukraine’s industry and accounted for 8.4% of the country’s GDP, 
according to the German Advisory Group to Ukraine.67 Coal 
production stood at 83.7 million tonnes, making Ukraine Europe’s 
third biggest coal producer after Poland and Russia. But the number 
of coalmines eroded further from approximately 250 in the mid-1990s 
to between 150 and 100 in 2013.  
The reason for the industrial decline was lack of 
competitiveness. Coal production in the Donbas, where 90% of 
Ukraine’s reserves lie, has been largely loss-making and dependent 
on state subsidies. Between 2013 and 2016, those subsidies amounted 
to 11 billion hryvnia, while the recipient mines accumulated losses of 
17.6 billion hryvnia (€630 million).68 The subsidies, in turn, were often 
pilfered by corrupt mine executives. Relatives and associates of then-
President Viktor Yanukovych have been accused of transferring 
hundreds of millions of dollars supposed to be spent on mining 
equipment and refining services to offshore companies between 2010 
and 2013.69 
Coal and coke were used to keep the steel and metal industry 
running, which became a major source of the region’s wealth between 
the recession of the 1990s and the financial crisis of 2008/2009. 
However, the industry suffered massive layoffs from its huge Soviet-
era plants. Thus, Mariupol’s gigantic Ilyich steel mill reduced staff 
from 57,240 in 2007 to 16,285 in 2017. The Yenakiieve Iron and Steel 
Works shrunk from 7,872 to 6,699 workers in the same period. 70 
Ownership in the local industry was concentrated in the hands 
of a few businessmen with vested political interests and typically a 
                                                        
66 http://old.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/coal-miners-stage-
nationwide-strike/329029.html 
67 https://www.beratergruppe-ukraine.de/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/PB_06_2017_en.pdf  
68 https://www.epravda.com.ua/rus/publications/2018/01/10/632715/  
69https://biz.censor.net.ua/resonance/3007858/direktor_gosoperatora_rynka_
uglya_34ne_operatory_doljny_shahtam_a_shahty_operatoram34  
70 Figures from the government SMIDA database https://smida.gov.ua/  
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criminal past. By far the most powerful of them, Rinat Akhmetov, 
controlled much of the coal and metals industry in 2013 and was 
accused of supporting the separatists in 2014 before siding with the 
government in Kyiv. Akhmetov’s role in the conflict has not been 
investigated in full, but he is believed to have lost whatever influence 
he retained after the seizure of his assets by the separatists in 2017. 
The war in the Donbas dealt a serious blow to the region’s huge 
but crumbling economy. Not only did infrastructure like roads and 
bridges suffer destruction and damages during the conflict’s initial 
phase, when the frontline was moving back and forth. Following the 
Minsk agreement and the settling of the Line of Contact, the Luhansk 
and Donetsk regions were artificially divided into two halves, 
severing long-established supply chains.  
While the first blows resulted from the breakout of armed 
conflict and the subsequent severance of banking links in 2014, the 
worst-case scenario unfolded in early 2017, when a road and rail 
blockade initiated by Ukrainian activists stopped all trade between 
the government-controlled and non-government-controlled areas 
(GCA and NGCA respectively) and prompted the seizure of 
Ukrainian-run plants by the separatists. 
The demarcation line of February 2015, which remains in place 
today, leaves the bulk of Donbas coalmines and a large share of heavy 
industry plants located in the NGCA. According to the Ukrainian 
Energy Ministry, 60 of the region’s 95 mines are outside the GCA. 
Moreover, not one of the 35 mines that remain in government-
controlled areas produces anthracite coal – the type that is needed to 
fuel many of the country’s power stations.71 
However, most of the industrial plants located in the NGCA 
were owned by Ukrainian conglomerates (the biggest being 
Metinvest and DTEK, which both belong to Akhmetov’s System 
Capital Management Group). These were re-registered in 
government-controlled areas where they also paid taxes. In 2016, the 
Ukrainian treasury received 6.27 billion hryvnia in taxes and other 
payments – more than 2 billion alone from DTEK’s eleven 
                                                        
71 https://korrespondent.net/business/economics/3505737-nazvano-chyslo-
shakht-na-Donbase-kontrolyruemykh-ukraynoi  
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companies.72 This enabled the firms to receive Ukrainian certificates 
in order to export goods produced in the NGCA. Thus, 2015 and 2016 
saw the return of industrial production in the People’s Republics, 
albeit at levels far lower than before the war. 
The economic dependency of the ‘People’s Republics’ on 
Ukraine reflects the fact that the Donbas had become even more 
integrated with the rest of the Ukrainian economy since 
independence in 1991. However, both the separatists and the 
government in Kyiv have since taken decisive steps to change that.  
Notably, in November 2014, the National Bank of Ukraine 
ordered the severance of all banking links with the NGCA.73 As a 
consequence, the separatists gradually switched from the Ukrainian 
hryvnia to the Russian rouble – which was first introduced in 
Donetsk on 1 April 2015, and in Luhansk in September of that year.74 
Trade, however, continued. In 2016, sales of coal, coke, iron and 
metals from non-government-controlled areas to government-
controlled areas amounted to $1.6 billion, according to the German 
Advisory Group. Ukraine, which needs anthracite coal to fuel some 
of its biggest power plants, bought about 8 million tonnes, or 79% of 
its annual anthracite consumption, from the NGCA in 2016.75 Sales 
from GCA to NGCA, mostly also coal, coke and metals, were much 
                                                        
72 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/270441-predpryyatyya-rabotayushhye-na-
terrytoryy-ordlo-zaplatyly-bolee-6-mlrd-gryven-nalogov and 
https://dtek.com/en/media-center/press/dtek-zayavlyaet-o-potere-
upravleniya-predpriyatiyami-raspolozhennymi-na-vremenno-
nekontroliruemoy-territorii-donetskoy-i-luganskoy-oblasti/  
73 Interfax Ukraine report, 26 November 2014 
https://interfax.com.ua/news/economic/236330.html  
74 DAN report on the rouble’s introduction, 26 March 2015 https://dan-
news.info/ekonomika/perexodnyj-period-vvedeniya-rublya-v-dnr-prodlitsya-
do-1-maya-mer.html LIC report about the rouble’s introduction, 31 August 
2015 http://lug-info.com/news/one/plavayuschii-kurs-grivny-k-rublyu-s-1-
sentyabrya-budet-vveden-tolko-v-obmennykh-punktakh-minfin-lnr-6241  
75 Slide 10 http://www.beratergruppe-ukraine.de/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2017/06/PB_06_2017_en.pdf  
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lower at $584 million, resulting in a significant trade surplus for the 
NGCA.76 
 The trade blockade of 2017 
As the figures suggest, the separatists depended disproportionately 
on trade with Ukraine. Consequently, they suffered more from the 
blockade that was imposed in 2017. However, the Ukrainian 
government certainly did not welcome the blockade, while the 
separatists eagerly used it as a pretext to seize much of the industry 
in the NGCA. 
Leading separatists had expressed dislike at the fact that goods 
produced inside their ‘Republics’ were shipped to and taxed by 
Ukraine, whom they saw as a military aggressor and not as a business 
partner. Donetsk leader Zakharchenko repeatedly threatened to 
nationalise Ukrainian-owned enterprises if they did not pay taxes.77 
There are, however, indications that these companies, in addition to 
paying Ukrainian taxes, actually did pay the separatists, if only in 
order to be allowed to carry on their operations.78 
Similarly, Ukrainian activists and nationalist politicians 
criticised the fact that their country was trading with the separatists. 
The first suggestion to impose a blockade against this trade was made 
by National Security and Defence Council Secretary Oleksandr 
Turchynov, who argued in December 2016 that Ukraine should 
follow Croatia’s experience of defeating separatists by cutting their 
trade links.79 Turchynov later backpedalled by saying that no 
blockade should be imposed without the president’s approval, but 
                                                        
76 Slide 11 https://berlin-economics.com/wp-content/uploads/Connectivity-
and-Co-operation.pdf  
77 In a June 2016 call-in-show he claimed that nationalisation was happening 
“step by step” https://dan-news.info/politics/onlajn-konferenciya-aleksandra-
zaxarchenko-s-zhitelyami-zaporozhya-obnovlyaetsya.html  
78 Comments from revenue ‘Minister’ Alexander Timofeyev rendered by 
Ukrainian journalist Serhiy Garmash in November 2016 
https://www.ostro.org/general/politics/articles/512859/  
79 Turchynov was referring to the conflict with the Serb-populated Krajina 
region of Croatia, which ended by military defeat in 1995 
http://project.liga.net/projects/pastor/  
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his idea was eagerly picked up by groups of war veterans and 
nationalists, who began blocking rail and road links in January and 
February 2017.80 
This prompted the separatists to announce that all Ukrainian-
registered enterprises in the ‘Republics’ would be put under 
“external control” i.e. seized. In a typical sign of Moscow-based 
decision-making, the move was carefully orchestrated and 
‘parliaments’ in Donetsk and Luhansk passed similar laws on the 
same day, February 10. On February 27, Zakharchenko and 
Plotnitsky issued a rare joint statement, in which they suddenly 
pulled forward the deadline to comply from March 31 to March 1, 
leaving next to no time for the companies affected.81 Ukraine’s SBU 
intelligence service released one day later a wiretapped phone 
conversation between Zakharchenko and his aide Dmitry 
Trapeznikov, which strongly suggests that the Kremlin was eager to 
use the blockade as a pretext for company seizures.82 
The Ukrainian government condemned the blockade, arguing 
that it damages the economy and divides society.83 However, after 
the separatists carried out their seizures and after increasingly violent 
clashes between police and the blockade organisers, President Petro 
Poroshenko made a U-turn on March 16, converting the trade ban 
into government policy.84 
While the consequences were serious, it soon became clear that 
the blockade hurt the ‘People’s Republics’ more than the rest of 
Ukraine. The damage to the country as a whole turned out less than 
expected. While economists initially predicted a 1.3% reduction for 
GDP growth in 2017 from the combined effects of plant seizures and 
                                                        
80 The railway blockade began on January 25 
https://www.ostro.org/general/politics/news/517751/ the first roadblocks in 
February https://www.ostro.org/general/society/news/519421/  
81 http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-7-february-
14-march-2017-newsletter-nr-19/  
82 https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/21/view/2839#.uhqjQfWw.dpbs  
83 Cabinet declaration of 15 March 2015 
https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2017/03/15/7138223/  
84 https://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/prezident-uviv-u-diyu-rishennya-
rnbo-shodo-nevidkladnih-zaho-40422  
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trade ban, the real figure turned out to be 0.9%.85 According to the 
World Bank, Ukraine’s GDP grew by 2.5% in 2017, 3.3% in 2018 and 
2.7% in 2019.86 While these figures are below potential and do not 
compensate for the massive GDP contractions of 2014 and 2015 (by 
6.5% and 9.7%), they do signal that economic recovery is possible 
without the Donbas. The Zelenskiy administration attempted to lift 
the blockade in June 2019, but the topic was shelved when it became 
clear that the separatists were not ready to meet Kyiv’s conditions by 
handing back seized plants and replacing the rouble with the 
hryvnia. 
The blockade’s effects on the NGCA were much harsher. 
Russian media reports said in early March that factories were forced 
to halt production because no raw materials reached them and/or 
production could not be delivered to buyers.87 Not only was industry 
cut off from long-established supply chains, it also lost its key staff 
after the Ukrainian mother companies stopped wage payments and 
withdrew the middle management teams, which had been running 
the businesses after senior managers had left in 2014.  
At DTEK alone, this affected some 36,000 employees. The 
group’s CEO Maxim Timchenko said that the companies’ further 
operations in the NGCA was impossible and warned that income 
levels would dramatically fall while unemployment would rise.88 
Yuriy Hrymchak, a deputy minister in the Ukrainian Ministry for the 
Temporarily Occupied Territories, said in April 2017 that as many as 
140,000 people had lost their jobs and their former links with 
Ukraine.89 
                                                        
85 NBU figures from early 2018 https://www.beratergruppe-ukraine.de/ 
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Newsletter_112_2018_Deutsche-
Beratergruppe.pdf  
86 https://data.worldbank.org/country/ukraine  
87 Kommersant newspaper, 9 March 2017 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3236732  
88 https://dtek.com/en/media-center/press/dtek-zayavlyaet-o-potere-
upravleniya-predpriyatiyami-raspolozhennymi-na-vremenno-
nekontroliruemoy-territorii-donetskoy-i-luganskoy-oblasti/  
89 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/280564-v-kabmyne-uvydely-otryv-naselenyya-
donecka-ot-ostalnoy-ukrayny  
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Meanwhile, separatist leaders were adamant that the problems 
were temporary and would be solved soon. Zakharchenko claimed – 
contrary to the facts – that the effects would be catastrophic for 
Ukraine. “Let (Ukraine) learn to live without electricity, heat and 
soon without food, wages and pensions,” he said on 3 March 2017 in 
Donetsk.90 Two months later he predicted that the Ukrainian 
economy would soon fall apart.91 
But all available figures show that the economy on the NGCA 
side suffered massively. The Donetsk Industry and Trade ‘Minister’ 
Alexei Granovsky claimed in February 2018 that production in the 
metallurgy sector was “building up”. As proof, he said that 1.53 
million tonnes of iron, 1.2 million tonnes of coke and 1.1 million 
tonnes of steel were produced in the ‘People’s Republic’ in 2017.92 
However, according to the numbers for 2016, published on the 
website of Granovsky’s ‘Ministry’, there really was a sharp drop – 
from 2.7 million tonnes of iron, 2.4 million tonnes coke and 2.1 million 
tonnes of steel.93 Thus, the blockade almost halved metals 
production, a sector which according to Granovsky employed more 
than 24,000 people in 2017. 
The fact that the local metals industry has traditionally been 
export-orientated makes matters worse. The only recipient countries 
mentioned by the Industry ‘Ministry’ are the Luhansk ‘People’s 
Republic’ and Russia. While the former does not possess much 
purchasing power, sales to Russia face legal, political and economic 
hurdles. Russian companies, who trade with the unrecognised 
Donbas ‘Republics’ risk falling under sanctions from the European 
Union and the United States. And the ‘Republics’ cannot legally 
export production to Russia, because as long as Moscow does not 
recognise them, they cannot get the necessary certificates. Thirdly, 
                                                        
90 https://dan-news.info/politics/zaxarchenko-rekomendoval-ukraine-
nauchitsya-zhit-bez-sveta-i-nalogovyx-postuplenij-iz-dnr.html  
91 http://av-zakharchenko.su/inner-article/Zayavleniya/Aleksandr-
Zaharchenko-Skoro-my-budem-svidetelyami-ekonomicheskogo/  
92 http://mptdnr.ru/news/775-aleksei-granovskii-promyshlennyi-kompleks-
respubliki-naraschivaet-obemy-proizvodstva.html  
93 http://mptdnr.ru/news/251-i-o-ministra-promyshlennosti-i-torgovli-
podvel-itogi-raboty-za-2016-god.html 
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Russia itself is a large producer of coal and steel and has little interest 
in importing these products from the Donbas, with which there is a 
low degree of complementarity.  
It is of little surprise then that major NCGA enterprises quickly 
found themselves struggling. The huge Yenakiieve Metallurgy Plant 
near Donetsk first halted production in February 2017.94 After being 
put under “external management”, workers were told that 
production could not be resumed before August. The Donetsk 
Industry ‘Ministry’ said at the time that restarting the plant with 
more than 5,300 workers would cost 584 million Russian roubles 
(then about $10 million) per day, according to a report that was 
apparently published accidentally.95 Similarly, the Donetsk 
Metallurgy Plant (known by its Russian acronym DMZ) reportedly 
halted production in October 2018.96 
In Luhansk, the huge Alchevsk Metallurgy Plant (known by its 
Russian acronym AMK) reported a workforce of more than 13,000 
and an output of 1.5 million tonnes between December 2017 and 
December 2018.97 This is almost half of the 2.8 million tonnes annual 
production before the blockade.98 In November 2018, Ukrainian 
authorities said that they detained a ship with 3,000 tonnes of steel 
from the AMK in Mariupol. The Liberian-registered freighter had 
apparently been sailing from Russia to Belgium.99 
 The coal industry 
Figures for the NGCA coal industry show stagnating production 
numbers at only a fraction of pre-war production. The Donetsk 
‘People’s Republic’ said that it produced 8 million tonnes of coal in 
                                                        
94 https://www.minprom.ua/news/225770.html  
95 http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-15-march-4-
april-2017-newsletter-nr-20/  
96 http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/Kyiv/v-ordo-ostanovilsya-ocherednoy-
metallurgicheskiy-zavod-sokratyat-600-chelovek  
97 http://lug-info.com/news/one/alchevskii-metallurgicheskii-kombinat-za-
god-vypustil-okolo-15-mln-tonn-produktsii-41327  
98 https://www.rbc.ru/business/29/11/2017/5a1eec849a79471427956b44  
99 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/286180-lucenko-v-maryupole-arestovany-tonny-
produkcyy-alchevskogo-metkombynata-kotorye-perepravlyaly-yz-rossyy  
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2019, probably similar to the figure for 2018, when no full production 
numbers were published. The DNR had said in February 2018 that it 
wanted to produce 8.2 million tonnes in that year and that it 
produced slightly more than 6 million tonnes of coal in 2017, the year 
the blockade began.100 The Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’ said in 
August 2018 that the 22 mines on its territory had produced more 
than 5 million tonnes of coal between January and July 2018 – almost 
one million more than in the same period of 2017.101 
These numbers cannot hide that the coal mining industry is in 
decline overall. Added together, NGCA coal extraction in 2018 
amounts to less than 20 million tonnes per annum. The GCA 
produced some 11.5 million tonnes.102 For comparison, in 2013, the 
whole Donbas produced 55 million tonnes of coal. Less than 30 of 
originally more than 90 mines in the NCGA are still working. The 
Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ alone had earmarked 63 mines for 
closure in 2017 and placed them in a special restructuring 
company.103 In addition, a number of illegal mines, so-called 
Kopanki, continue to work, despite attempts by the separatists to 
close them down.104 
Another serious problem for the NGCA coal industry is posed 
by ecological hazards. Many of the mines have been kept dry by 
elaborate pumping schemes that keep underground water away. 
Since the beginning of the war in 2014, the separatists have ended 
pumping at some mines, which promptly flooded. A survey released 
                                                        
100 http://mintek-dnr.ru/news/v_proshlom_godu_shakhtery_doneckoj_ 
respubliki_dobyli_svyshe_8_mln_tonn_uglja/2020-01-13-2243 and https://dan-
news.info/ekonomika/ugledobyvayushhie-predpriyatiya-dnr-s-nachala-goda-
dobyli-svyshe-73-mln-tonn-uglya-minugleenergo.html and http://smdnr.ru/s-
nachala-goda-gospredpriyatiya-respubliki-dobyli-odin-million-tonn-uglya/  
101 http://lug-info.com/news/one/predstaviteli-vlastei-lnr-pozdravili-
shakhterov-respubliki-s-professionalnym-prazdnikom-foto-37828  
102 https://uaenergy.com.ua/post/31942/dobycha-uglya-v-ukraine-v-2018-g-snizilas 
103 http://smdnr.ru/v-respublike-otkryto-okolo-tysyachi-vakansij-dlya-
trudoustrojstva-rabotnikov-zakryvayushhixsya-shaxt/  
104 Luhansk Prosecutor-General Sergei Gorenko said in December 2018, that 187 
tons coal were confiscated from an illegal mine in the Slavyanoserbsk district 
http://lug-info.com/comments/one/io-generalnogo-prokurora-lnr-sergei-
gorenko-my-staraemsya-maksimalno-opravdat-doverie-zhitelei-respubliki-685  
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by the OSCE in late 2017 said that 36 mines cannot be used because 
of flooding.105 This in turn creates serious environmental and health 
risks, because flooded mines can contaminate drinking water. One of 
the mines, Yunkom, even poses the risk of nuclear contamination 
because it was the scene of a Soviet atomic test in 1979.106  
The main problem for the coal industry in the NGCA is to sell 
its production outside the ‘People’s Republics’, where demand is 
insufficient. The largest coal consumers, the Starobeshivska and 
Zuivska power plants, together burned 4.8 million tonnes of coal in 
2014, and current figures are thought to be much lower, because both 
plants operate at half capacity or less.107 Thus, the bulk of the coal 
needs to be exported. Since 2017, this is only possible via Russia, with 
the caveat that companies risk being hit by western sanctions. 
Russia should also be reluctant to import Ukrainian coal, 
because it is itself a net exporter of coal. In August 2018, it exported 
17.2 million tonnes of its domestic coal production of 36.3 million 
tonnes per month.108 Furthermore, the Russian ports of Taganrog and 
Azov, which lie closest to the Donbas, have only limited capacity and 
cannot quickly begin exporting extra coal from neighbouring 
Ukraine. 
However, significant amounts of coal from the NGCA is 
thought to be shipped to Russia. Denis Didenko of Ukraine’s DTEK 
Energo said in November 2018 that the current amount was between 
400,000 and 500,000 tonnes per month, which means as much as 6 
million tonnes per year.109 Official Ukrainian statistics suggest that 
coal imports from Russia are even bigger, implying that not all coal 
shipped from Russia to Ukraine is originally from the NGCA. 
                                                        
105 https://www.osce.org/project-coordinator-in-ukraine/362566  
106 https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/377719 
107 Analysis of the Donetsk Institute of Information, August 2017 
http://dii.dn.ua/analytics/127-pivroku-pislya-zakhoplennya-yak-pracyuye-
promyslovist-v-dnr-analitychnyy-zvit  
108 https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-
news/coal/090418-russian-coal-exports-rise-to-172-mil-mt-in-aug-production-
also-stronger-ministry  
109 These figures are based on Russian rail and customs statistics 
https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/video-Donbasrealiyi/29607262.html  
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According to Energy Ministry figures, the country imported some 19 
million tonnes of coal between January and November 2018, almost 
10% more than in the same period of 2017. The imports were worth 
$2.7 billion and 62% of this ($1.66 billion) was made up by coal 
imported from Russia.110 
While importing coal from Russia and/or from the NGCA is 
politically sensitive in Ukraine, the coal is needed, because there are 
no anthracite reserves in the GCA. According to the Energy Ministry, 
in 2017 Ukraine was projected to consume 9.5 million tonnes of 
anthracite, of which 4.2 million tonnes had to be imported.111 
Anthracite can be imported from other countries, including the 
United States and South Africa, albeit at a higher price. In the long 
run, Ukraine could convert its anthracite-fuelled thermal power 
stations so that they can operate with lower-quality bituminous coal, 
or better still phase out coal-burning power stations entirely. Plans to 
phase out the use of anthracite were announced by the Cabinet of 
Ministers in Kyiv as early as November 2017.112 
 Brain drain – demographic catastrophe? 
The outlook for the traditional industries in the NGCA is bleak. Trade 
with the GCA is officially suspended, supply chains remain severed, 
while trade with Russia and other countries faces structural and legal 
hurdles. And factories are struggling with a severe deficit in capable 
staff, both when replacing middle management positions and when 
hiring graduates. The problem was highlighted in the summer of 
2018, when Donetsk Industry and Trade ‘Minister’ Granovsky 
publicly admitted that the restart of industrial production was 
hampered by the fact that most able and talented staff had left.113 
In 2014, the Donetsk and Luhansk regions had a combined 
population of 6.6 million people, 2.24 million in the Luhansk region 
                                                        
110 https://interfax.com.ua/news/economic/551609.html  
111 https://economics.unian.net/energetics/1931006-minenergouglya-
prizyivaet-konfiskovyivat-ugol-s-okkupirovannogo-Donbasa.html  
112 http://old.kmu.gov.ua/kmu/control/en/publish/article?art_id=250432256& 
cat_id=244314975 
113 http://mptdnr.ru/news/927-v-minpromtorge-sostojalsja-kruglyi-stol-po-
voprosam-podgotovki-kadrov-dlja-gp-stirol.html  
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and 4.34 million in the Donetsk region, making the latter Ukraine’s 
most populated region. However, the number of inhabitants had 
been falling well before the present conflict. Official statistical data 
show that both regions lost inhabitants every single year since 2002. 
In Donetsk, the losses ranged on a scale between 67,000 in 2002-03 
and 28,000 between 2012 and 2013.114 
The exact number of inhabitants of the NGCA is not clear 
because no censuses or proper surveys have been carried out there 
since 2014. The DNR is thought to contain a third of the territory and 
half of the pre-war population of the Donetsk Oblast, while the LNR, 
which controls just one third of the Oblast’s territory, is believed to 
comprise more than two thirds of the region’s pre-war population – 
because it includes the more densely populated southern areas.115 
The only officially available figures are those of the separatist-
controlled statistics offices. As of December 2019, the DNR claimed 
2.26 million inhabitants, while the LNR claimed 1.44 million – 
together 3.7 million.116 These figures, however, omit the large number 
of people who have fled their homes since 2014. Their number is 
thought to be at least 1.5 million, combining Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) and refugees outside Ukraine, first and foremost in 
Russia.117  
While early estimates put the population remaining in the 
NGCA at between 2 and 2.5 million, present numbers may well be 
below 2 million.118 Thus, the DNR officially recorded 9,577 births in 
2019. If the ‘republican’ annual birth rate is 10 babies born per 1,000 
                                                        
114 http://donetskstat.gov.ua/statinform1/dem_migrac4.php and 
http://www.lg.ukrstat.gov.ua/sinf/demograf/demogr0712_04.php.htm  
115 According to the Luhansk Region Administration, 692,400 people lived in 
the government-controlled parts as of January 2018, 32% of a total population 
of 2.17 million http://loga.gov.ua/sites/default/files/pasport_ 
luganskoyi_oblasti.pdf  
116 http://glavstat.govdnr.ru/pdf/naselenie/chisl_naselenie_1219.pdf 
and glavstat.govdnr.ru/pdf/naselenie/chisl_naselenie_1218.pdf; “LNR”: 
https://gkslnr.su/stat_info/kratkie-itogi/paschetnay-chislenost-naseleniya/  
117 https://www.unhcr.org/54d4a2889.html  
118 This figure was quoted by the RBC.ru outlet in 2015, quoting an unnamed 
separatist official https://www.rbc.ru/investigation/politics/15/06/2015/ 
5579b4b99a7947b063440210  
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inhabitants as in Ukraine, the overall population would be just under 
1 million.119 No birth figures were available for the LNR, but given 
that the socio-economic situation there tends to be worse than in 
Donetsk, it is likely that the population there is also well below half 
the official 1.44 million. 
Despite the lack of objective data, the official numbers over 
time clearly show a shrinking population. Thus, the DNR lost 19,460 
inhabitants throughout 2019, 21,836 in 2017 and 23,062 in 2016 – in 
both years not a single district recorded population growth.120 
Figures from Luhansk show that the ‘People’s Republic’ there is 
losing officially some 15,000 inhabitants per year and that the 
population shrank from 1.474 million in December 2017 to 1.444 
million in January 2020.121 
The separatists seemingly reacted to this demographic decline 
by preventing key people from leaving the ‘People’s Republics’. In a 
decree published in January 2018, Donetsk leader Alexander 
Zakharchenko banned a list of professions from entering Ukraine.122 
Apart from senior government figures and persons with access to 
state secrets, the ban also affects leaders of enterprises, state and 
municipal companies, as well as senior staff in hospitals, universities, 
schools and even kindergartens, according to a clarification issued by 
the State Security ‘Ministry’ (MGB).123 The separatists justified this by 
claiming that Ukrainian intelligence agencies were massively hiring 
agents among visiting people from the ‘Republics’. 
A similar ban is in force in the Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’, 
where state employees even need written permission when travelling 
                                                        
119 https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/svyshe-9500-svidetelstv-o-rozhdenii-
sostavleno-v-dnr-v-2019-m-bolshaya-chast-o-rozhdenii-malchikov.html  
120 http://glavstat.govdnr.ru/pdf/naselenie/e_dvij_naselenie_1217.pdf  
121 https://gkslnr.su/chislennost-postoyannogo-naseleniya-respubliki/546-
raschetnaya-chislennost-naseleniya-respubliki-na-1-dekabrya-2017g.html and 
https://gkslnr.su/chislennost-postoyannogo-naseleniya-respubliki/1168-
raschetnaya-chislennost-naseleniya-respubliki-na-1-yanvarya-2020g.html  
122 http://doc.dnr-online.ru/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Ukaz_N363_15122017.pdf  
123 http://mgb-dnr.ru/news.php?id=20180120_00&img_num=0  
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to Russia, according to a Russian media report from March 2018.124 A 
Radio Liberty report in May 2018 said that the Donetsk ‘People’s 
Republic’ slapped exit bans on miners who were on unpaid leave 
because of their pits’ financial troubles. Experts speculated that the 
unemployed miners are being pressured to join the separatists’ 
armed formations.125 In what seemed a measure to suppress 
information about dwindling population numbers, Ukrainian media 
pointed out that the DNR statistics office suddenly stopped 
publishing detailed demographic figures in October 2018.126 
 Is Moscow subsidising a black hole? 
The Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ also tried to distract attention from 
economic shortcomings by presenting humble industrial assembly 
operations as huge progress towards economic autarky. In August 
2018, Zakharchenko and his deputy Alexander Timofeyev celebrated 
the first tram built in the DNR. However, Ukrainian media quickly 
pointed out that the tram looked exactly like Czechoslovak models 
redesigned in Izhevsk, Russia.127 
Earlier, Zakharchenko had announced that production of 
passenger buses will begin in Donetsk. However, the buses were 
really produced in the Pavlovo Bus Factory128 in Russia’s Nizhny 
Novgorod region and only fitted with chairs and some interior parts 
in Donetsk.129 
While the ‘People’s Republics’ carefully keep their budgets 
secret, most independent observers agree that Russia is subsidising 
them to a large extent. Moscow has not published any figures for this 
aid, which is believed to be contained in the 17% of the Russian state 
budget that is labelled secret, and whose total is believed to be more 
                                                        
124 http://www.rosbalt.ru/world/2018/03/08/1686788.html  
125 https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/Donbas-realii/29251293.html  
126 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/285593-dnr-ubrala-demografycheskuyu-
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127 https://www.ostro.org/general/society/news/552334/  
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129 https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/doneckij-elektrozavod-peredal-
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than 3 trillion roubles (€38 billion) in 2019.130 During his annual press 
conference in December 2018, President Vladimir Putin evaded 
answering a question from a Ukrainian reporter about how much 
Russia is spending on occupied Donbas.131 
The size and the relative share of the Russian subsidies for the 
NGCA have been the subject of much speculation, ranging all the 
way up to €5.6 billion per year.132 The most recent figures were made 
in January 2020 by Ukraine’s Intelligence Service SBU, who said that 
Russia bankrolls the Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’ with 30 billion 
roubles (€440 million) per year, paid through a bank in South 
Ossetia.133 
Two years earlier, George Tuka, then a deputy Minister for the 
Temporarily Occupied Territories and a former governor of the 
Luhansk region, claimed that Moscow’s non-military subsidies 
amount to 35 billion roubles per year for each ‘Republic’ – which adds 
up to almost €1 billion. According to Tuka, the budget of the DNR 
was 68 billion roubles in 2017, while the LNR had a budget of 42 
billion roubles. The numbers suggest that the Donetsk separatists 
managed to bankroll almost half their budget, while those in Luhansk 
could just cover 22%.134 
Also, part of Russia’s expenses are electricity supplies to the 
LNR, which was cut off from the Ukrainian power grid in April 2017 
following a payment dispute with the Ukrenergo state energy 
provider. According to estimates cited in Russian media, this costs 
Moscow another 3 billion roubles (€40 million) per year.135 
While there is practically no public debate about this in Russia, 
considerable divisions inside the leadership were revealed in 2019 
and 2020. In August 2019, Moscow political scientist and Surkov-
                                                        
130 https://p.dw.com/p/36jQu  
131 Question from Roman Tsymbalyuk http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ 
president/news/59455  
132 Security Council Secretary Oleksandr Turchynov in an interview November 
2016: https://interfax.com.ua/news/interview/387483.html  
133 https://ssu.gov.ua/ua/news/1/category/2/view/6996#.XcN5ihBG.dpbs  
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confidant Alexei Chesnakov openly accused Russian deputy Prime 
Minister Dmitry Kozak – who oversaw the ‘People’s Republics’ 
economies – of planning to “hand over Donbas” to anyone willing 
pay for their rebuilding in exchange for lifting sanctions against 
Russia. Chesnakov refuted this view by arguing that an end to the 
sanctions was unlikely because the US would not lift theirs even if 
the EU did so. He argued that the sanctions were a price worth paying 
for the “blood spilled in Ukraine”, for which he blamed the United 
States.136 
The conflict between Kozak and Surkov escalated on 25 
January 2020, when Chesnakov announced that Surkov was leaving 
the state service because of a change in policies vis-à-vis Ukraine. 
While no policy change was discernible at the time, the move was 
clearly a reaction to Kozak’s promotion to a deputy head of the 
Kremlin administration one day earlier, making him more senior in 
the Kremlin hierarchy than Surkov, who is merely a presidential aide.  
No solution to this intra-elite conflict over the Donbas had been 
found before publication as Surkov remained in his position “de 
jure”, as Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov put it.137 
The first time that Moscow’s direct financial role was openly 
acknowledged was in October 2018, when the Tass state news agency 
quoted Donetsk separatist leader Denis Pushilin as saying after talks 
with Surkov in the Kremlin that the presidential aide had given 
guarantees that would allow increases in wages in the ‘People’s 
Republic’.138 Pushilin again indirectly acknowledged the existence of 
subsidies when he said in November that the ‘Republic’ should strive 
to live without them.139 
The ‘People’s Republics’ finances suffer both from weak 
revenues and high spending. Their former income base remains 
                                                        
136 http://actualcomment.ru/chesnakov-nelzya-igrat-s-ukrainoy-v-poddavki-
1908210956.html  
137 https://tass.ru/politika/7623859  
138 https://tass.ru/politika/5657257 Pushilin announced a 10% rise in public 
sector wages one week later https://dnr-online.ru/s-1-noyabrya-realno-
uvelichit-zarplaty-byudzhetnikam-na-10-eto-reshenie-uzhe-prinyato-denis-
pushilin/  
139 https://dan-news.info/politics/pushilin-otmetil-tri-klyuchevyx-
napravleniya-raboty-na-postu-glavy-dnr.html  
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shaken by the blockade. And while the nationalisations were 
supposed to redirect company taxes to the separatists, the 
widespread production standstill that ensued probably thwarts any 
such effects. Their spending is thought to be disproportionally high 
because of ageing populations and large bureaucracies (see 1.6).  
 Low wages and humble pensions 
According to its leader Leonid Pasechnik, the Luhansk ‘People’s 
Republic’ had more than 437,000 pensioners in 2017.140 Assuming 
that the LNR’s real population is below 1 million, that means that 
maybe half of the local population depends on government 
handouts. Pasechnik also said that more than 21.7 billion roubles 
were spent on pensions in 2017. If Tuka’s budget figures are correct, 
more than 50% of state expenditure (save for the military) goes to 
pensioners.  
The Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ claimed to spend on average 
3.17 billion roubles per month for its more than 670,000 pensioners 
between January and October 2018.141 Projected over the whole year, 
this would amount to 38.1 billion roubles, again more than half of the 
annual budget (2017) according to Tuka. 
To be sure, pensions and wages in the NGCA are extremely 
low compared to both the GCA and Russia. An average pension in 
the DNR was officially 4,380 roubles (€57) in December 2017. An 
average pension in the Donetsk region’s GCA was 3,268 hryvnia 
(€105) in 2018, almost similar to an average pension in the 
neighbouring Russian Rostov-on-Don, which was 8,488 roubles 
(€110).142  
                                                        
140 Pasechnik quoted this number in a speech in May 2018 http://lug-
info.com/news/one/io-glavy-lnr-predstavil-pyatiletnyuyu-programmu-
razvitiya-respubliki-nash-vybor-foto-35133  
141 https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/pensionnyj-fond-dnr-s-nachala-goda-
vyplatil-zhitelyam-respubliki-pochti-32-milliarda-rublej.html  
142 https://dan-news.info/ekonomika/razmer-srednej-pensionnoj-vyplaty-v-
dnr-prevysil-4380-rublej-matyushhenko.html and 
http://donetskstat.gov.ua/statinform1/soc_zah1.php and 
https://www.rostov.kp.ru/daily/26775/3809660/  
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Wage differences are even bigger. In mid-2019, an average 
wage in the DNR was just 11,877 roubles (€167).143 By contrast, an 
average wage in the Russian region of Rostov-on-Don is three times 
as large – 36,800 roubles, while in government-controlled Donetsk 
region it is almost three times higher – 11,769 hryvnia (€427).144 
Figures from the Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’ are even lower. 
Separatist leader Pasechnik said in 2018 that doctors on average get 
7,300 roubles (€94), nurses 5,700 roubles (€74).145 
 The rise of Vneshtorgservis and Serhiy Kurchenko 
Derelict industries with broken supply chains and little market 
access, low incomes and large social payment obligations are part of 
the toxic mix that the NCGA economy is facing. This extremely 
difficult situation is the most likely explanation for the sweeping 
changes in the sphere of economic policymaking that have 
characterised the Donetsk separatist leadership since Zakharchenko’s 
assassination. 
After the removal of Zakharchenko’s allies from the 
‘government’ – first and foremost his influential lieutenant Alexander 
Timofeyev, who was sacked as Revenue Minister and deputy head of 
cabinet, the ‘People’s Republic’ got a powerful ‘Prime Minister’ with 
rumoured links to the secretive Vneshtorgservis holding. 
Alexander Ananchenko was appointed deputy head of cabinet 
on 7 September 2018, acting head of cabinet on October 18 and was 
confirmed ‘Prime Minister’ on December 1.146 Donetsk separatist 
leader Denis Pushilin is believed to have surrendered control of the 
economy to Ananchenko, who in the newly created position of ‘Prime 
Minister’ received the right to introduce bills to ‘parliament’ and is 
guaranteed to govern unhindered by the “Leader” thanks to an 
                                                        
143 https://ukraina.ru/news/20190802/1024495764.html 
144 https://index.minfin.com.ua/labour/salary/average/doneckaya/ and 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4117614 
145 http://lug-info.com/news/one/vlasti-lnr-planiruyut-povysit-
minimalnuyu-zarplatu-medrabotnikov-do-11-163-rub-pasechnik-35106  
146 https://dan-news.info/politics/vrio-glavy-dnr-pushilin-naznachil-trex-
ispolnyayushhix-obyazannosti-vice-premerov-respubliki.html  
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amendment banning one person from holding both offices.147 These 
changes are a clear break from the Zakharchenko era, who was both 
“Leader” and “Chairman of the Cabinet” and had entrusted running 
the economy to Timofeyev. 
Little is known about Ananchenko’s biography, who has 
worked as a businessman in large firms both in Donetsk and Russia. 
He did not appear in public for one year, until he took part in a 
televised debate in November 2019 among members of the Donetsk 
Republic ‘movement’.148  
Multiple reports have linked Ananchenko to Vneshtorgservis, 
saying that he worked as an adviser to company CEO Vladimir 
Pashkov, himself a former deputy governor of the Siberian Irkutsk 
region.149 When Pashkov was appointed Ananchenko’s deputy 
overseeing the economy in April 2019, the lines between 
Vneshtorgservis and the DNR government were further blurred.150 
The obscure holding company, which has no public records, 
first appeared in the spring of 2017 as the managing vehicle for seized 
factories and coalmines in the NGCA. Vneshtorgservis has in turn 
been linked to Serhiy Kurchenko, a Ukrainian businessman who rose 
to prominence under former President Viktor Yanukovych and is 
believed to be living in Russia since the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution. 
Unconfirmed reports suggest that Kurchenko set up an office in 
Donetsk after Zakharchenko’s death and that he was in the city for 
Ananchenko’s confirmation as ‘Prime Minister’ on 1 December 
2018.151 
Believed to be registered in South Ossetia, Vneshtorgservis 
serves as a vehicle allowing the trade of goods between Russia and 
the ‘People’s Republics’ without breaking Russian law or provoking 
                                                        
147 Signs of growing influence of secretive Oligarch holding in Donetsk: 
http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-15-november-
14-december-2018-newsletter-49/  
148 https://civicmonitoring.org/newsletter51/ and 
https://civicmonitoring.org/newsletter68/  
149 http://antifashist.com/item/semya-na-gorizonte-premer-ministrom-dnr-
stal-chelovek-kurchenko.html  
150 https://civicmonitoring.org/newsletter55/ and 
https://civicmonitoring.org/newsletter57/  
151 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/286975-v-doneck-pryekhal-sergey-kurchenko  
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new sanctions. To this end South Ossetia serves as a hub – the 
separatist region of Georgia is the only territory to have recognised 
the ‘People’s Republics’ – and it has been recognised by Russia. 
However, from a Ukrainian legal point of view, any shipment of 
goods from the NGCA to Russia is smuggling.  
The enclave in the Caucasus also provides a banking link: The 
South Ossetian Mezhdunarodny Rashchyotny Bank (MRB, or 
International Settlements Bank) has been the official correspondent 
bank for the state banks of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘People’s 
Republics’ since 2015, when it opened an office in Luhansk (it opened 
another one in Donetsk in October 2018).152 South Ossetia’s role in 
allowing financial transactions between Moscow and Donetsk and 
Luhansk was also confirmed in a Washington Post investigation in 
November 2018.153 
However, during the seizures in 2017, Vneshtorgservis took 
control of only nine enterprises in the DNR. The remaining 34 were 
administered by the separatists, with the ‘ministries’ of revenue, 
industry and energy taking the biggest. A Radio Liberty report said 
in September that the 34 separatist-administrated plants will be taken 
over by Vneshtorgservis, but by time of publication, only one more 
enterprise had been handed to the holding. In the LNR, 
Vneshtorgservis controls four plants with more than 45,000 workers 
(see Box 3.1). 
  
                                                        
152 https://crb-dnr.ru/about/history and https://gosbank.su/novosti-
gosbank/vneshnejekonomicheskaja-dejatelnost/ and https://dan-
news.info/world/centralnyj-respublikanskij-bank-dnr-vydal-pervuyu-
bankovskuyu-licenziyu-filialu-inostrannogo-banka.html  
153 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/11/21/ 
feature/how-russia-avoids-sanctions-and-supports-rebels-in-eastern-ukraine-
using-a-financial-system/  
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Box 3.1 Plants in the NGCA administered by VNESHTORGSERVIS 
Donetsk region – according to a decree by separatist leader Alexander 
Zakharchenko published in April 2017.154 Most plants were owned by 
Rinat Akhmetov’s DTEK or Metinvest. 
Name Assets Owner 
Branch 1 Donetskstal Iron and Steel Works 
(DMZ, 4,500 workers) 
V. Nusenkis 
Branch 2 Yenakiieve Iron and Steel Works 
(EMZ, 5,394 workers) 
Metinvest 
Branch 3 Makeevka (Makiivka) 
Metallurgical Plant 
Metinvest 
Branch 4 Yenakiieve Coke and Chemicals 
Plant (Koksokhimprom) 
Metinvest (50%)155 
Branch 5 Khartsyzk pipe plant Metinvest 
Branch 6 Yasinovsky Coke & Chemical 
Factory, Makiivka 
Donetskstal/DMZ 
Branch 7 Makiivka Coking & Chemical 
Plant (Makeevkoks) 
Donetskstal/DMZ 
Branch 8 Komsomolske Flux Plant 
(Komsomolskoe Rudoupravlenie) 
Metinvest 
 Air Liquide Yenakiieve. This plant is owned by French industrial 
gas company Air Liquide, which said in March 2017 that it lost 
control over its operations. While it appears on Zakharchenko’s 
decree, it was not given a Vneshtorgservis branch number nor has 
it appeared in news reports since.  
 Dokuchayevsk Flux and Dolomite Plant (DFDK). This plant was 
transferred from the Donetsk Industry ‘Ministry’ to 
Vneshtorgservis in October 2018. Separatist leader Pushilin has 
announced that it will merge with the Komsomolske Flux Plant 
(Branch 8). 
  
                                                        
154 http://doc.dnr-online.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PerchenPrdpr_SovMin.pdf  
155 Operationally part of Metinvest, 50% of this plant is owned by three companies 
linked to the business group of Yuriy Ivanyushchenko and Ivan Avramov. 
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Luhansk region – a total of four plants with 45,000 workers are 
controlled by Vneshtorgservis in the Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’ 
according to official comments made in August 2018.156 It is not clear 
why the branches are numbered 2 and 12. 
Name Assets Owner 
Branch 2 KrasnodonVugillya157  
Five coalmines 
Metinvest 
Branch 2 RovenkiAntratsit, 
SverdlovAntratsit: 11 coalmines158 
DTEK 
Branch12 Alchevsk Metallurgy Plant 
(AMK): More than 13,000 workers 
ISD 
 
 
 Return of the oligarchs? 
Serhiy Kurchenko has been named in the past as a beneficiary of non-
public trade deals between the NGCA and Russia. In 2015, the 
separatists accused him of making illicit profits from the gas trade 
with Russia and Donetsk MPs demanded an investigation into 
Kurchenko’s “shady business deals”.159 Two senior separatist 
officials said to be connected to Kurchenko and the oil and gas trade 
were actually killed – Donetsk Energy ‘Minister’ Eduard Fainitsky in 
May 2015 and Dmitry Kargayev, an adviser to Luhansk leader Igor 
Plotnitsky, in March 2016.160 
                                                        
156 http://lug-info.com/news/one/bolee-45-tys-chelovek-rabotayut-na-
pereshedshikh-pod-vneshnee-upravlenie-predpriyatiyakh-lnr-37806  
157 Known as KrasnodonUgol in Russian https://coal.metinvestholding.com/ru  
158 Apparently these mines are run by the same management as KrasnodonUgol. 
159 http://lug-info.com/news/one/vlasti-lnr-vychistili-vse-struktury-
kurchenko-iz-skhemy-postavok-gaza-v-respubliku-ministr-7697 and 
https://dan-news.info/politics/deputaty-narodnogo-soveta-i-od-dr-prizvali-
glavu-dnr-razoblachit-sgovor-kurchenko-s-drugimi-oligarxami.html  
160 https://lb.ua/news/2015/11/10/320543_dnr_ubili_stavlennika_kurchenko. 
html Moskovsky Komsomolets on Kargayev’s killing www.mk.ru/politics/water 
2016/04/23/ekonomicheskie-makhinacii-v-lnr-kto-stoit-za-ubiystvom-
kargaeva.html  
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In March 2018, a Russian media report said that Kurchenko’s 
trading firm Gaz Alyans had been awarded a monopoly for exporting 
coal from the NGCA to Russia. The decision by the Economic 
Development Ministry in Moscow prompted other Russian coal 
traders to file a complaint with the government.161 In September that 
year, another Russian media report said that Gaz Alyans had taken 
over two Russian metals plants that had previously belonged to the 
Ukrainian group Industrialny Soyuz Donbasa (ISD). The group’s co-
founder Oleg Mkrtchan was arrested earlier in 2018 by Russian police 
on embezzlement charges. One of the plants, the Revyakinsky Metals 
Combinate near Tula, was operating with iron from the Donetsk 
‘People’s Republic’, according to the report in the Kommersant 
newspaper.162 
However, Kurchenko was never seen as a businessman in his 
own right. Dubbed Mladooligarch (junior oligarch) because of his 
youthful age (he was a self-declared billionaire aged 29 in 2014), he is 
widely seen as a placeholder for Yanukovych and his family. Media 
reports in 2013 and 2014 found that he amassed wealth with dubious 
gas deals and worked closely with Yanukovych’s oldest son 
Oleksandr.163 
The fact that a close associate of Yanukovych has been able to 
make such a comeback in Donetsk is an anathema to the separatists’ 
anti-oligarch ideology – which might explain the secrecy 
surrounding his activities in the ‘People’s Republics’. In 2016, 
Zakharchenko claimed that all Ukrainian oligarchs, including 
Kurchenko were officially banned from entering the DNR.164 His 
adviser Alexander Kazakov said after his death that Zakharchenko 
“was building a socialist model with significant market elements – 
much to the anger of oligarchs of all kinds.”165 And when 
                                                        
161 https://www.rbc.ru/business/22/03/2018/5ab240569a7947e39a8159bc?from 
=center_6  
162 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3737337  
163 http://old.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/how-a-29-year-old-
ukrainian-made-a-killer-fortune-on-russian-gas/513190.html  
164 https://dan-news.info/politics/dnr-ne-otmenit-zapret-na-vezd-dlya-
ukrainskix-oligarxov-zaxarchenko.html  
165 https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2493527.html  
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Zakharchenko’s successor Pushilin was asked in November 2018 
about a possible return of oligarchs, he retorted “there will be no 
oligarchs” in the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’.166  
And it raises questions about Moscow’s economic strategy. 
Kurchenko’s biography and his close links to the former Ukrainian 
leadership do not make him a likely candidate to promote the 
NGCA’s economic integration with Russia. If this ought to happen, 
as separatist leaders like to claim, Russian businesses, say from the 
metals sector, should be testing the grounds. Instead, corporations 
have been eager to deny business links with the Donbas – like in 
March 2017, when a Russian media report said that the Kremlin had 
asked metals producers to supply raw materials to eastern 
Ukraine.167 Kurchenko’s return to the Donbas suggests that Russia’s 
globalised business is so susceptible to Western sanctions that the 
Kremlin saw no other choice but to resort to former corrupt elites. 
 The Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’ – a different case? 
While the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ underwent massive 
transformation in its economic policymaking, there was little 
discernible change in Luhansk. In fact, separatist leader Pasechnik 
largely kept his cabinet when he confirmed it in office one month 
after the November 2018 elections.168 
The only discernable ‘new’ economic activity was when Janus 
Putkonen, a Finnish pro-Russian activist, appeared in Luhansk in 
September, announcing the founding of an investment company to 
attract foreign businesses to the Donbas.169 Putkonen, who is not 
known to have worked as a businessman before, had previously been 
                                                        
166 Interview with the dnr-live portal http://dnr-live.ru/o-vts-arestah-i-
vozvrate-v-ukrainu/  
167 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/267985-v-rossyy-otrycayut-namerenyya-
postavlyat-syre-na-predpryyatyya-v-ordlo  
168 “Pasechnik keeps his cabinet“ in 
http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-dnr-and-lnr-15-november-
14-december-2018-newsletter-49/  
169 http://lug-info.com/news/one/investkorporatsiya-Donbasa-planiruet-
podpisat-s-investorami-chetyre-biznes-proekta-38287  
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leading the separatists’ media efforts in Donetsk, where he ran a news 
website in English and other languages. His investment project in 
Luhansk does not seem to have been successful and as of spring 2019, 
Putkonen was back in Finland as editor of the alternative media site 
mv-lehti.170 The separatist-appointed mayor of Luhansk, Manolis 
Pilavov, admitted on local TV in December 2018 that investors were 
currently not interested in the city.171 
In 2019, the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ began actively looking 
for foreign investors – in June separatist leader Pushilin appeared at 
the St Petersburg economic forum, and in October he hosted an 
international investment forum in Donetsk, pledging a tax-free 
offshore zone and boasting agreements worth 135.6 billion Russian 
roubles (€1.9 billion). However, the forum’s foreign attendants were 
either little-known or unwilling to appear in public, while no 
investments materialised in the following months. 
Pasechnik claimed during the forum that his ‘Republic’ 
managed to sign seven contracts with foreign investors during the 
Donetsk forum.172  
3.4 Society 
 No ethnic conflict  
The war in the Donbas differs from other separatist conflicts in 
Europe and the Caucasus because it lacks an ethnic, linguistic or 
religious dimension. While the Donetsk and Luhansk regions are 
both predominantly Russian-speaking, ethnic identity does not 
necessarily play a role when it comes to taking sides in the conflict.173 
                                                        
170 https://www.facebook.com/janus.putkonen  
171 Pilavov suggested investors need more “stability and tax breaks” 
http://novosti.dn.ua/news/287699-v-luganske-zayavyly-ob-otsutstvyy-
predlozhenyy-ob-ynvestycyyakh-  
172 https://twitter.com/glavalnr/status/1189202262855475200  
173 In fact, in the last census 2001, almost 57% in Donetsk Oblast identified as 
ethnic Ukrainians and just 38% as ethnic Russians 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/donetsk/ In 
Luhansk Oblast, the figures were 58% Ukrainians to 39% Russians 
http://2001.ukrcensus.gov.ua/results/general/nationality/lugansk/  
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As mentioned before, identity in the Donbas has traditionally 
been linked to the economy. The Soviet legacy of being a region of 
special importance led locals to support Ukrainian independence in 
1991 because this offered a better chance to dominate the national 
economy than within a much bigger Russia. However, the economic 
crisis of the 1990s led to a certain marginalisation and isolation of the 
Donbas, while regional elites took control of politics, the economy 
and the media.174  
In 2004, more people in Donetsk identified themselves as “a 
person from Donetsk” (68%) than as Ukrainian (barely 40%). But the 
relative weakness of Ukrainian identity alone was not sufficient for 
separatist movements to be successful anywhere in Ukraine. Apart 
from Russian interference and geographical location along the border 
with Russia, a key factor was probably the tentative support from 
influential local businessmen (‘oligarchs’) for the separatists – Rinat 
Akhmetov in Donetsk and Oleksandr Yefremov in Luhansk. This 
may also explain why ‘People’s Republics’ failed in other Russian-
speaking regions. A recent study on why a Russian-backed separatist 
movement in the neighbouring Kharkiv region did not last concludes 
that local elites’ siding with Kyiv was decisive.175 
The conflict’s political ‘manufacturing’ was highlighted by 
ideological shifts emanating from Moscow. In 2014, President 
Vladimir Putin and Kremlin-controlled media galvanised Russian 
nationalists in Ukraine and Russia by using the term “Novorossiya”, 
suggesting the secession of the entire south of Ukraine all the way to 
the border with Moldova, in accordance with the eponymous Tsarist-
era province. However, the Kremlin abandoned this terminology one 
year later, replacing it with the non-territorial “Russki Mir” (Russian 
                                                        
174 Yulia Abibok: Identity policy in the self-proclaimed republics in east Ukraine 
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-06-
06/identity-policy-self-proclaimed-republics-east-ukraine-0#_ftn1  
175 How Eastern Ukraine Is Adapting and Surviving: The Case of Kharkiv 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/09/12/how-eastern-ukraine-is-adapting-and-
surviving-case-of-kharkiv-pub-77216  
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World), a civilisational term uniting all those inside and outside 
Russia who value Russian language and culture.176 
The end of the Novorossiya project dashed nationalist hopes of 
uniting wide parts of Ukraine with Russia and reduced Russian 
influence to much smaller pockets along the border with Russia, the 
‘People’s Republics’, which make up less than three percent of 
Ukraine’s territory.177 The alienation between nationalist separatists 
and the Kremlin deepened after the signing of the Minsk agreements 
and the ensuing Russian non-recognition of the ‘People’s Republics’. 
While the ouster of Luhansk separatist leader Plotnitsky in 
November 2017 swept a nationalist separatist faction to local power, 
the killing of Zakharchenko resulted in pragmatist, Kremlin-loyal 
people running the bigger ‘Republic’.  
 Social cohesion  
The ‘People’s Republics’ are artificial in the sense that their 
populations do not differ from the rest of the Donbas and other 
(Russian-speaking) Ukrainian regions nearby. Apart from the 
Ukrainian border with Russia and the administrative boundary 
between the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, their territories are 
defined by the Line of Contact, a purely military line that cuts 
through the centre of both regions. 
The vexing question is how opinions and public sentiment 
have changed in these areas since 2014, as opposed to the 
neighbouring government-controlled areas. The answer to this 
should have important consequences for the government’s 
reintegration strategies. Should pro-Russian sentiment be dominant 
there, reintegration becomes more difficult. 
While the local population is subjected to relentless anti-
Ukrainian propaganda from Russian and local media, the ideological 
turbulences within the ‘People’s Republics’ must have weakened 
their appeal. Early separatist leaders like Pavel Gubarev, Andrei 
Purgin and Alexander Khodakovsky in Donetsk and Valery Bolotov 
                                                        
176 Putin’s ‘Greater Russia’: misunderstanding or mission? 
https://www.raamoprusland.nl/dossiers/roesski-mir/878-putin-s-greater-
russia-misunderstanding-or-mission  
177 https://www.svoboda.org/a/27797444.html  
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in Luhansk were professed Russian nationalists who advocated 
unification with Russia – preferably with all of “Novorossiya”. 
However, they soon were sidelined (Gubarev and Purgin), exiled 
(Khodakovsky) or dead (Bolotov). 
While the present leaders appear more pragmatic, they have 
taken nationalist strides when this suits Moscow. Thus, Pushilin 
suddenly advocated abolishing Ukrainian as a state language in the 
Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ and laid claim to government-controlled 
areas by signing a law that defines the DNR’s borders as identical 
with those of the Donetsk region (Pasechnik followed suit two weeks 
later).178 
However, calling the government-controlled parts of the 
Donetsk and Luhansk regions “temporarily occupied by the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces” fades in comparison to former Donetsk 
leader Zakharchenko’s July 2017 initiative, when he declared a new 
state called “Malorossiya” that would include large parts of Ukraine 
(the idea, which was seemingly not coordinated with Luhansk or 
Moscow, was quietly dropped weeks later).179 
 How popular are the ‘People’s Republics’?  
The ideological fluctuations, political turbulences and the uncertain 
status, combined with economic depression all suggest that the 
‘People’s Republics’ must be facing a massive popularity problem. 
However, there is too little satisfactory data to prove this. Sociological 
research in the NGCA is difficult, potentially disputed and outright 
dangerous.  
A Ukrainian survey released in November 2019 suggested that 
64% of local inhabitants want the areas to become part of Russia, 
while just 18.5% wanted to remain in Ukraine and another 16% 
wanted independence. However, the survey’s methods and results 
were strongly criticised by experts, who argued, among other things, 
that it is impossible to carry out proper polling inside the ‘People’s 
Republics’.62 Indeed, open polling has apparently been declared 
                                                        
178 https://civicmonitoring.org/newsletter69/  
179 The Malorossiya Affair http://www.civicmonitoring.org/developments-in-
dnr-and-lnr-24-may-22-august-2017-newsletter-23/  
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illegal by the separatists. Alexander Kazakov, a former adviser to 
slain separatist leader Zakharchenko, said in September 2018 that 
surveys were banned in the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ and that 
people caught breaking the ban would be detained.180 
A less controversial survey conducted by telephone released in 
August by the Berlin-based ZOiS-think tank found that a majority of 
almost 55% want the ‘People’s Republics’ to be part of Ukraine, while 
45.5% opted for Russia. However, telephone interviews inside the 
NGCA are also controversial, because respondents may well give 
wrong answers for fear of reprisals from eavesdropping intelligence 
agencies.  
Because of these shortcomings, researchers have resorted to so-
called focus group studies. This methodology, developed in the US 
for market research, is conducted by interviewing small groups of 
people and studying their conversation patterns. In the context of the 
Donbas, this means groups of IDPs or recently arrived visitors from 
the NGCA. Because these visitors overwhelmingly tend be 
pensioners and because of the travel restrictions for officials and 
other professions in the ‘People’s Republics’, it is clear that focus 
group studies have similar deficits. 
Under these circumstances, the results of available surveys 
must be treated with caution. On the other hand, published surveys 
are shaping the debate in Ukraine and beyond.  
Another useful indicator of loyalty are the separatists’ figures 
about passports. Both ‘People’s Republics’ have been issuing their 
own documents long before Russia began handing out its passports 
to locals in 2019. Their practical value significantly increased after 
February 2017, when President Putin ordered Russian authorities to 
recognise them and other documents issued by the ‘People’s 
Republics’ – including number plates on cars. 
The Donetsk separatists claimed in November 2018 that they 
had issued 247,000 passports – almost 100,000 more than in 
                                                        
180 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/284807-v-dnr-govoryat-chto-tekh-kto-
provodyt-oprosy-v-donecke-zaderzhyvayut  
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January.181 Assuming that the DNR has no more than 1.8 million 
inhabitants (as opposed to the official 2.28 million), its passports were 
issued to no more than 15% of the local population. The last figures 
available from Luhansk are from December 2017, when Interior 
‘Minister’ Igor Kornet claimed to have issued 100,000 passports – less 
than 10% of an assumed population of a little more than 1 million.182  
Carrying such a passport might be helpful in Donetsk and 
Luhansk and to a certain extent in Russia. In Ukraine, their possession 
– if apprehended – usually results in criminal procedures. 
The ‘republican’ passports have been eclipsed by Russia’s 
citizenship campaign, which began in June 2019. However, the fact 
that possession of a DNR and/or LNR passport is a mandatory 
requirement for getting a Russian one has led to a significant increase 
in demand for them. 
 The Media 
The media landscape in the ‘People’s Republics’ fully mirrors the 
political landscape in that dissent or opposition to separatist rule is 
non-existent and practically all outlets are under separatist control. 
In 2014, media in Donetsk and Luhansk were forced to support the 
separatists or to move their offices to the GCA. Visits by armed men 
were common, as shown in this example from a Donetsk local news 
site: 
“Today, April 25, the newsroom of 62.ua was attacked by 
supporters of the Donetsk People’s Republic. Eight people 
with balaclavas, masks and baseball bats entered the 
newsroom and demanded to publish this notice … in 
which they ask for medicine, humanitarian aid, 
protection gear and uniform pieces. They also ask the 
                                                        
181 https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/pasporta-dnr-s-nachala-ix-vydachi-
poluchili-pochti-chetvert-milliona-zhitelej-migracionnaya-sluzhba.html  
182 http://lug-info.com/news/one/migratsionnaya-sluzhba-mvd-vydala-
zhitelyam-respubliki-100000-pasportov-lnr-31035  
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local population for financial assistance and left bank 
card details.”183  
One month later, armed men occupied the Donetsk TV channel 
“Union”. The station was subsequently turned into a main 
propaganda tool for the separatists.184 
Despite their subservience, separatist media have in the past 
been drawn into disputes among their leaders. In Donetsk, the state-
run Donetsk News Agency (dan-news.info) sided with Pushilin, 
while the official site dnr-online.ru supported Zakharchenko before 
the latter’s death.185 In Luhansk, the official news site “Lugansk 
Information Centre” (lug-info.com) has at times openly quarrelled 
with Plotnitsky, who in turn was supported by the “Lugansk 24” TV 
channel.186 
In Donetsk, two outlets controlled by Pavel Gubarev – dnr-
live.ru and novorossia-tv.ru – sometimes publish dissenting 
opinions. However, during the height of Gubarev’s conflict with the 
election commission which prevented him from participating in the 
November 2018 vote, all his sites were offline.  
Overall, there is evidence that separatist-run media has little 
impact on local audiences. This was indirectly acknowledged by 
Donetsk separatist leader Pushilin, when he told a meeting with 
editors-in-chief in December 2019 that ‘republican’ outlets need to 
fundamentally change in order to win the “information war” with 
Ukraine. Pushilin said that the media’s content needs to be more 
“interesting, lively and controversial”, suggesting that he finds it dull 
and uniform.61 
                                                        
183 The staff of this site managed to leave Donetsk and set up operations in the 
GCA https://www.62.ua/news/523650/storonniki-doneckoj-narodnoj-
respubliki-prisli-trebovat-ot-sajta-62ua-izmenit-redakcionnuu-politiku 
184 https://www.62.ua/news/541599/vooruzennye-storonniki-dnr-
potrebovali-ot-telekanala-union-izmenit-redakcionnuu-politiku  
185 Unlike DAN, dnr-online.ru did not publish any calls to postpone the 
November elections during August 2018, suggesting that Zakharchenko was 
against this idea 
186 http://lug-info.com/news/one/glava-lnr-sobstvennoruchnoi-podpisyu-
podtverdil-podderzhku-predsedatelyu-sovmina-20630  
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Interviews with locals by this study’s author and a recent focus 
group survey by the Ukrainian Institute for the Future suggest that 
Russian TV is the dominant source for information.187 This was 
already the case before 2014, not least because the much bigger 
Russian channels were felt to offer the better entertainment 
programme. 
The historical dominance of Russian media makes it harder for 
Ukraine to win the locals’ hearts and minds. Kyiv’s efforts to roll back 
Kremlin and separatist propaganda have so far concentrated on 
improving the reception of Ukrainian television in the NGCA. While 
this was overdue because Ukrainian national media have been 
underrepresented in the Donbas long before 2014, there is no 
evidence that this effective. The opening of new broadcasting masts 
in Karachun and Hirnyk (Donetsk region) and in Bakhmutovka 
(Luhansk region) were met with reports that the separatists were 
planning to jam the Ukrainian TV signals.188 Ukraine responded by 
jamming Russian TV signals in the GCA.189 
It remains to be seen if plans by the administration of President 
Zelenskiy to launch a new Russian-language TV channel will be more 
successful.190 In April 2018, Emine Dzhaparova, then Ukraine’s First 
Deputy Information Minister, admitted that Ukrainian media had 
practically been erased from the ‘People’s Republics’. In order to 
bring them back, Ukraine’s control needs to be re-established, 
Dzhaparova said.191 
                                                        
187 “Local ones are just propaganda, imitation of media. We are dancing, we are 
doing something else, and so on” https://www.uifuture.org/en/publications/ 
reports/24339-dumky/ta/nastroi/jyteliv/okupovanych/terytoriy 
188 http://sprotyv.info/ru/news/Kyiv/vlasti-dnr-v-donecke-hotyat-
demontirovat-peredatchik-ukrainskogo-telesignala 
189 https://censor.net.ua/news/3062242/rossiyiskiyi_telesignal_nachali_ 
glushit_v_zone_ato_syumar  
190 http://novosti.dn.ua/news/297097-na-baze-uatv-zapustyat-kanal-dlya-
nepodkontrolnogo-donbassa  
191 https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-presshall/2446006-osobennosti-
soznania-i-identicnosti-zitelej-podkontrolnyh-i-okkupirovannyh-territorij-
doneckoj-oblasti.html  
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 Human rights: The MGBs and dissent 
Those who express dissenting opinions inside the ‘People’s 
Republics’, including pro-Ukrainian ones, face repression and 
physical abuse. A prominent example is blogger and journalist 
Stanislav Asieiev (Russian transliteration Aseyev), who had worked 
for Radio Liberty in Donetsk under pseudonym before he was 
abducted and imprisoned in 2017. In 2018, he was paraded on 
Russian state TV, where he confessed to working for Ukrainian 
intelligence. After his release in the December 2019 prisoner 
exchange, Asieiev revealed that he and other prisoners had been 
tortured with electrical shocks. Previously, a separatist court had 
sentenced him 15 years in prison, essentially for publishing critical 
reports about the Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’.192 
Other cases include Luhansk blogger Eduard Nedelyayev, who 
was arrested and paraded as a Ukrainian spy in a video in November 
2016.193 A few months earlier, he was quoted by German tabloid Bild 
as saying that the Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’ resembles North 
Korea.194 Nedelyayev was released in a January 2017 prisoner 
exchange. 
Repressions have also hit religious communities other than the 
Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. While all 
denominations have been forced to register with separatist 
authorities, the most prominent victims are Jehovah’s Witnesses, who 
were banned completely in both ‘People’s Republics’ in 2018 and lost 
more than a dozen premises in seizures.195 Russia banned Jehovah’s 
                                                        
192 https://civicmonitoring.org/newsletter66/ 
193 http://lug-info.com/news/one/soznavshiisya-v-shpionazhe-bloger-
nedelyaev-planiroval-stat-proKyivskim-partizanom-19429  
194 Nedelyayev blogged under the pseudonym “Edward Ned” 
https://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/ukraine-konflikt/was-wir-haben-ist-
kein-leben-mehr-2-46579068.bild.html  
195 The 2018 bans were justified with “extremist activities” in Donetsk 
https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/deyatelnost-svidetelej-iegovy-na-territorii-
dnr-priznana-ekstremistskoj-i-zapreshhena-verxovnyj-sud.html and with not 
being a traditional confession in Luhansk http://lug-
info.com/news/one/prinyatyi-narodnym-sovetom-zakon-o-religii-zapretil-
deyatelnost-religioznykh-grupp-v-lnr-32220  
112  BEYOND FROZEN CONFLICT 
 
Witnesses in 2017 on grounds that they are an “extremist 
organisation”. In July 2018, the Luhansk State Security ‘Ministry’ 
raided a Baptist service and accused church members of forming an 
“extremist religious organisation”.196 
Both the Donetsk and Luhansk Security ‘Ministries’ (MGB) 
continue to detain people and publish video interviews of 
“confessions” on their websites. The YouTube channel of the Donetsk 
MGB is a particularly disturbing example.197 Among others, it still 
contains interviews from September 2016, in which five teenagers 
confess planning sabotage acts.198 Donetsk separatist leader Pushilin 
pardoned three of the men in December 2019. Nothing is known 
about the fate of the other two.199 In March 2018, it published a video 
confession of a botanist and cactus grower, claiming that he had 
released “destabilising information” on Twitter.200 
Apparently random detentions continued in the run-up to the 
December 2019 prisoner swap, which resulted the release of 101 
Ukrainians detained inside of the ‘People’s Republics’ (Ukraine 
released 127). The detentions signal that this was less a prisoner than 
a hostage swap and Ukrainian negotiator Valeria Lutkovska said 
afterwards that up to 300 persons remain in detention in the NGCA.  
Thus, the ‘People’s Republics’ remain black spots with regard 
to human rights, where the international community can only look 
on while security services act with impunity. 
 International isolation 
A contributing factor to the NGCA’s growing isolation is the fact that 
the separatists have expelled international aid organisations. In 
autumn 2015, the French group Doctors Without Borders had its 
accreditation withdrawn from both the Donetsk and Luhansk 
‘People’s Republics’. Separatist media at the time published reports 
                                                        
196 http://mgblnr.org/media/c300a2c3-98eb-4a7d-b302-ebf89b06bf26  
197 https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCmOf-vjTAq90H_j74rAPihQ/videos  
198 http://mgb-dnr.ru/news.php?id=20160912_00&img_num=1  
199 https://dnronline.su/2019/12/30/glava-dnr-denis-pushilin-pomiloval-
podrostkov-osuzhdennyh-za-diversii-v-yasinovatoj/  
200 http://mgb-dnr.ru/news.php?id=20180307_00&img_num=0  
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alleging that the organisation was smuggling drugs and spying for 
Ukraine201 – which Doctors Without Borders vehemently denied.202 
One year later, the separatists kicked out Czech aid organisation 
People in Need amid similarly unfounded allegations conveyed in 
local and Russian media.203 
The only international humanitarian organisations with a 
permanent presence in the NGCA are currently the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the United Nation’s Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Apart from the ICRC, 
the main source of aid deliveries are the convoys from the Russian 
Federation, which have been arriving on average every month, 
although in 2019 the convoys stopped without explanation between 
January and July, resuming on a weekly basis in October.204 Russia’s 
refusal to allow OSCE officials and Ukrainian customs to properly 
inspect them has led to allegations that the convoys contain non-
humanitarian aid. A former separatist official confirmed in 2019 that 
the convoys are used (at least) to bring Russian cash to Donetsk and 
Luhansk.205 
From the Ukrainian side, Rinat Akhmetov’s “Pomozhemo” 
foundation sent aid convoys to Donetsk and Luhansk between 2014 
and 28 February 2017. On that day, the eve of the seizure of 
Ukrainian-run factories (most of which belonged to Akhmetov), the 
separatists refused entry to a convoy and subsequently imposed a 
complete ban.206 
                                                        
201 https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/dnr-lishila-vrachej-bez-granic-
akkreditacii-za-shpionazh-i-nezakonnuyu-postavku-psixotropnyx-
preparatov.html  
202 https://www.msf.org/ukraine-msf-strongly-refutes-false-allegations-
levelled-media-humanitarian-committee-donetsk 
203 A Russian TV report accused the aid workers of weapons storage 
https://www.clovekvtisni.cz/en/people-in-need-helped-hundreds-of-thousands-
of-people-in-donetsk-and-was-always-transparent-in-its-work-3748gp  
204 The 12th and last convoy in 2019 arrived on 19 December, according to the 
OSCE observer Mission, stationed in Russia: https://www.osce.org/ 
observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-donetsk/442579  
205 Comments by Eduard Matyukha, who served as a mayor of Horlivka in 2014 
https://lb.ua/news/2019/11/24/443111_bivshiy_narodniy_mer_gorlovki.html  
206 https://www.fdu.org.ua/files/docs/513_ru_pomojem_russ_2.pdf  
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3.5 Security 
Introduction 
The military dimension of the conflict in the Donbas is characterised 
by the absence of a declaration of war and Russia’s persistent denial 
of involvement. Irregular formations have been fighting on both 
sides, resulting in challenges for command and control.  
Two instances of military defeat (Ilovaisk and Debaltseve) 
catalysed Ukraine’s signing of armistices (Minsk 
Protocol/Memorandum and the Package of Measures) but the 
Ukrainian military was left overall intact. Both battles were won 
thanks to the temporary and local intervention of regular Russian 
troops. 
The Line of Contact has been respected by both sides since it 
was agreed in Minsk. Despite ceasefire violations occurring on a daily 
basis and government troops conducting a “creeping offensive” in 
the so-called grey zone, both sides adamantly maintain that their 
troops won’t cross this line permanently. And despite political 
declarations about “ending the occupation” on the other side, neither 
side currently seeks a military solution. There is also no basis to speak 
of a war of attrition, because material losses and casualties are not so 
high that they cannot be compensated. 
The Minsk agreement’s political solution – to grant the NGCA 
special political status inside Ukraine – has over the past four years 
become increasingly unacceptable to both sides. The agreement’s 
condition of a lasting ceasefire makes it attractive for both sides to 
avoid implementing the political parts simply by firing shots. Other 
possible motives for ceasefire violations are international attention 
seeking (in the case of Kyiv) and shoring up domestic support despite 
oppressive and unjust regimes (in the case of the separatists). 
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Box 3.2. The Minsk Agreements 
Three agreements between Ukraine and Russia where negotiated 
and signed in the Belarussian capital, mediated by the OSCE. They 
all suffer from a lack of clarity and the lack of political will to 
implement them.  
The non-implementation of the original Protocol of 5 
September 2014 led to the signing of the Memorandum on 
September 19, whose continued non-implementation led to the 
Package of Measures of 12 February 2015. When no implementation 
had been reached by 2016, the ‘Normandy Four’ group (France, 
Germany, Ukraine and Russia) decided to work on a road map on 
how to implement the Package of Measures. This, too, proved 
elusive because the Ukrainian and Russian visions of a road map 
differ profoundly. Ukraine insists that Russian forces must be 
withdrawn first and control of its border with Russia needs to be re-
established, while Moscow wants direct dialogue and local elections 
to take place first. 
The documents are legally not treaties but agreements 
(soglashenie in Russian) without parliamentary ratification, which 
lowers their degree of formally binding the parties. Although 
Presidents Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko took part in the 
negotiations for the Package of Measures, all agreements were 
signed by their representatives207 plus separatist leaders Alexander 
Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky (without titles). 
                                                        
207 Russian Ambassador Mikhail Zurabov and former Ukrainian President 
Leonid Kuchma. 
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The Package of Measures of 12 February 2015 contains 13 points,208 
the most important being:  
1) A strict ceasefire is to begin on 15 February 2014 
2) Two days after the ceasefire, both sides begin withdrawing 
their heavy weapons to form a 50km-wide security zone and 
complete this within 14 days.209 
3) On the first day after the withdrawal’s completion, Kyiv must 
begin a direct dialogue with separatist representatives about 
holding local elections according to Ukrainian law and about 
the future political status of the NGCA. Ukraine needs to pass 
a law delineating the areas.210 
4) Ukraine must adopt a general amnesty for all people involved 
in the conflict. 
5) All prisoners must be released within 5 days after the 
withdrawal. 
6) Intra-Ukrainian economic ties must be re-established, including 
the banking system. 
7) The process of returning control of the border with Russia to 
the government of Ukraine begins on the first day after local 
elections are held and ends after a political solution is reached. 
8) Foreign armed formations, mercenaries and their weapons 
must be withdrawn under OSCE monitoring, illegal formations 
must be disarmed. 
9) A decentralisation that takes into account the certain areas’ 
peculiarities (as agreed with their leaders) must be enshrined in 
a constitutional amendment by the end of 2015. The special 
status law needs to include the following measures: 
a. Amnesty 
b. Language self-determination 
                                                        
208 https://www.osce.org/cio/140156 
209 An addendum signed on 29 September 2015 included large weapons with 
calibres of less than 100 millimitres in the withdrawal 
http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/190821?download=true  
210 The Rada passed this law on 17 March 2015 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=54394  
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c. Participation in the appointment of judges and 
prosecutors 
d. Ability to make agreements with Kyiv on economic, social 
cultural rebuilding  
e. State support for economy, social cultural rebuilding 
f. Kyiv must assist the certain areas’ cooperation with 
neighbouring Russian regions. 
g. Set up people’s militias to maintain public order inside the 
certain areas. 
h. The certain areas’ elected lawmakers shall not be removed 
from office before their term ends. 
i. All questions regarding local elections shall be discussed 
with NGCA representatives on the basis of the Law “On 
Temporary Order” (the special status law).211  
 The armed formations’ formation 
During its early stages, the war in the Donbas was characterised by 
organisational shortcomings and the presence of irregular formations 
on both sides. On the government side, volunteer battalions were 
hastily set up and trained, most of them by the Dnipropetrovsk 
regional administration, which was then headed by controversial 
businessman Ihor Kolomoisky. The integration of the volunteer 
formations into the regular army later proved challenging. 
The conduct of the “Anti-Terrorist Operation” also posed 
organisational challenges as it had to be coordinated between three 
government agencies – the Defence Ministry, the intelligence service 
SBU and the Interior Ministry. Many of these issues were addressed 
by the “reintegration law” implemented on 1 May 2018, which 
handed over command from the SBU to the Armed Forces and 
changed the name to Joint Forces Operation (known in Russian and 
Ukrainian by the acronym OOS). 
                                                        
211 President Poroshenko signed the special status law on 16 October 2014 
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/glava-derzhavi-pidpisav-zakon-
quotpro-osoblivij-poryadok-mis-33881 It was last prolonged for another year in 
October 2018. 
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The same can be said about the military formations on the other 
side. From the onset, it was not the regular Russian army fighting in 
eastern Ukraine, but small armed formations led by field 
commanders, some, but not all of whom were Russian citizens. 
Perhaps the most prominent of them was Igor Girkin, whose role is 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
Command and Control was centralised in the Donetsk 
‘People’s Republic’ by late 2014, when powerful independent field 
commander, Igor Bezler of Horlivka, had left for exile in Crimea in 
October 2014.212 Another independent commander, Alexander 
Khodakovsky, was appointed “National Security Council” Secretary 
in November 2014 and became an opposition figure after his 
dismissal in 2015.213 A violent conflict with commanders of a Russian 
volunteer formation called “Troy” in early 2016 remained an isolated 
incident.214 
In the Luhansk ‘People’s Republic’, military consolidation took 
considerably more time because numerous field commanders 
refused to accept the leadership of Igor Plotnitsky. In the end, 
Plotnitsky was overthrown in November 2017 in a coup that was 
backed by his own security forces. 
Most of the armed formations in the NGCA have since late 2014 
been commanded by an Army Corps – the First Corps in Donetsk and 
the Second Corps in Luhansk.215 Both are believed to be commanded 
by professional Russian officers. According to Ukrainian military 
leaders, the corps are subordinated to Russia’s Eighth Combined 
Arms Army – a relatively new formation in Russia’s Southern 
                                                        
212 https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5455558bcbb20f3ac9f20244  
213 Khodakovsky was apparently sacked in March 2015, but this was only made 
public one year later https://dan-news.info/politics/parlament-dnr-sozdal-
komissiyu-po-rassledovaniyu-deyatelnosti-aleksandra-xodakovskogo.html  
214 https://vlada.io/articles/prinyato-reshenie-srazu-obnulyat-v-dnr-
sereznyiy-vnutrenniy-konflikt-ubit-polevoy-komandir/  
215 The Corps were apparently renamed Operative Command in 2016, but they 
are still mostly referred to by their old names 
https://svbr.livejournal.com/26334.html  
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Military District, apparently set up especially for the war in the 
Donbas.216 
However, Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ leader Alexander 
Zakharchenko kept some formations under his personal commando, 
among them the Republican Guard and a Special Forces Brigade. 
After Zakharchenko’s death on 31 August 2018, they all were 
subordinated to the First Army Corps – sometimes forcefully. 
Donetsk had also retained a Defence ‘Ministry’ under Zakharchenko 
which was duly dissolved in September 2018. However, both 
‘Ministry’ and ‘Minister’ Vladimir Kononov were said to have had 
practically no command and control over the armed formations.217  
After Zakharchenko’s assassination the Donetsk separatists’ 
military structures were remodelled according to those in Luhansk – 
there is no Defence ‘Ministry’, the armed forces are named “People’s 
Militia” and are under the exclusive command of the Army Corps. 
While former Luhansk leader Igor Plotnitsky once said that “People’s 
Militia” was the right term for an “army of the people” in which 
miners, teachers and others become fighters, others argued that the 
term was chosen because the Minsk Package of Measures allows the 
“Certain Areas” of Donetsk and Luhansk to form “People’s Militias” 
for maintaining public order.218 
 Asymmetric mutual deterrence 
While the separatists keep their troop numbers secret, Ukrainian 
officials have voiced their own estimates. Ukraine’s Joint Forces 
Operation said in December 2018 that the combined troops of both 
                                                        
216 Comments by Serhiy Nayev, the commander of Ukraine’s Joint Forces 
Operation https://www.ukrinform.ru/rubric-ato/2452327-naev-armejskie-
korpusa-dnr-i-lnr-eto-klassiceskie-podrazdelenia-vs-rf.html and 
https://topwar.ru/111200-v-vs-rf-formiruetsya-8-ya-obschevoyskovaya-
armiya.html  
217 https://vz.ru/news/2018/9/9/941039.html  
218 https://web.archive.org/web/20171121101755/http://mil-lnr.info/press-
sluzhba/reportazhi-intervyu/item/1658-my-ne-vsegda-afishiruem-nashu-silu-
no-my-tochno-znaem-chto-nasha-armiya-nas-zashchitit-igor-plotnitskij The 
People’s Militia is mentioned in the footnote to the Agreement’s point 11 
https://www.osce.org/ru/cio/140221?download=true  
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separatist Army Corps number 32,000, that 11,000 of them are 
Russian citizens and that regular Russian officers hold the key 
command positions.219 President Poroshenko said weeks earlier that 
Russian troops “in and around” Ukraine numbered 80,000.220 By 
comparison, Ukraine had 64,000 troops in the Donbas in 2015 
according to Poroshenko.221 
The overall number of Russian servicemen in Crimea, the 
Donbas and southern Russia is relevant because they are central to 
the ongoing military confrontation: Ukraine is deterred from entering 
the NGCA by force because of the threat of a large Russian military 
invasion, as happened in Ilovaisk 2014 and in Debaltseve 2015. 
Russia’s Armed Forces consist of about 1 million professional 
soldiers, about four times as many as Ukraine’s 255,000 men and 
women.222 Russia also outspent Ukraine by almost 20 times in 2017, 
when its military expenditure reached $66.3 million, while Ukraine 
just spent $3.6 million, according to the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).223 Thus, Moscow is unlikely to feel 
constrained by military deterrence – but probably by political 
considerations.  
While it cannot be proven that the sanctions imposed by the 
European Union and the United States in 2014 after the annexation of 
Crimea and the shooting down of the Malaysian Boeing MH17 in late 
July caused the Kremlin to change its behaviour, it is true that in 
August, Russian citizens were withdrawn from the separatist 
leadership and Russia and Ukraine sat down for the first round of 
Minsk negotiations in September. To be sure, Russian regular troops 
entered Ukraine and defeated government forces in Ilovaisk in 
August 2014 and in Debaltseve in February 2015, but both battles 
resulted in consolidation rather than significant expansions of 
separatist-held territory. 
                                                        
219 https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/555933.html  
220 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/poroshenko-80000-russian-
troops-ukraine-181201164222788.html  
221 https://web.archive.org/web/20170228171239/http://24today.net/open/484721  
222 https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/3947234-chyselnist-zsu-dosiahla-
255-000-osib  
223 http://visuals.sipri.org/  
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The EU’s resolve to use sanctions against Russia has receded – 
the bloc has kept prolonging the ones from 2014 but found no 
majority for imposing new ones following the Kerch Strait incident 
in November 2018, when the Russian Coast Guard attacked and 
seized three Ukrainian navy boats.224 However, the US imposed new 
sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act and the EU’s stance may harden again if Russia 
launches a military attack in eastern Ukraine, e.g. to achieve a land 
corridor with Crimea. 
On the other hand, Moscow may not be interested in seizing 
more territory at all. An important point is that while it may be 
relatively easy to conquer more of Ukraine militarily, keeping and 
running new territories poses far greater problems – similar to those 
encountered in the NGCA today.225Moscow’s main motivation to 
hold on to the ‘People’s Republics’ may well be to maintain a spoiler 
for Ukraine’s ambitions to join NATO and the EU (see Chapter 2). 
 The fighting along the Contact Line 
All this does not mean that there is no violence. By 2019, more than 
13,000 people have been killed in the conflict according to the United 
Nations. And between January and mid-December of that year, the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces had lost 97 servicemen and  
-women, according to Defence Ministry figures reported by the BBC 
– only slightly fewer than 2018, when that figure was 110. The 
Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ said that 149 of its fighters were killed in 
the course of 2019.226 
                                                        
224 Only ten of 28 EU countries advocated new sanctions for the Kerch Incident 
https://twitter.com/RikardJozwiak/status/1072130653490216960  
225 Is a Russian military operation against Ukraine likely in the near future? 
https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/12/26/is-a-russian-
military-operation-against-ukraine-likely-in-the-near-future/ 
226 https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-50843934 and 
http://ombudsmandnr.ru/obzor-soczialno-gumanitarnoj-situaczii-
slozhivshejsya-na-territorii-doneczkoj-narodnoj-respubliki-vsledstvie-voennyh-
dejstvij-v-period-s-21-po-27-dekabrya-2019-goda/ No reliable figures were 
available from the LNR. 
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On a – relatively speaking – more positive note, the number of 
civilian deaths has been going down steadily. In 2019, the OSCE 
Special Monitoring Mission recorded 19 civilian deaths and 128 
injuries, the lowest figures since the conflict began in 2014. In 2018, 43 
civilians were killed and another 192 injured.227 
Of course, lower casualty figures do not mean that tensions 
have fundamentally subsided. Rather, they reflect the fact that no 
dramatic escalations happened in 2018. By contrast, intense fighting 
in the area of Avdiivka in late January 2017 cost more than 30 
soldiers’ and seven civilians’ lives. That outbreak of violence has been 
explained with political posturing, because it occurred between the 
first telephone calls of the then newly-elected US President Donald 
Trump with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin (January 28) and 
Ukraine’s Petro Poroshenko (February 4). The situation calmed down 
after Trump assured Poroshenko of continued US support.228 
The separatists also have clear political motives to keep the 
violence simmering. As the ‘People’s Republics’ fail to live up to their 
promises of replacing Ukraine’s corrupt oligarchy with a fairer “rule 
of the people” – plus (eventual) unification with Russia, they focus 
on demonising Ukraine and the West as hostile aggressors. The 
dominance of reports in separatist media about Ukrainian Armed 
Forces attacking, often supposedly with the help of “NATO 
instructors”, strongly suggests that the purpose of the armed conflict 
is to shore up public support. 
The reasons for violence do not always have to be political 
though. One persistent aspect of the conflict between 2015 and 2018 
has been Ukraine’s tactic of gradually moving troops into frontline 
settlements that had hitherto been in the so-called grey zone between 
the sides’ frontline positions. 
These advances were often of little military value, while they 
increase the risk of escalation as both sides move closer to each 
                                                        
227 https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/444073  
and https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/407795? 
download=true  
228 https://www.rferl.org/a/trump-poroshenko-phone-call-russia-
putin/28279111.html  
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other.229 The “creeping offensive” can be explained by the desire to 
report successes and the retaking of lost territory. Each instance is 
usually followed by buoyant reports in Ukrainian media.230 More 
importantly, the limited offensives kept up military pressure and 
allow Kyiv to claim that there is a hot war rather than a frozen 
conflict. 
The tactic more or less ended in December 2018, when 
Ukrainian military adviser Yuriy Biryukov said that government 
troops had “liberated” practically the whole “grey zone”.231 
 Disengagement 
In 2019, President Zelenskiy’s administration made a range of 
concessions in order to get the Kremlin to agree to hold another 
‘Normandy Format’ summit. While the signing of the Steinmeier 
Formula is purely theoretical (see Chapter 2), the implementation of 
the disengagement agreement directly affected the security situation 
because it resulted in mutual troops withdrawals on three locations – 
most importantly Stanytsia Luhanska, the only crossing point in the 
entire Luhansk region, where civilians have been forced to climb over 
a badly damaged footbridge over the river Donets, which divides the 
sides. 
In June and July 2019, the sides retreated two kilometres each 
from Stanytsia, allowing for the rebuilding of the bridge, which was 
opened in November in Zelenskiy’s presence.232 
The disengagement agreement, signed back in 2016, is 
supposed to increase security by making both sides retreat two 
                                                        
229 See eg this report on Chyhari (Chyhyri) – a hamlet in a depression next to slag 
heaps occupied by separatist fighters https://medium.com/dfrlab/minsk 
monitor-ukraine-takes-control-of-village-near-horlivka-54f29260b5c0  
230 Report about Katerynivka https://inforesist.org/vsu-otvoevali-poselok-
novoaleksandrovka-v-luganskoy-oblasti/ and about Zolote 4 
https://www.uaportal.com/news/osvobozhdenie-Donbasa-poyavilos-video-
kak-zhiteli-hutora-volnyij-vstrechali-bojtsov-oos.htm  
231 https://gordonua.com/news/war/seraya-zona-Donbasa-osvobozhdena-i-
vzyata-pod-kontrol-biryukov-611978.html  
232 https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-defense/2822171-zelensky-says-bridge-
in-stanytsia-luhanska-opened.html  
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kilometres each from the Line of Contact – initially at three locations. 
The agreement does not solve the conflict, but Russia demanded its 
implementation as a precondition for a ‘Normandy Format’ summit, 
probably to test President Zelenskiy’s capability as commander-in-
chief, knowing that the Ukrainian military opposed it. 
The ‘Normandy Format’ summit held on December 9 in Paris 
decided to add another three locations, which should be negotiated 
before the next summit planned in April. 
 International Presence: The OSCE Mission 
The biggest and most lasting international effort to contain the 
conflict is the OSCE Monitoring Mission, which was first deployed to 
all of Ukraine in April 2014 and was subsequently enlarged from 100 
to about 800 monitors from OSCE member states, 600 of whom are 
stationed in the Donbas.233 The unarmed and civilian Mission is by 
far the largest international presence in the NGCA, where it 
maintains regional headquarters in Donetsk and Luhansk and its 
patrols cross the Line of Contact multiple times per day. Its mandate, 
which is subject to prolongation each spring, allows the monitors to 
report not just about the security situation but more broadly about 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and to engage in dialogue 
facilitation.234 
The Mission has proven to be a unique source of neutral 
information about ceasefire violations, e.g. in 2018, when it recorded 
multiple night-time military movements across the Russian-
Ukrainian border in the NGCA, proving direct Russian 
involvement.235 It also plays a vital function in facilitating local 
ceasefires that enable urgent infrastructure repairs.236 Recently, 
Mission members have helped to sustain freshwater supplies by 
                                                        
233 https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-
ukraine/411437?download=true  
234 https://www.osce.org/pc/116747?download=true  
235 One of the Mission’s long-range drones was subsequently shot down over 
separatist-held territory https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-
ukraine/401342 
236 https://www.osce.org/stories/osce-mirror-patrols-windows-of-hope-
eastern-ukraine  
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handing over cash payments from the separatists to Ukrainian 
electricity providers who pump the water across the Line of Contact 
(for Ukrainian entities, any business relationship with the NGCA is 
illegal).237 
On the downside, the mission has been dogged by mutual 
accusations of bias. Ukrainian politicians and activists routinely 
decry the presence of Russian citizens in the Mission, whom they 
accuse of passing military secrets to their government.238 The 
separatists, on the other hand, regularly complain about the 
Mission’s alleged ineffectiveness and pro-Ukrainian bias.239 On 
several occasions they organised protests outside OSCE locations in 
Donetsk and Luhansk.240 
The OSCE Mission also suffers from expectations that it will 
solve the conflict – which unarmed civilian monitors clearly cannot. 
While these limitations directly reflect the international community’s 
divisions on Ukraine, actors in Kyiv and the West are actively 
promoting a peacekeeping mission to change this.  
 Prospects for a peacekeeping mission 
The fact that the Line of Contact has been respected by both sides is 
the single biggest achievement of the Minsk agreement, but the 
ensuing military stalemate represents a growing source of 
frustration, especially for the Ukrainian side. While a military 
solution can be ruled out as long as it is likely that Russia will repel it 
with massive superiority, Ukraine has repeatedly promoted the 
                                                        
237 https://www.svoboda.org/a/29695308.html  
238 In October 2017 Ukrainian deputy parliamentary speaker Iryna 
Herashchenko wrongly complained that the number of Russians in the Mission 
had doubled within one year https://ru.tsn.ua/ato/za-posledniy-god-v-missii-
obse-na-Donbase-vdvoe-vozroslo-kolichestvo-rossiyan-geraschenko-
1001815.html  
239 Video produced by the Donetsk Information ‘Ministry’ in June 2018 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CcUN-s_BrRw  
240 In February 2017, a well-organised protest was held outside the Park Inn 
hotel in Donetsk https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/donchane-schitayut-chto-
nablyudateli-obse-v-Donbase-ne-obektivny-i-skryvayut-prestupleniya-
Kyiva.html  
126  BEYOND FROZEN CONFLICT 
 
deployment of an international peacekeeping force – with a United 
Nations or even an OSCE mandate. However, such suggestions were 
roundly rejected by Russia and the separatists even staged protests 
against an armed foreign mission.241 
The idea only gained momentum in September 2017, when 
Russian President Putin suddenly proposed the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers. However, he attached conditions which have been 
deemed unacceptable by Ukraine and most other countries. 
Putin’s suggestion is as follows:242 
 The peacekeepers should provide protection for the OSCE 
Mission 
 The peacekeepers should be stationed only along the Line 
of Contact 
 Their deployment can only happen after the sides’ 
disengagement, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and 
direct talks between Ukraine and the separatists 
In essence, Putin’s proposal would create a demilitarised buffer 
zone between the GCA and the NGCA, patrolled by unarmed OSCE 
observers and armed UN peacekeepers. Ukraine’s reservations 
against this scenario are easy to understand – it seems only too likely 
that it will entrench the alienation of the ‘People’s Republics’ from the 
rest of Ukraine, while Moscow can continue to treat them as de facto 
parts of Russia through an open border that is not controlled by Kyiv. 
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin spelt out a red line for his 
government in this respect when he said in June 2018 that a Russian-
controlled Donbas can never be part of Ukraine.243 
The separatists, unsurprisingly, have refused to endorse 
anything but Putin’s proposal and accused Ukraine of using 
peacekeeping scenarios as a lobbying tool for foreign military 
assistance to retake the Donbas by force. Donetsk separatist leader 
                                                        
241 In June 2016, the Donetsk separatists claimed tens of thousands participated 
in a protest against an armed OSCE Mission https://dan-
news.info/world/desyatki-tysyach-zhitelej-dnr-na-mitinge-v-stolice-vyrazili-
protest-vvedeniyu-vooruzhennoj-missii-obse.html  
242 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55535  
243 https://interfax.com.ua/news/interview/512774.html  
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Pushilin argued in September 2017 that Ukrainian President 
Poroshenko was seeking to “cleanse” the territory of the ‘People’s 
Republics’ with the help of Blue Helmets.244 Ukraine’s Interior 
Minister Arsen Avakov in April 2018 actually fuelled such fears, 
when he proposed a “Step by Step” plan, according to which Ukraine 
retakes the Donbas city by city with the help of international 
peacekeepers.245 
Despite the shortcomings of Putin’s proposal, Ukraine’s 
western allies jumped on the opportunity to create a momentum and 
push negotiations for a more useful mission. The peacekeeping 
discussions opened a new theatre to engage Russia and to test its will 
to solve the conflict. 
Experts have proposed various models for a peacekeeping 
force. Most of them foresee the initial deployment of an armed 
mission, followed by a civilian transitional administration for the 
NGCA. The consensus is that a “robust” force, that can defend itself 
against a range of attacks, needs up to 50,000 members, including a 
civilian and police component. 
Oleksandr Levchenko, a Ukrainian diplomat and adviser to the 
Ministry for Temporarily Occupied Territories, said in October 2018 
that a mission should consist of between 25,000 and 50,000 members, 
including 15% policemen and 15% civilians. He added that the 
Mission should try to build on experience in Croatia, notably the UN 
Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia in 1996-1998.246 
Because such large numbers are unrealistic, proposals for a 
mid-sized mission with 20,000 members have been put forward, plus 
a police component of 2,000 to 4,000. However, this scenario only 
works if Russia genuinely commits itself “to stopping its proxies in 
the Donbas causing serious trouble for the peacekeepers”.247 
                                                        
244 https://dan-news.info/politics/silami-mirotvorcev-oon-poroshenko-
nameren-zachistit-territorii-respublik-pushilin.html 
245 https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2018/04/16/7177768/  
246 https://www.unian.info/politics/10309443-croatian-peacekeeping-model-
best-for-donbas-ukraine-s-ministry-for-occupied-areas.html  
247 Study by Richard Gowan, January 2018 https://www.hudson.org/ 
research/14128-can-the-united-nations-unite-ukraine  
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An even more downsized force has been proposed by the 
UPEACE Centre in The Hague, which calls for a UN-mandated 
“peace support operation” using Quick Reaction Forces to assist the 
OSCE in strengthening the ceasefire along the Line of Contact and, 
subsequently, ensure protection and freedom of movement for the 
OSCE throughout the conflict zone, including the border with Russia. 
This proposal sees the deployment of no more than 3,000 special 
forces initially and up to 10,000 plus 3,000 police officers for 
maintaining law and order for an interim administration.248 
The challenges of getting an international peacekeeping force 
together are clearly enormous. First, Russia and Ukraine need to 
agree on contributing countries. Clearly, Kyiv won’t accept Russian 
citizens being part of a mission, which has proven a permanent 
source of trouble for the present OSCE Mission. Similarly, Russia will 
presumably try to minimise the presence of NATO member states 
and oppose US, British or French troops, while German troops are 
unlikely for historical reasons.  
Because a force made up primarily from Asian and/or Latin 
American countries is unlikely to have much political and 
operational credibility, the contributors’ burden is likely to fall on a 
relatively small number of European non-NATO states like Sweden, 
Finland and Austria. While a strong mandate from the UN Security 
Council seems mandatory, Western countries might oppose direct 
UN command, likely leading to a potentially cumbersome mix of a 
stand-alone Multinational Force with UN police and OSCE observers 
in parallel.249 
 Limits for a peacekeeping mission 
Such technical issues should not shroud the fundamental point, 
namely that a peacekeeping mission cannot create a solution – as the 
Russian term mirotvortsy (peacemakers) misleadingly suggests. In 
                                                        
248 http://www.upeace.nl/index.php?page=news-news-recent-
planning_for_peace_in_eastern_ukraine:_report_by_upeace_centre_the_hague_
presents_scenario_for_un_blue_helmets_in_donbas&pid=138&id=196 
249 Richard Gowan: Nordic Peacekeepers for Ukraine: Back in Blue? 
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order to be effective, a mission must be deployed only after political 
leaders have agreed on the terms of a political solution. It should be 
abundantly clear that the current military presence in the NGCA, 
which includes probably more than 40,000 men under arms plus 
heavy weapons that can be mobilised relatively quickly, cannot be 
matched by any conventional international peacekeeping force. 
This argument was already made in 2016, when Germany 
rejected a Ukrainian proposal to arm the existent OSCE Mission. 
Apart from the fact that there is no precedent for such a mission, the 
German Foreign Ministry pointed out that the Mission’s present 
civilian (and unarmed) nature is an advantage, because it ensures the 
conflict parties’ consent. “When you take the idea of an armed 
mission to its logical conclusion, it raises a whole range of difficult 
legal, political, practical and military issues,” the Ministry said at the 
time.250 
Bringing Russia to withdraw arms and personnel that it denies 
having deployed in the first place is only the beginning of a tough 
negotiation scenario. A recent Chatham House paper asks: How will 
Russian military personnel be distinguished from the local “people’s 
militias”? Which weapons may remain?251 Another daunting task 
will be to make Moscow give up political control of the ‘People’s 
Republics’ and to reach their dissolution. This demand has been 
made more than once by US envoy Kurt Volker, who argued that the 
‘Republics’ have no place in Ukraine’s constitutional order.252 
Here, time is not on Ukraine’s side. No matter how illegal and 
illegitimate they are, the longer the ‘People’s Republics’ exist, the 
harder will it be to erase them from history. Their so-called state 
building activities are already in full swing. New school curriculums 
focus on patriotic education and revise historical assessments 
established during the years of Ukrainian independence. As a recent 
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study argues, “their intended effect is the creation of a new Donbas 
community which is hostile towards ‘nationalist’ Ukraine.”253 
The current military stalemate reflects the absence of political 
will to reach a solution. A peacekeeping force can only come to 
Ukraine as an implementation assistance after such political will 
materialises. 
3.6 Outlook 
This study has found that the ‘People’s Republics’ are politically 
unstable, economically not viable and fraught with military risks. The 
strong presence of violence and military adventurism creates an 
atmosphere of corruption, impunity and widespread injustice. While 
major corruption excesses may have been terminated with the 
assassination of Alexander Zakharchenko and the removal of his 
deputy Alexander Timofeyev, the establishment of a flourishing 
market economy seems unlikely anytime soon.  
The difficulties are exacerbated by the fact that infighting in the 
Donbas translates into infighting in Moscow and vice versa. Thus, 
while the 2017 putsch in Luhansk resulted in the removal from power 
of Kremlin ally Igor Plotnitsky, the killing of Zakharchenko in 2018 
brought Kremlin loyalist Denis Pushilin to power.  
A recurring theme has been uncertainty about the role of 
Vladislav Surkov, the Kremlin’s point man for Donbas. In 2018, 
President Putin waited almost three months between his re-election 
in March and Surkov’s reappointment in June, prompting 
widespread speculation that Surkov would lose his job. The situation 
escalated again in 2020, when Surkov announced his resignation after 
Putin appointed his rival Dmitry Kozak to deputy head of the 
presidential administration. However, Surkov had not been relieved 
of his duties and no solution to this conflict was visible by the time of 
publication. 
Finally, it is becoming harder to obtain reliable information 
from the Donbas, as levels of secrecy were stepped up. The colossal 
                                                        
253 https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2018-06-
06/identity-policy-self-proclaimed-republics-east-ukraine-0  
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lack of transparency is highlighted by Donetsk ‘Prime Minister’ 
Alexander Ananchenko, of whom there was no official photograph 
more than one year after he joined the ‘Government’ in September 
2018.254 The NGCA’s isolation is growing, as business and trade ties 
remain blocked, young and talented people are leaving and even the 
telephone breaks down, as in early 2018 when the Vodafone network 
was cut off for three months in the Donetsk region NGCA. 
With this complex situation, there are not many policy options 
for Ukraine and the West. 
It should be abundantly clear that there is no military solution. 
As long as Russia has tens of thousands of troops stationed along the 
border with Ukraine and does not clearly signal a political and 
military withdrawal from the Donbas, this cannot possibly be an 
option.  
But a political solution, as agreed in Minsk, remains out of 
reach. While President Zelenskiy’s administrations seems willing to 
try its implementation, the conditions set by Kyiv-Ukrainian control 
of the NGCA before local elections – are unlikely to be approved by 
Moscow.  
More fundamentally, Russia wants a Ukrainian government 
that is pro-Moscow. But the violence in Donbas, which was 
unleashed and is fuelled by Moscow, has shattered the chances of 
such political forces coming into power. Even in the unlikely event of 
an end to the war, it remains unthinkable today that a majority of 
Ukrainians will elect a pro-Russian government. 
Thus, Ukraine’s biggest chance is winning the conflict with soft 
powers, given the disastrous economic conditions in the NGCA. The 
conditions for this are not that bad – wages in the Donbas GCA are 
almost three times as high as in the NGCA. However, wages in the 
neighbouring Russian Rostov region are already three times as high. 
While Ukraine may have a long way to go before becoming a 
western-style democracy with strong political institutions, low levels 
of corruption and a functioning welfare state, it already holds a 
trump card in that its citizens are eligible for visa-free entry to the 
European Union. In a clear sign that Ukraine is perceived as a 
                                                        
254 Despite Ananchenko’s televised speech in November, there was no photo of 
him on the government website https://pravdnr.ru/sostav-pravitelstva/  
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favourable destination, the separatists have imposed travel bans on 
people they cannot afford to lose.  
If conditions develop favourably, Ukraine could offer targeted 
benefits for those willing to resettle from the NGCA to the GCA. It 
could also lift its blockade, potentially offering significant economic 
returns. This might resemble the German ‘Magnet Theory’ of the late 
1940s and 50s, according to which West Germany would ‘win over’ 
East Germans by projecting a more prosperous economy and freer 
society after the partition following World War II.255 
While that theory was proven only 40 years later than their 
proponents Kurt Schumacher and Konrad Adenauer hoped, such a 
long wait need not necessarily be the case for eastern Ukraine. The 
Donbas is certainly nowhere near becoming a model economy in a 
Moscow-led economic bloc, like the GDR did in the 1970s. If it 
becomes too expensive for Russia and if Kyiv is willing to lift the 
blockade, Ukraine is clearly the natural economic anchor for the 
NCGA.  
However, the soft power equation is greatly complicated by the 
presence of hard military power. Ukraine can hardly carry out an 
effective soft power strategy while the fighting in the Donbas 
continues. For the violence makes it easy for Russia to vilify Ukraine 
as a cruel regime, which may in turn explain why Moscow is not 
interested in a real ceasefire. 
Another question is if Ukraine wants to bridge the culture gap 
with Russia. 
Ukraine’s current language and education policies are not well 
suited to attract an alienated Russian-speaking working-class 
population living in relative poverty along the border with the 
Russian Federation. According to Ukraine’s new education law, state 
schools must phase out Russian as a language of instruction. Over the 
past four years, the government has enacted bans on Russian cinema 
films, independent TV stations as well as Russian social networks and 
internet search engines. If, and this is a big if, Ukraine adopts a more 
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conciliatory policy towards the Russian language, it could project its 
message into the Donbas more easily. 
Time is not on Ukraine’s side. Despite the Minsk agreements, 
the ‘People’s Republics’ keep pushing their agenda of integration 
with Russia. For example, in 2018 more and more Donetsk University 
students were receiving degrees that are valid in Russia.256 Schools 
are changing curriculums in history and other subjects and focus on 
patriotic education. Moscow may even sit back and do very little: the 
longer the ‘People’s Republics’ exist in their current isolation from 
Ukraine, the more Russia’s sphere of influence will create anti-
Ukrainian identity. The experience of other separatist entities shows 
that with each year of their existence, a return to the parent state 
becomes less likely.  
And should relations with the West deteriorate further, the 
Kremlin might heed calls from inside the Russian political 
establishment and recognise the ‘People’s Republics’ as independent, 
just as it did with South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 2008. This is a worst-
case scenario Ukraine and its allies should avoid at all costs because 
it opens the road to the next annexation of Ukrainian territory. 
 
 
                                                        
256 https://dan-news.info/obschestvo/chetyre-s-polovinoyu-tysyachi-
vypusknikov-respubliki-poluchili-diplomy-rf-sovet-rektorov-dnr.html  
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A final political solution of the conflict over Transdniestria remains elusive 
and dependent on wider geopolitical trends. However, in contrast to other 
conflicts, it is peaceful, there are substantial people-to-people contacts and 
also economic convergence as the region participates in Moldova’s Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU. A series of 
confidence-building measures, overseen by the OSCE, have been agreed by 
the two sides since 2016. Transdniestria’s current de facto authorities, close 
to the powerful Sheriff conglomerate are pragmatic. An economic squeeze, 
large-scale emigration and reduced Russian aid has made the government 
more ready for compromise. With the coming to power of a government in 
Chisinau committed to cracking down on the black economy and smuggling 
schemes, a key question will be how a change in the status of Transdniestria 
as a ‘grey zone’, exploited by a wide range of players, will affect its long-term 
future.  
4.1 Introduction 
The Transdniestria conflict is in many ways less a conflict than a bitter 
political and territorial dispute. There has been virtually no violence 
since the armed phase of the conflict ended in 1992. There are high 
levels of daily contact between people in Transdniestria and in right-
bank Moldova and the economies of the two sides are connected at 
many levels. A spirit of pragmatism prevails in the conflict, which 
contrasts it with the conflicts in Ukraine and the South Caucasus. The 
dispute is perpetuated by the rival geopolitical orientations of 
decision-makers on both sides. Many in the region also view the 
status quo as benefiting elite business groups on either side of the 
Dniester River, who have agreed to divide up assets and profit from 
Transdniestria’s unrecognised status.1  
There has been modest progress since 2016, with the 
implementation of most of a “package of eight” confidence-building 
and integration measures, drawn up by both sides and mediated by 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
This has benefited ordinary people in practical ways and given 
momentum to bottom-up processes of de facto integration. A final 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to Lyndon Allin and William Hill, both of whom know the 
history of this conflict far better than I, for guidance on this issue over the last 
few years. Many thanks also to Dionis Cenusa, Michael Emerson and Nikolaus 
von Twickel for useful comments on the first draft of this report.  
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political resolution of the conflict is still elusive, however. This is 
partly due to a reluctance by powerful figures on both sides to 
surrender the political control and economic monopolies they 
currently hold and form a common state. It also is a reflection of the 
fact that, although everyday relations are good, there is no burning 
desire amongst the populations on either side of the Dniester River 
to live in a shared state.  
Opinion polls in right-bank Moldova consistently show that 
the Transdniestria issue ranks very low down a long list of public 
priorities, behind corruption, low levels of income and emigration.2 
Large parts of the public are wary about a reintegration project that 
would tilt the balance of Moldovan politics more towards pro-
Russian forces and potentially slow down the country’s progress 
towards Europe. For many Transdniestrians, by contrast, integration 
with Moldova does not look like an attractive prospect – at least at 
the moment. Many people in Transdniestria have taken advantage of 
the possibility of obtaining Moldovan passports, which gives them 
the right of visa-free travel to the EU’s Schengen zone, or even 
Romanian passports. However, Moldova remains Europe’s poorest 
(sometimes second poorest) country with a GDP per capita of only 
around $3,000, and with exceptionally high rates of emigration. The 
fraud scandal in which one billion dollars was reported ‘missing’ 
from three Moldovan banks in 2014 confirmed the reputation of the 
country as state crippled by endemic corruption in which ordinary 
citizens’ rights are not defended. One de facto official in Tiraspol 
disparaged efforts to re-integrate his region into Moldova, saying, 
“Attempts to attach us to a broken car that is not moving won’t 
work.”3 
The ongoing conflict is also a matter of geopolitical contestation 
between Russia and Western powers – albeit in a milder form than 
that over Georgia and Ukraine. In contrast to the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia and the European Union and 
                                                        
2 See for example the International Republic Institute poll of May-June 2018, 
where the conflict is not mentioned at all as an important issue. 
https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2018-7-
16_moldova_poll_presentation.pdf 
3 Interview in Tiraspol, February 2018.  
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United States agree that the final status of Transdniestria should be 
within a reintegrated Moldova. However, there is disagreement on 
what that status should look like, and also on the security issue. 
According to informed sources, there are three battalions of Russians 
in Transdniestria, each consisting of about 1,500 men. Around one 
third of them are peacekeepers. The other two thirds form the OGRF 
troop contingent, a remnant of the Soviet 14th Army, which was 
formerly stationed in the region, but which is there illegally, without 
host-country consent.  
Two mitigating factors make the security issue somewhat less 
intractable than in Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Ukraine. One is that, 
unlike Georgia and Ukraine, the NATO issue is currently off the 
agenda, as Moldova has committed itself to “permanent neutrality” 
in its constitution. The second one is that the majority of the ‘Russian’ 
troops in the OGRF are almost certainly not ethnic Russians, but local 
Transdniestrian residents wearing Russian uniforms. The Russian 
military has been unable to rotate and replace men from Russia there 
for several years, meaning that under an informal agreement, Russian 
peacekeepers rotate with OGRF men. There may be as few as 100 
ethnic Russians, almost all officers, remaining.  
The rather comfortable status quo was shaken up for a while 
by the events in Moldova of June 2019, when an unconventional 
alliance of the pro-European ACUM party and the Socialists came 
together to force the ruling PDM out of office, and its leader, Vladimir 
Plahotniuc, widely described as Moldova’s chief ‘oligarch’, out of the 
country. This peaceful change of regime unsettled the elite in Tiraspol 
– in particular the heads of the Sheriff conglomerate – which had 
reached a modus vivendi with Plahotniuc. The coalition fell in 
December to be replaced by a Communist-led government with the 
PDM (minus Plahotniuc) as the junior partner. 
Transdniestria policy has mostly been put on hold in Chisinau 
while Moldova sorts out its domestic politics ahead of a crucial 
election in 2020. Two experienced negotiators took the brief: first 
Vasile Şova, a well-known interlocutor in Tiraspol, who held the 
same post between 2002 and 2009, then Alexandru Flenchea, who had 
worked intensively on the issue for the OSCE office. That means that 
the policy of “small steps” is set to continue. Should the Russia-
friendly Socialist Party keep power in 2020, it is likely to pursue plans 
TRANSDNIESTRIA TODAY 139 
 
for reintegration, albeit cautiously. The party published a plan for the 
future “federalisation” of Moldova, which is still on their website, 
although their leaders do not make the case for it in public4 This idea 
is anathema to ACUM, which is more focused on cutting down 
contraband trade and illegal smuggling from the territory.  
4.2 Background 
The Transdniestria conflict was not fought on an ethnic basis. 
Allegiance is defined more in terms of geography, politics, culture 
and history. People who identify themselves as Moldovan, Russian 
and Ukrainian live on both sides of the River Dniester (Nistru) and 
the unrecognised entity on the eastern side calls itself the 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic. A narrow curling strip of land 
400km long mostly adjoining the broad river, the region is known as 
Transnistria in Moldovan, to denote territory on its far (eastern and 
left) bank. Transdniestria is the internationalised version used by 
international mediators, while the local Russian version, 
Pridnestrov’ye, means just “the place next to the Dniester”. 
Over the last century, there have been several different entities 
in the wider region named “Moldova” or “Moldavia” and 
“Transdniestria” or “Transnistria,” with very different borders. In 
1924, a first Moldovan Soviet Republic, the MASSR, was established 
on land exclusively on the eastern side of the Dniester, covering not 
only present-day Transdniestria but also much of what is now the 
Balta region of Ukraine. In that republic, Ukrainians outnumbered 
Moldovans, who comprised only around 30% of the population.  
In 1940, having agreed the infamous “Secret Protocols” with 
Nazi Germany in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact agreed, the Soviet 
Union seized the lands of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina west of 
the Dniester from Romania, apportioning the part of Bessarabia 
adjoining the Black Sea to Ukraine and creating a new Moldovan 
Soviet Republic which had no access to the sea to the north and west. 
After Germany invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, Nazi-allied 
Romania reconquered these territories and held them for three years. 
They were recaptured by the Red Army in 1944 and the Soviet 
                                                        
4 See http://socialistii.md/ru/federalizare/ 
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republic of Moldova was re-established, comprising territories on 
both sides of the Dniester River.  
The legacy of World War II and its aftermath still hangs heavily 
over the wider region and defines the identities of Transdniestria and 
right-bank Moldova. For right-bank Moldova, the end of the war was 
a time of conquest by Stalin, followed by mass deportations of 
Moldovans to Siberia and a devastating famine. Subsequently in the 
1940s and 50s, as it did in the Baltic Republics, Moscow sought to 
Russify the republic and imposed Russian leaders on it (including 
Leonid Brezhnev from 1950 to 1952). A large segment of people on 
this side look west and keep strong cultural and historical affinities 
with Romania, of which Moldova was a part for much of modern 
history. The Moldovan language is basically the same as Romanian, 
the two having been divided by the imposition of a Cyrillic script on 
Moldovan in Soviet times. A steady minority of around 20% of 
Moldovans support union with Romania, according to opinion polls.5  
People in Transdniestria still look east. The inhabitants of the 
territory say that it suffered under Romanian military rule in 1941-44 
and their descendants see the years 1944-45 as a moment of liberation 
by the Soviet Union. In the post-war years the population was 
swelled by thousands of labour migrants from other parts of the 
USSR, who came to work in the region’s factories. So 
Transdniestrians mostly still belong firmly to the “Russki Mir” 
(Russian World) whose centre is Moscow and looks back fondly on 
the Soviet Union as a great power. (They tend to share this outlook 
with Moldova’s main minority population, the ethnically Turkic 
Gagauz, who also predominantly speak Russian). Transdniestria has 
preserved many symbols and monuments from the Soviet era, 
including a hammer and sickle in its flag (which was devised before 
the USSR ended), statues of Lenin, Soviet-era street-names and a 
security agency named the KGB.  
In Soviet times, Transdniestria was developed into being the 
industrial powerhouse of what was otherwise a poor agricultural 
                                                        
5 A BOP opinion poll of May 2018 found 24% of Moldovans in favour of union 
with Romania. https://deschide.md/ro/stiri/politic/30828/SONDAJ-BOP--
C%C3%A2%C8%9Bi-moldoveni-sunt-gata-s%C4%83-voteze-pentru-Unirea-cu-
Rom%C3%A2nia.htm%7Cdate=May 
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republic. Up until the 1980s the region’s leaders exercised 
disproportionate political influence over the rest of Moldova. As 
Charles King writes, “In demographic and economic terms, the MSSR 
gradually developed as two republics in one: a largely rural, 
Moldovan, and indigenous population in Bessarabia employed 
primarily in agriculture and light agro-industry; and a more urban, 
Slavic, and generally immigrant population in Transnistria working 
in Soviet-style heavy industry.”6 This made for a republic with two 
competing elites on each side of the river, even as the wider 
population still had much in common.  
In 1989-91, in the crisis years of the perestroika era, in parallel 
to protests in the Baltic states and the South Caucasus, a new 
nationalist movement in Chisinau defied Soviet power, re-asserted a 
Romanian identity for Moldova and sought independence from 
Moscow. The smaller pro-Moscow elite in Transdniestria made 
countermoves, declaring its own autonomy and re-affirming loyalty 
to the Soviet centre. On August 31, 1989 the newly empowered 
Supreme Soviet of Moldova adopted three language laws, which 
prioritised Moldovan as the “state language” of the republic. This 
was strongly resisted in Transdniestria as an attack on its people’s 
rights, which would also render Russophone cadres ineligible for top 
jobs. Tiraspol doubled down on its support for existing Soviet 
structures and policies. The two sides began to separate from one 
another. The dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 raised 
the stakes by making Moldova an independent state and the 
Transdniestrians separatists by default.  
The Transdniestrian conflict was brief but traumatic. It lasted 
two months in 1992, and around one thousand people lost their lives. 
Neither side had a proper military force, but both acted aggressively. 
A Moldovan government offensive on the town of Bendery was 
pushed back by armed Transdniestrians, receiving both formal and 
informal support from the Russian military. The intervention of the 
Russian 14th Army and its commander General Alexander Lebed on 
behalf of the Transdniestrian side was decisive. A Russian-brokered 
                                                        
6 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture 
(Stanford, CA: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1999), 100. 
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ceasefire agreement in July 1992 cemented the status quo and 
introduced a joint Moldovan, Russian and Transdniestrian 
peacekeeping force to police the new de facto boundary.  
The Russian government has supported Transdniestria 
financially and politically, but within certain limits. In the 1990s 
Moscow partially demilitarised the region. The 14th Army, numbered 
almost 10,000 in 1992, was later reclassified as the Organizational 
Group of Russian Forces or OGRF in 1995. Its new commander Valery 
Yevnevich arrived with a mandate to drastically reduce the stocks of 
equipment and fuel held at Russian bases in Transdniestria. The 
number of Russian troops in the territory was progressively reduced. 
In the 1990s, Transdniestria was a ‘pet project’ for left-wing and 
nationalist forces opposed to Boris Yeltsin’s government. They 
worked with a group headed by Transdniestria’s first de facto 
president Igor Smirnov, a “Red Director” industrialist, and men like 
security boss Vladimir Antyufeyev, formerly a Soviet-era police chief 
in Latvia. This political alliance received more blessing under 
President Putin and in 2014 Antyufeyev briefly re-surfaced as a 
serving official in the Russian-created Donetsk ‘People’s Republic’ in 
eastern Ukraine. However, Transdniestria has always been given a 
lower priority by the Kremlin than other conflict territories. The 
Russian authorities pushed for the ‘Kozak plan’ for reunification of 
Moldova in 2003. They declined to honour a referendum of 2006 in 
which people in Transdniestria voted for independence and future 
union with Russia. Most notably, they withheld the international 
recognition Moscow granted Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 
4.3 Negotiations – one step forward one step back  
Talks over the Transdniestrian dispute run on both formal and 
informal tracks. There is both an international negotiation format and 
frequent direct contact between leaders in Chisinau and Tiraspol. In 
contrast to other post-Soviet separatist conflicts, the de facto 
authorities in Tiraspol are accepted as a direct party to the conflict. 
There is a substantial record of bilateral agreements, dating back to 
the mid-1990s. One Transdniestrian official asserts that since the 
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1990s the two sides have signed 187 agreements and that the first step 
must be to implement them properly.7 
Moscow unilaterally negotiated the ceasefire of 1992, but the 
political talks became internationalised in 1993 when the OSCE 
(initially the CSCE) first set up an office in Moldova. Ukraine joined 
the talks in 1995. By 2005 this format had become formalised as the 
‘Five Plus Two’ format, convened by the OSCE and comprising the 
five parties of Moldova, Transdniestria, OSCE, Russia and Ukraine, 
as well as the European Union and the United States.  
There is a broad international consensus on what a future 
political agreement should look like. It is set out in “Report Number 
13” of November 1993 in which the Chisinau mission of the (then) 
CSCE summed up its understanding of the nature of the conflict. The 
report stated that “the present division of Moldova threatens not only 
the territorial integrity of the country but stability in Europe as a 
whole” but also noted “a distinct Transdniestrian feeling of identity 
and an apparent aversion of most Transdniestrians against being 
governed directly from the centre”. The report therefore made the 
case for an eventual solution in which Transdniestria should have an 
autonomous status with special rights but which would not 
undermine Moldova as a viable national state.8  
Twelve years later, a law, passed in 2005 almost unanimously 
by the Moldovan parliament, fleshed out what this constitutional 
arrangement could mean in practice. It declared Moldova to be a 
single state, adhering to democratic principles and that the dispute 
with Transdniestria would be solved only by peaceful means. “The 
negotiation process with Transdniestria is conducted so as to achieve 
the goals of democratisation and demilitarisation of Transdniestria.” 
Transdniestria was declared to be a “autonomous-territorial 
formation with special legal status,” with its own parliament 
(Supreme Soviet), symbols and three languages of Moldova, Russian 
and Ukrainian.9  
                                                        
7 Interview in Tiraspol, February 2018. 
8 Document is at https://www.osce.org/moldova/42307?download=true 
9 Text of law is at http://lex.justice.md/viewdoc.php?action=view&view= 
doc&id=313004&lang=2 
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Both these documents basically set out a basically federal 
arrangement for Moldova. However, there is widespread scepticism 
on both sides as to whether this can be made to work in practice. In 
Transdniestria, many say that the Moldovan state, as currently 
configured, is not a project they want to be part of. They point to the 
example of Gagauzia as proof that Moldova has not honoured an 
autonomy arrangement for their territory. Gagauzia is a small non-
contiguous region which is home to the Gagauz minority, who are 
Turkic in origin and language but Orthodox by religion and mostly 
pro-Russian by allegiance. The region was given special status under 
a 1994 law, but most observers, including the OSCE, say that most 
provisions of the law remain on paper and have not been properly 
implemented.  
In what are in many ways mirror-image concerns in right-bank 
Moldova, the concept of “federalisation” is anathema to much of 
society. This reflects in particular fears of a solution to the conflict 
along the lines of the Kozak Memorandum of 2003. This was an 
initiative pushed by Moscow and its envoy Dmitry Kozak, accepted 
by Tiraspol and initially agreed to but rejected at the last minute in 
Chisinau, after the intervention of its Western partners. The draft 
plan for a “Federative Republic of Moldova” was seen at the time in 
Chisinau and Western capitals to give unacceptable veto powers to 
Transdniestria in an upper house of parliament created by the 
amended constitution of a reunified Moldova. Moreover, later 
additions to the draft text provided for a Russian peacekeeping force 
in Transdniestria after the settlement and up until the year 2020.10  
Why the hostility to a federal solution? This issue shows up 
deep divisions within Moldova over its future constitutional 
structure. Many of the more strongly Romanophone parts of it have 
strong doubts about reintegration of Transdniestria into anything less 
than a unitary state; many of the minority who advocate union with 
Romania would probably be prepared to live entirely without 
Transdniestria, a territory that was only joined to them in the 1940s. 
For these people, reintegration could be a proxy for allowing Russia 
                                                        
10 William H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad and the West, Lessons from the Moldova-
Transdniestria Conflict, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington D.C/The 
John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2012, p.139-148.  
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to influence their country again by the back door. As William Hill 
writes, 
“Almost all of civil society in Chisinau had severe 
misgivings about granting nearly equal political status 
within the Moldovan polity to an entity that was widely 
perceived as an agent of Moscow, from whose fifty-year 
rule Moldova had just freed itself. Whether right or 
wrong, for a substantial portion of Moldova’s educated 
elite, and perhaps the population as a whole, the issue of 
federalisation was not just a question of adopting a 
particular political system. It also involved Moldova’s 
independence from Russia and very survival.”11  
Despite the many differences between Moldova and Ukraine, this 
point of view has been strengthened since the outbreak of the conflict 
in eastern Ukraine in 2014, where there are fears that Moscow could 
try to use the two ‘People’s Republics’ as a Trojan Horse to weaken a 
new federated Ukrainian state (see Chapter 3).  
Since the rejection of the Kozak plan, there has been deadlock 
in negotiations on the issue of final political status. However, there 
has been progress on de facto integration in other areas. 
Transdniestria, whose businesses rely heavily on exports to the 
European Union, quietly signed up to Moldova’s Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU in 2016 (see 
below). Many Transdniestrians have taken Moldovan foreign 
passports, allowing them to travel more freely to the EU. 
Since 2016, the OSCE has successfully promoted an “output-
based” policy of “small steps” which benefit ordinary people and 
facilitate de facto integration of the two territories. Eleven working 
groups focus on a range of practical issues. In 2016, under the German 
presidency of the OSCE, a “package of eight” issues associated with 
the conflict was identified. They were small but significant for those 
affected. The eight were: 1) the issue of the recognition 
(apostolisation) of diplomas from Transdniestria in Moldova, 
allowing Transdniestrian students to use them to continue their 
studies abroad; 2) the issue of giving Transdniestrian vehicles 
registered international licence plates that would allow them to travel 
                                                        
11 Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad, p. 61. 
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beyond the borders of Moldova; 3) the integration of the 
telecommunications market; 4) the regulation of environmental 
standards in the Dniester River basin; 5) a review of criminal cases 
involving citizens from the other side of the river; 6) the operation of 
schools teaching the Moldovan language in the Latin script in 
Transdniestria; 7) ensuring access of farmers in Chisinau-controlled 
territory to farmland in Dubasari in Transdniestria; 8) the re-opening 
of the Gura-Bicului Bridge across the river, closed since 1992 and 
other issues of freedom of movement.  
The re-opening of the Gura-Bicului bridge in November 2017 
was a catalyst for resolution of the other issues. Six of the eight issues 
had been resolved by the end of 2018. Latin-script Moldovan schools 
were free to operate in Transdniestria. By March 2019, 240 diplomas 
from the Taras Shevchenko University in Tiraspol had been 
apostolised in Chisinau, allowing their holders to study abroad.12 
Several thousand Transdniestrian drivers had taken advantage of the 
chance to travel outside Moldova in their own cars. The numbers of 
people affected may have been only in the thousands, but the 
measures also had a wider symbolic significance. The success of these 
measures also raised the question of what are the next priorities, if 
momentum in the talks is to be maintained.  
4.4 Politics and society in Transdniestria  
In the last few years, Transdniestria has suffered a financial and 
demographic squeeze, which has changed its social profile and 
economic outlook. Even more dramatically than Moldova, 
Transdniestria is a shrinking territory in human terms, hollowed out 
by large-scale emigration of the working-age population. According 
to the last Soviet census of 1989, the territory had a population of 
679,000. According to the locally organised census of 2004 this had 
dropped to 555,000. The population was estimated to be 469,000 in 
                                                        
12 See “One year after the first apostolisation of the diplomas awarded by the 
Taras Shevchenko University in Tiraspol” https://gov.md/ro/content/un-de-
la-primele-apostilari-ale-diplomelor-de-studii-eliberate-de-catre-universitatea-
taras 
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2017, of whom 159,000 were ethnic Russians, 154,000 Moldovans and 
125,000 Ukrainians.13  
Many locals estimate the real population level to be even lower. 
Similar calculations to the ones used in 3DCFTA reports in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia by this author would confirm this. In 2018, 4,500 
births were recorded in Transdniestria. If the birth rate is assumed to 
be the same as in Moldova, with 12 births per year per 1,000 people, 
this would suggest a population of 375,000.14 
Likewise, 45,086 pupils in primary and secondary education 
were recorded as being in school education. If, as in Moldova, around 
11.5% of the population is in school education, that would indicate a 
population of 392,000 people.  
Of the remaining population, around one third are pensioners. 
This is a heavy drain on the local budget, around 20% of which goes 
on supporting pensions (which are also topped up by Russia), and 
reinforces a public ideology which is conservative and sceptical of 
reunification with Moldova.  
Under its first de facto president Igor Smirnov, Transdniestria 
was a semi-authoritarian entity, with heavy government control of 
the media and limited freedom of assembly. There were a high 
number of arbitrary detentions – an issue that is still a major human 
rights concern for Transdniestria today.15 However, Transdniestria 
has never closed its borders, and its people have always travelled 
freely back and forth to Ukraine and right-bank Moldova. Moreover, 
like Abkhazia, the region has developed a habit of competitive 
politics. To the surprise of many, Smirnov was not only defeated in 
his third presidential election of 2011, but finished in third place. The 
man who had been the dominant leader of the region was abandoned 
not only by his patron, the Russian government, but by the 
population as a whole. Russia’s preferred candidate, Anatoly 
                                                        
13 See “Statistical Yearbook of PMR 2018” http://mer.gospmr.org/ 
gosudarstvennaya-sluzhba-statistiki/informacziya/ezhegodnik-
gosudarstvennoj-sluzhby-statistiki/statisticheskij-ezhegodnik-2018.html 
14 “Statistical Yearbook of PMR.” 
15 Thomas Hammarberg, Follow-up Report on Human Rights in the 
Transnistrian Region, UNDP, 2018 https://www.undp.org/content/ 
dam/unct/moldova/docs/Follow-up_Report_TH_2018.pdf  
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Kaminsky, polled second and the next leader was the relatively 
inexperienced parliamentarian, Yevgeny Shevchuk. 
Shevchuk’s term in office did not usher in greater democracy 
but was marked by political turmoil and a series of corruption 
scandals. He lost the presidency in the election of 2016 and the 
following year fled abroad, together with his wife Nina Shtanski, who 
had served as the region’s de facto foreign minister. 
Vadim Krasnoselsky became Transdniestria’s third de facto 
president in 2016. He was backed by the business conglomerate 
Sheriff which had long been the most powerful economic player in 
the region and his coming to power formally confirmed their political 
domination of the territory as well.  
Sheriff was founded by Ilya Kazmali and Viktor Gushan in 
1993 as a retailing business. Gushan remains, in the eyes of many, the 
powerful behind-the-scenes ‘oligarch’ who controls much of what 
goes in the region. Sheriff is by far the biggest private-sector 
employer in Transdniestria. It owns a large chain of supermarkets, 
the well-known Kvint winery and distillery, a chain of petrol stations, 
a mobile phone provider, the region’s Mercedes car-dealership and a 
television station. It founded Moldova’s most successful football club 
and built a stadium, in which the Moldovan national team plays 
international matches. Sheriff’s status was such that in 2016 the 
government took out a loan from the company in order to pay off 
pension arrears.16  
Former leader Shevchuk, who fell foul of Sheriff in 2016, 
alleged in 2019 that the group had captured Transdniestria. In an 
interview from exile he said, “At the present moment, there is no 
competition in Transdniestria, neither in the media, in politics or in 
the economy. Everything has been privatised by one oligarchic 
structure. Transdniestria is a caliphate whose religion is money.” 
Needless to say, Shevchuk’s critics say that these were the comments 
                                                        
16 “Правительство Возьмёт Займ на Погашение Долгов по Ежемесячной 
Надбавке к Пенсиям” [“The Government will take a loan to cover debt for the 
monthly pension top-up”], Novosti Pridnestrov’ya, April 14, 2016. 
https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/16-04-14/pravitelstvo-vozmyot-zaym-na-
pogashenie-dolgov-po-ezhemesyachnoy 
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of a man who had sought to work with Sheriff but failed and had fled 
with serious corruption allegations levelled against him.17  
4.5 The economy 
Transdniestria has suffered an economic downturn over the past few 
years, due to emigration, reduced direct Russian support, ageing 
industry and other factors. Its GDP per capita, at just under $3,000, is 
lower even than that of Moldova. Sectors that rely on government 
support such as education (including Transdniestria’s main 
university TSU) suffer from a lack of domestic funding, as well as a 
lack of access to foreign assistance programmes.  
The population has been cushioned from some of the worst 
effects of this as the unrecognised territory has its own currency, the 
Transdniestrian rouble, which has not been devalued in parallel with 
other currencies such as the Moldovan lei or the Russian rouble. But 
this looks to be unsustainable over the longer run.  
In 2018, region’s the total GDP was estimated at 13.7 billion 
Transdniestrian roubles (€812 million at official exchange rates).18 
The official economy relies on four main sources: remittances; direct 
Russian aid; indirect Russian aid in the form of free gas; and exports 
from its factories, now connected to the Moldovan Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU.  
Remittances were reported to be worth around $8 million a 
month in 2018, 65% of the sum coming from Russia and 14% from EU 
countries.19 Russian direct aid comes in two main forms. There is 
assistance for pension top-ups (known informally as a “Putinka”), 
                                                        
17 “Беглый президент назвал Приднестровье захваченным государством” 
[“The fugitive President called Transdniestria a captured state”], EurAsia Daily, 
June 25, 2019. https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2019/06/25/beglyy-prezident-
nazval-pridnestrove-zahvachennym-gosudarstvom 
18 Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Pridnestrovie, “2018 Год в Цифрах” 
[“2018 in figures”] http://tiraspol.ru/confirmed/2017-goda-v-tsifrah-
okonchatelnyie-dannyie/ 
19 Pridnestrov’ye, “Динамика денежных переводов” [“The Dynamics of 
Remittances”, December 5, 2018. http://newspmr.com/novosti-pmr/ 
ekonomika/17609 
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handed out twice-yearly since 2008, which means that pensioners in 
Transdniestria receive more than their counterparts in right-bank 
Moldova. The number of pensioners still receiving it was reported to 
be 146,000 in 2019.20 Originally the top-up was worth around $15 a 
month. The amount fell due to devaluation of the Russian rouble and 
has sometimes been delayed. By 2015 it had dropped to $9.21 Notably, 
the Russian government did not offer to make up the difference.  
For several years, from 2012 to 2017, Russian development 
assistance also arrived through an organisation named Eurasian 
Integration, which was reported to have invested 4.5 billion roubles 
($70 million) in Transdniestria, in the construction of schools, 
kindergartens and medical clinics. There was controversy over this, 
with allegations that buildings had not been finished and money 
misappropriated.22  
All of this is dwarfed however by what is essentially a free gas 
subsidy for Transdniestria provided by the Russian gas giant 
Gazprom. Moldova receives almost all its gas from Russia via 
Moldovagaz, a company in which Gazprom has a 50% stake. 
Moldovagaz then supplies gas both to right-bank Moldova and to 
Transdniestria. Gazprom sends the bill to Moldovagaz, which does 
not pay for the gas that goes to Transdniestria – but nor do the 
authorities there. Over the past decade, the unpaid gas debt for 
                                                        
20 “Александр Мартынов: В Этом Году Существенных Задержек С 
Российскими Надбавками К Пенсии Быть Не Должно” [“Alexander 
Martynov: This year there Should not be Significant Delays with Pension Top-
Ups,” Novosti Pridnestrov’ya, February 13, 2019, https://novostipmr.com/ru/ 
news/19-02-13/aleksandr-martynov-v-etom-godu-sushchestvennyh-
zaderzhek-s.  
21 “Российская надбавка для приднестровской пенсии уменьшится” [“The 
Russian Top-Up for Transdniestrian Pensions will be reduced”], Bel’tsy Siti, 
September 9, 2015, https://beltsymd.ru/2015/09/09/ 
economy/rossijskaya-nadbavka-dlya-pridnestrovskoj-pensii-umenshitsya 
22 “Приднестровье попросит у России поддержки,” Transdniestria will Ask 
for Support from Russia, Sputnik Moldova, January 16, 2019, 
https://ru.sputnik.md/society/20190116/24129424/Pridnestrove-poprosit-u-
Rossii-podderzhki.html 
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Transdniestria that has accrued with Moldovagaz is estimated at 
between $6 billion and $7.5 billion.  
In Transdniestria, the government uses this effectively free gas 
to charge its customers low prices and also to supply the Kuchugan 
(Moldova GRES) power plant located in Transdniestria. Owned by 
Russian energy company RAO-UES, this plant supplies two thirds of 
right-bank Moldova’s electricity.23  
The last source of income for the territory comes from its heavy 
industrial plants and light industry, which continue to operate and to 
export products, mainly to Moldova and the European Union. 
Around two thirds of exports from Transdniestria go west. The 
largest and biggest employer is the Moldovan Metallurgical Plant 
(MMZ), located in the town of Rybnitsa and founded in 1985. The 
plant also benefits from subsidised gas. It produces steel and 
laminated metal. Up until 2015 the biggest shareholder was the big 
Russian businessman Alisher Usmanov, but in that year its 
ownership passed to the de facto authorities in Tiraspol. In recent 
years, the factory has been running at reduced capacity.  
Other factories have prospered since 2006, thanks to 
agreements allowing them to register as Moldovan companies for the 
purposes of export. They include the drinks and distillery business 
Kvint, and textile and shoe companies such as Tirotex and Softshoes.  
All these companies have benefited from Transdniestria 
participating in Moldova’s DCFTA with the EU. This happened 
quietly. The DCFTA with Moldova began operating in 2014. 
Transdniestria, which was even more reliant on trade with the EU 
than right-bank Moldova, still traded under Autonomous Trade 
Preferences until the end of 2015. When that arrangement expired, an 
agreement was reached by the EU-Republic of Moldova Association 
Council “to extend the geographic scope of application of the DCFTA 
                                                        
23 Expert Group, “War by Other Means Kremlin’s Energy Policy as a Channel of 
Influence,” April 2019, https://www.expert-grup.org/media/k2/ 
attachments/War_by_other_means.pdf; Victor Parlicov Tudor Șoitu Sergiu 
Tofilat “Energy and Politics, The Price for Impunity in Moldova,” IDIS Viitorul, 
April 2017. http://www.viitorul.org/files/Policy%20Paper%202017%20-
%20Impunitate%20si%20%20intelelegeri%20rentiere%20sectorul%20energetic%
20ENG%20II.pdf 
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to cover the entire territory of Moldova,” including Transdniestria, 
enabling the region to keep up its trade with EU countries.24 The 
scheme is another important component in the economic alignment 
of the two territories, but probably more as a potential than current 
reality, as implementation has been patchy thus far.25  
The details of Transdniestria’s participation in the DCFTA are 
set out in an unpublished ‘non-paper’. Officials in Brussels admit 
fairly openly that the DCFTA has political benefits, and have been 
prepared thus far to overlook lack of implementation by the 
Transdniestrian side. Tiraspol pledged to drop 50% of customs duties 
on EU imported goods by 2018, provide “certificates of origin” for its 
own goods, and comply with EU sanitary standards. To make up for 
lost revenue, it should then introduce a VAT on sales (a tax which 
both Moldova and Russia have).  
Many businesses in right-bank Moldova have concerns about 
the deal. One business leader, while welcoming the deal overall, said, 
“I wouldn’t call it economic integration of two banks, I would call it 
a parallel integration with EU.” The perception is that 
Transdniestrian businessmen reap the benefit of the DCFTA without 
having to undergo the difficult regulatory approximation. A 
Transdniestrian businessman in the town of Bendery who exports 
shoes marked MD (for Moldova) to 80 countries, gives a different 
perspective. He had no complaints about his contacts in EU countries 
who invited him to trade fairs and were reliable customers. But he 
said that Moldovan customs behaved in an arbitrary manner and also 
complained that right-bank businesses received technical assistance 
from the EU which he was unable to access.26  
Legitimate businesses in Transdniestria also suffer from 
blanket international restrictions on banking services introduced to 
                                                        
24 See Parliamentary Questions, European Parliament, April 4, 2016, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-001168-
ASW_EN.html  
25 Vadim Gumene, “DCFTA’s Implications for Foreign Trade of the Transnistrian 
Region,” 20 March 2019, 3DCFTAs, http://www.3dcftas.eu/ 
system/tdf/Transnistria_trade_Gumene.pdf?file=1&type=node&id=564&force= 
26 Interviews in Chisinau and Bendery, February 2018. 
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crack down on organised crime. In April 2011, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, a bureau of the US Treasury, issued an 
advisory note, recommending that US companies avoid dealings 
with eight banks in Transdniestria, citing lack of oversight and 
criminality there.27 As a result of this and other international 
sanctions, Transdniestrian companies exporting to European 
countries and further afield must route payments and receipts 
through as many as three intermediary banks.  
4.6 The grey zone  
One major reality of the Transdniestrian situation is known to all 
observers but hard to describe accurately. This is the fact that ever 
since it came into being as a non-recognised entity in the 1990s, the 
territory’s ‘grey’ unrecognised status has been useful to a variety of 
actors, not just in Transdniestria itself but in Moldova, Ukraine and 
further afield.  
The cross-border cooperation has not only had negative effects. 
Many attribute the success of some of the confidence-building 
measures in recent years to what could be called ‘backroom deals’ by 
powerful players. In the opinion of one Foreign Ministry official in 
Chisinau in 2018, “I ought to say openly that we were able to achieve 
a breakthrough thanks to our informal leaders, Plahotniuc and 
Gushan.” Former OSCE ambassador to Moldova, William Hill, a 
renowned international expert on the conflict, added a Ukrainian 
element to the picture, calling the progress since 2016 “the result of 
improved relations between oligarchs: Plahotniuc, the 
Transdniestrian Sheriff conglomerate head Viktor Gushan, and 
former Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko.”28  
                                                        
27 See https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/annual_report_ 
fy2011.pdf 
28 William H. Hill and David J. Kramer, “The Fight for the Poorest Country in 
Europe,” The American Interest, July 2, 2019, https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2019/07/02/the-fight-for-the-poorest-country-in-europe/; Vladimir 
Thoric, Margarita Tuzlova, Metin Dzhumagulov, “Poroshenko-Sheriff Business 
Connections,” Rise Moldova, March 20, 2018, 
https://www.rise.md/english/poroshenko-sheriff-business-connections/. 
Poroshenko has family ties to the region. He grew up in the town of Bendery and 
his parents lived there until the war of 1992. 
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In the case of Chisinau the reflected aura of progress on 
Transdniestria was undoubtedly useful for Plahotniuc in his dealings 
with international partners, as he was criticised for corruption and 
backsliding on democracy. In the bigger scheme of things, of course, 
lack of transparency and illegality do not contribute to a sustainable 
peace. In many respects the two sides are cooperating on smaller 
issues so as not to do a deal on the bigger issues, while the strength 
of the grey economy undermines legitimate business development.  
Many of the more lurid accusations about Transdniestria have 
not been substantiated. There is little evidence for example of major 
smuggling of weapons or nuclear materials through the territory, as 
sometimes been alleged. However, the territory is a centre for 
dubious businesses, such as bitcoin mining. The mining of bitcoin 
crypto currency is not illegal but it is unregulated and consumes large 
volumes of electricity, conveniently supplied in Transdniestria. 
Bitcoin transactions are hard to track and have been used for the 
purposes of money laundering or other illicit activities. 29  
Some of the shadowy schemes centred in Transdniestria 
involve Moldova, some Ukraine, some have a wider international 
scope. One that appears to have illegally profited actors in both 
Transdniestria and right-bank Moldova stems from the non-
transparent gas trade, described above. It was revealed that a 
shadowy intermediary energy company named Energokapital had 
enriched people on both sides of the river. Official data shows that in 
2015 Chisinau paid Energokapital some $222 million for electricity, 
while the intermediary company paid $129 million to 
Transdniestria’s local gas company.30 
Major business interests in Ukraine have also exploited 
Transdniestria’s status for years. The territory has been and remains 
a major transit route for contraband goods from Ukraine’s major port, 
Odessa – which has always acted as the main metropolis for 
                                                        
29 On bitcoin mining in Transdniestria, see “War by Other Means.”  
30 See Virginia Nica, “Moldova Pays High Price for Power Games,” Balkan 
Insight, March 8, 2017, https://balkaninsight.com/2017/03/08/moldova-pays-
high-price-for-power-games-03-07-2017/; Michael Bird and Andrei Cotrut, 
“Moldovan energy intermediary company linked to ‘billion-dollar bank theft’ 
scandal”, Black Sea, March 14, 2016, https://theblacksea.eu/stories/moldovan-
energy-intermediary-company-linked-to-billion-dollar-bank-theft-scandal/ 
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Transdniestria. According to one European official, “Odessa made 
Transdniestria possible.” In the most lucrative scheme, goods would 
arrive in Odessa’s port marked for import to Moldova 
(Transdniestria) thereby escaping Ukrainian customs duties. They 
would then either bypass Transdniestria altogether or go there and 
re-enter Ukraine. In the mid-2000s, so much chicken was technically 
being imported to Transdniestria that it was estimated that on paper 
each resident of Transdniestria was eating more than 100kg of 
chicken legs a year. 
In response to this, the EU’s border monitoring mission 
EUBAM was deployed to the region in 2005, with centres in both 
Odessa and Chisinau. The mission represents the most major 
contribution by the EU to resolution of the conflict and its associated 
problems and has expanded to have a staff of 135. EUBAM’s mandate 
is to monitor and register rather than enforce, but by being an 
international team with ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground, the mission 
has undoubtedly curtailed the worst excesses of this contraband 
trade. In recent years, cigarette smuggling has been the main 
contraband scheme. In 2012, Moldovan prime minister Vladimir Filat 
and Transdniestrian leader Yevgeny Shevchuk signed an agreement 
which facilitated freight rail traffic between the two sides of the river 
and the establishment of Moldovan customs posts on Transdniestrian 
territory.31  
The deal was signed and executed with remarkable speed, 
illustrating the fact that when mutual interests were at stake, 
agreement could be reached very quickly. However, there was 
widespread speculation that the deal also enabled the easy transit of 
duty-free cigarettes by train between the two territories.  
Unverified estimates put the number of cigarettes passing 
through Transdniestria every year in the billions. When the flow was 
disrupted, officials on both sides of the river developed another 
scheme, whereby contraband cigarettes were sold in ‘duty-free 
shops’ on the territory of Transdniestria. These shops were 
authorised by a law passed by the Moldovan parliament in 2015. In 
2018, an estimated 2.5 million packets of cigarettes passed through 
Transdniestria, or five times more than the population could 
                                                        
31 Text is available at http://mfa-pmr.org/ru/xDk 
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consume. Prime Minister Sandu estimated in July 2019 that between 
2015 and 2019, the value of goods imported by the duty-free entities 
amounted to 2.8 billion MDL (€139 million) and about 75% of the 
volume of goods sold in these shops was illegal. Many of the duty-
free shops were owned by the businessman Ilan Şor, the man at the 
centre of the major banking fraud scandal.32  
Since the Euromaidan of 2014 Ukraine has tried to restrict 
illegal cross-border trade with Transdniestria, with mixed results. 
Border controls have been tightened for individuals. A new border 
control mechanism was set up provisionally in July 2017, and made 
fully operational in April 2018, with both Ukrainian and Moldovan 
customs officers deployed there. This was heralded as the start of 
serious Kyiv-Chisinau collaboration on the issue of the 
Transdniestrian border, something many Moldovans had advocated 
for years, and there are plans for the same controls to be established 
all along the border with Ukraine.  
However, big question marks remain as to whether the 
activities of EUBAM, the new crossing point, or the installation of 
new governments in Chisinau and Kyiv will change things 
fundamentally. There is a strong vested interest in contraband trade 
not just in powerful business groups across the region but for 
ordinary people who thereby get access to cheaper goods. Ukraine 
continues to be a country with multiple centres of power and the old 
local elite is still in charge of the city and port of Odessa. Profound 
reforms of governance are needed in both Moldova and Ukraine to 
change the dynamics that keep Transdniestria as a regional grey 
zone.  
Many challenges now face those dealing with the 
Transdniestria issue: how to maintain the positive momentum 
created over the past few years thanks to progress on the “package of 
eight” measures; how to crack down on the black economy and the 
region’s status as a smuggling route in a way that focuses on the 
                                                        
32 See for instance Facebook post by Moldovan expert Vladislav Kulminski, since 
June 2019 foreign affairs adviser to the prime minister, 
https://www.facebook.com/vladislav.kulminski/posts/10157491134402905 
“Moldova seeks to wipe out cigarette smuggling on eastern border,” bne 
IntelliNews, July 15, 2019, https://www.intellinews.com/moldova-seeks-to-
wipe-out-cigarette-smuggling-on-eastern-border-164372/?source=moldova 
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higher-up figures responsible and not the ordinary people associated 
with it; how to keep sight of the pursuit of a final political settlement 
while creating better conditions for ordinary people on both sides of 
the Dniester in the interim; how to improve implementation of the 
DCFTA in Transdniestria in a way that satisfies businesses in both 
territories. The good news from this region is that the pragmatic spirit 
of relations allows for incremental progress and opportunities for 
economic development, even as a final settlement remains elusive.  
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Abkhazia has grown more internationally isolated and dependent on Russia 
over the last decade. The big political issues about Abkhazia’s future remain 
unresolved, as the Geneva International Discussions are unable to tackle 
issues of status or security. Isolation has deepened as relations with the 
patron in Moscow are often strained, Russian aid has been reduced and only 
a few links with the outside world remain open. The main avenue of 
cooperation with Tbilisi remains the Inguri Hydro-Electric Power Station, 
where shared interests may result in stronger cooperation over energy 
issues. Abkhazia’s politics are competitive but within a mono-ethnic 
framework in which other communities do not have a role and the Georgians 
of Gali face discrimination. With the local budget strained, the territory’s 
public services are suffering and health and education sectors in particular 
in need of investment. 
5.1 Introduction 
Abkhazia today is in the peculiar state of having both entrenched its 
de facto separation from Georgia but also finding itself in almost 
complete international isolation. Recognition as an independent state 
in 2008 by Russia, (followed by Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria and 
Venezuela, four other countries with no close connections to the 
region), coincided with the closure of UNOMIG, the United Nations 
mission in the region, a reduced presence of international NGOs and 
humanitarian organisations there and a policy of unequivocal 
support for Georgia by its Western friends. Since then Abkhazia has 
become more secure and better off but also even more dependent on 
Russia, financially, militarily and politically. Yet the patron-client 
relationship is often strained. The two sides argue over several issues 
and Russian direct assistance has fallen in the last few years.  
The reference point for both Georgians and Abkhaz remains 
the deeply traumatic war of 1992-3, in which Abkhazia suffered 
widespread destruction, around five percent of the ethnic Abkhaz 
population perished and almost all the 240,000 ethnic Georgians 
living in the republic fled or were expelled. Most of Abkhazia still 
lives with the narrative that Georgia represents a threat and that 
therefore it cannot allow Georgian IDPs to return and must rely on 
Russia to provide security. Although attitudes have undoubtedly 
softened over time, years of mutual isolation mean that the two sides 
of the conflict now inhabit very different worlds. Most Abkhaz and 
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Georgians do not share a common language, as Russian-language 
usage in Georgia has declined and few residents of Abkhazia speak 
Georgian. Younger Georgians tend to choose English as a foreign 
language, while Abkhaz have much more limited opportunities to 
learn English. 
There are no reliable census figures but Abkhazia’s population 
is less than half that of the last Soviet census of 1989, when the 
autonomous republic had 525,000 people. Officially the Abkhaz 
authorities now put the population numbers at 244,000. The actual 
figure may be even lower, judging by numbers of schoolchildren and 
the birth rate, which has fallen since 2012. Almost all the ethnic 
Georgian population were displaced at the end of the conflict, with 
around 30,000 of them now living in Abkhazia’s southern Gali 
district. The remainder of the population is comprised of ethnic 
Abkhaz and Armenians, as well as a small Russian community and 
other even smaller ethnic groups.1 
Conflict resolution efforts have faltered since 2008 and have 
become even more difficult in the worsening geopolitical climate 
between Russia and the West. In the mid-2000s many Abkhaz 
officials gave visiting European diplomats a friendly reception and in 
2006 former Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh published a strategy 
document entitled “Key to the Future” which expressed a (rather 
incoherent) aspiration for Abkhazia to be part of Europe, while 
remaining independent of Georgia. Russian recognition in 2008 and 
Abkhazia’s support for Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine in 
2014 put the region squarely in the Russian geopolitical camp. This 
was reinforced by Syria’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence in 
2018.  
                                                        
1 The birth rate has fallen from 2,258 in 2012 to 1,768 in 2016. According to official 
statistics there are just over 28,000 children studying in school. If Abkhazia is 
assumed to have a comparable population breakdown to Russia and Georgia, 
then that would put the overall population of the republic at between 150,000 
and 200,000. Seasonal migration and dual residence in Gali and Zugdidi regions 
by many ethnic Georgians further complicate the picture. Population figures for 
2017 can be found at http://ugsra.org/ofitsialnaya-statistika.php?ELEMENT 
_ID=287. Figures on school children and birth rate for 2016 are at 
http://ugsra.org/abkhaziya-v-tsifrakh/2016-god.php 
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De facto, Abkhaz and Georgian officials present two mutually 
contradictory positions on the conflict. Georgia’s starting point is its 
territorial integrity and it expends a lot of diplomatic effort at the 
United Nations to win backing for its territorial rights and the right 
of return of displaced persons. Since 2008 Tbilisi has also defined 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia as being “occupied” by Russia and 
framed the conflict over the two territories as being primarily one 
with Russia and affording less agency to the Abkhaz and Ossetians. 
The United States, some European governments and the European 
Parliament – but not the EU – have adopted the “occupied” term.  
In 2019 Georgia’s deputy foreign minister Lasha Darsalia 
asserted that the conflict in Abkhazia was a “deliberately created 
situation by Russian occupying forces” and “these people [residents 
of Abkhazia] are literally held as hostages.”2 With regard to Abkhaz 
and South Ossetians themselves, the stated policy is one of 
“reconciliation between divided communities” within the integral 
state of Georgia. Within this framework the government in Tbilisi 
makes offers of free healthcare, education and other services.3  
The official Abkhaz (and South Ossetian) position – from which 
there is no public dissent – declares that the status issue is closed, and 
that Georgia and the rest of the world must “acknowledge reality” 
and recognise the independence of the two regions. For example, in 
a statement rejecting the new Georgian plan of 2018 Abkhazia’s de 
facto foreign minister Daur Kove said, “The only step in a better 
future is Georgia’s recognition of the independence of the Republic 
of Abkhazia and the construction of a full-fledged inter-state 
dialogue between our countries in order to stability and prosperity 
for future generations.”4  
                                                        
2 Lasha Darsalia, Presentation at Chatham House, London, March 1, 2019. 
3 “Ketevan Tsikhelashvili: ‘We are making open and determined peace 
statement’,” Democracy and Freedom Watch, April 4, 2018. 
https://dfwatch.net/ketevan-tsikhelashvili-making-open-determined-peace-
statement-50197 
4 “The commentary of Daur Kove on the new peace initiative of the Georgian 
government ‘A Step to a Better Future’”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Abkhazia, April 5, 2018, http://mfaapsny.org/en/allnews/ 
news/statements_speeches/kommentariy-daura-kove-o-novoy-mirnoy-
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5.2 Deadlocked negotiations  
Negotiations on the conflict are deadlocked. There have been no 
bilateral Georgian-Abkhaz talks on the conflict since 2006, which was 
the last time a Georgian envoy (Irakli Alasania) travelled to 
Abkhazia. The UN gave up its mediating mission in 2008. Some Track 
II dialogue initiatives continue in third countries, but are very much 
under the radar – they were easier to hold prior to the war of 2008. 
The parties to the conflict, as well as to the South Ossetia 
conflict, meet once a quarter at the Geneva International Discussions 
(GID), which were launched in October 2008 following the Five-Day 
War of August 2008. The 47th round took place in April 2019. These 
are “discussions” of current issues of concern rather than proper 
political talks. Herbert Salber, former European Union Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia, said 
of the GID in June 2016, “The major ambiguity of our Geneva process 
is that we are tasked to address a dispute, but are not mandated to 
discuss the core of this dispute, which is the political status of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. We are mandated to deal with the 
‘security and stability modalities in/of Abkhazia and South Ossetia’. 
As a result, we are not exactly in a conflict resolution rational.”5  
The GID is co-chaired by three diplomats from the European 
Union, OSCE and United Nations. The United States has observer 
status. Officials from Abkhazia, Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia 
attend the talks but without official labels, so as not to occasion 
arguments about status. There is no discussion of substantive 
political issues and proceedings are often interrupted by walk-outs. 
Working Group I is mandated to discuss security issues and Working 
Group II discusses humanitarian issues. On a couple of occasions, the 
co-chairs of have come close to negotiating a “non-use of force” 
agreement that Georgians, Abkhaz, South Ossetians and Russians 
could all accept, but they failed to agree the required language – 
primarily because each cannot agree who constitutes a “party to the 
                                                        
initsiative-pravitelstva-gruzii-shag-k-luchshemu-budushchemu-
/?sphrase_id=1521%20 
5 Address to the ASRC by Ambassador Herbert Salber European Union Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia Vienna, 28 June 
2016, https://www.osce.org/whoweare/248976?download=true 
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conflict.” One official who regularly attends the meeting complains 
that “everything is politicised” and it is hard to get agreement on 
even small issues, such as environmental cooperation. Small 
achievements, such as a programme to spray plants at risk of the box-
tree moth in Abkhazia, are given outsized attention in the absence of 
progress on bigger issues.  
On the ground the main mediating mechanism takes the form 
of the meetings of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism 
(IPRM) on the boundary lines of Abkhazia (Gali) and South Ossetia 
(Ergneti) at which the sides discuss specific security issues and the 
status of detainees. This mechanism also works in fits and starts. In 
2018 meetings were halted as the two sides rowed over the 
investigation of the killing of two Georgians, Giga Otkhozhoria and 
Archil Tatunashvili, who died on the boundary lines with Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia respectively. In June 2018, the Georgian authorities 
drew up what was called the “Otkhozhoria-Tatunashvili List,” a list 
of 33 individuals in Abkhazia and South Ossetia who it said should 
be internationally blacklisted for “murder, kidnapping, torture” and 
for concealing those crimes since 1991. Both Abkhaz and South 
Ossetians walked out of IPRM meetings complaining that this list 
“politicised” the issue.6  
5.3 Domestic politics and Russian influence  
Abkhazia is a multi-ethnic republic which is de facto an ethnocracy. 
The constitution stipulates that the president must be an ethnic 
Abkhaz (in Russian “litso abkhazskoi natsional’nosti”, Article 49.) 31 
of 35 members of parliament elected in 2017 are also ethnic Abkhaz. 
The large Armenian community is barely represented in public life. 
There are sometimes complaints that Abkhaz are “more equal in front 
of the law than others.”7  
                                                        
6 Georgia to Blacklist 33 Persons for Grave Human Rights Violations in Abkhazia, 
S. Ossetia, Civil Georgia, June 26, 2018, https://civil.ge/ 
archives/245041 
7 Thomas Hammarberg and Magdalena Grono, “Human Rights in Abkhazia 
Today,” Olof Palme International Centre, July 2018, p 51 
https://www.palmecenter.se/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Human-Rights-in-
Abkhazia-Today-report-by-Thomas-Hammarberg-and-Magdalena-Grono.pdf 
ABKHAZIA TODAY 165 
 
Within that context, there is lively and competitive politics, and 
elections are mainly free and fair. There was a fiercely contested 
presidential election in 2004, in which Sergei Bagapsh ultimately 
prevailed over Raul Khajimba, who was Moscow’s preferred 
candidate. A decade later, in 2014, there were street protests which 
resulted in the resignation of then leader Alexander Ankvab and 
Khajimba coming to power. Political debate in Abkhazia is free, and 
there are independent media outlets such as the Chegemskaya Pravda 
newspaper and the Abkhazia Inform news agency. Several NGOs 
continue to operate freely. One veteran of the civil society sector 
Asida Shakryl has become Abkhazia’s ombudswoman and dares to 
speak up for the issue of the rights of the republic’s Georgian 
minority. 
Khajimba proved to be a fairly weak president and lacked the 
stature of his three predecessors. His authority was undermined 
when he controversially pardoned a Georgia militia fighter named 
Giorgi Lukava who had been imprisoned in Abkhazia – an episode 
which underlines how strong the political legacy of the conflict with 
Georgia still is.8  
Khajimba was re-elected for another term in September 2019. 
However, the vote was questioned by the opposition and Khajimba 
was forced from office after street protests in January 2020. The 
strongest contender to be the next leader is probably parliamentary 
deputy Aslan Bzhania, who was the runner-up in the 2014 election, 
having served as head of the security service under Ankvab. Bzhania 
is a strong critic of the current political elite and promises to deliver 
security and a crackdown on corruption. He did not take part in the 
2019 vote when he was taken ill, with evidence emerging that he was 
the victim of a deliberate act of poisoning.9 The political turmoil of 
the last few years, with the politics of the street determining who 
leads the republics, has made Abkhazia increasingly weak and 
                                                        
8 “The Pardoning of a Georgian Convict could Cost the Abkhaz President his 
Job,” Jam News, January 7, 2018 https://jam-news.net/the-pardoning-of-a-
georgian-convict-could-cost-the-abkhaz-president-his-job/ 
9 https://jam-news.net/abkhaz-opposition-says-leader-may-have-been-poisoned/  
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ungovernable, raising questions as to whether any domestic leader 
can command proper legitimacy. 
Russia does not loom large in everyday politics but is a very 
powerful behind-the-scenes actor. It was alleged that the ousting of 
Ankvab in 2014 followed meetings between the opposition and 
Moscow’s main “curator” for Abkhazia, Vladislav Surkov.10  
In the 1990s Russia did not have a coordinated policy on 
Abkhazia. Some elements in the Russian military and security 
establishment provided the vital support for the Abkhaz side in the 
conflict of 1992-3, which helped them to recapture the city of 
Sukhumi and defeat the Georgian side. At the same time the 
government of Boris Yeltsin officially cultivated a good relationship 
with Georgia and supported a sanctions regime against Abkhazia in 
1996. Russia worked with the United Nations mission in Abkhazia 
and officially supported the territorial integrity of Georgia.  
In 2002, with Vladimir Putin now president, the policy began 
to change. In that year residents of Abkhazia were still using Soviet 
passports as travel documents, but they were set to lose their validity 
on July 1. The Russian government gave permission for Abkhaz to 
receive Russian passports in the city of Sochi and 150,000 of them 
took the opportunity to do so.  
Despite Russia’s policy of more overt patronage for Abkhazia, 
patron-client relations remained complicated. In 2004, the Russian 
authorities were so enraged at the rejection of Moscow’s preferred 
candidate in the presidential election, Raul Khajimba, that at one 
point the governor of neighbouring Krasnodar region threatened to 
close the border.11 A compromise was eventually brokered whereby 
Bagapsh became president and Khajimba vice-president. 
In 2008, Russia officially recognised Abkhazia as independent 
and initiated a policy closer to de facto integration, with heavy 
financial support. The Russian military is a key actor. Russia has more 
                                                        
10 “Putin's Aides Meet Abkhaz Leader, Opposition Over Crisis,” RFE/RL, May 
28, 2014 https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-officials-meet-abkhazian-leader-
opposition-over-crisis/25402324.html 
11 Theresa Freese, “Abkhazia: At War with Itself,” Eurasianet, December 3, 2004. 
https://eurasianet.org/abkhazia-at-war-with-itself 
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or less absorbed Abkhazia’s own military into a “Joint Group of 
Forces.” It keeps a contingent of 3,500 troops in Abkhazia (and a 
greater number in South Ossetia), as well as around 1,500 FSB 
security officers and border guards.12 Under a military agreement 
signed in 2009, Russia maintains a large base of the 49th Army from 
Russia’s Southern Military District on the Bombora airfield in the city 
of Gudauta. In 2013 it was reported to have least 41 T-90 battle tanks 
and 130 outdated APCs. In 2012 it was reported that Russia had 
deployed long-range S-300 missiles in the territory.13  
Russia has a de facto veto on many aspects of Abkhazia’s 
political life. Despite (or because of) that, tensions have persisted 
between Moscow and Sukhumi. On the Abkhaz side there was 
resentment when Abkhazia was not permitted by Moscow to derive 
economic benefits from the Sochi Winter Olympic Games of 2014. The 
Abkhaz leadership has also resisted plans for a new road across the 
mountains linking Abkhazia with the North Caucasus.14  
Differences were laid bare in 2014 when Moscow unveiled two 
draft “integration” treaties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia which 
formalised its role in running the security forces and giving it full 
control of the borders of the two territories. South Ossetia accepted 
its treaty, but there was resistance to the first draft of the treaty with 
Abkhazia. A second version of a re-titled “Union Relations and 
Strategic Partnership” left many competences with Abkhazia’s de 
                                                        
12 These figures are from 2013. See, Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation, 
International Crisis Group, April 10, 2013, 3. https://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
europe-central-asia/caucasus/abkhazia-georgia/abkhazia-long-road-
reconciliation 
13 “Russian Troops in Abkhazia to Get Air-Conditioned APCs,” Ria Novosti, April 
19, 2013. https://web.archive.org/web/20130420070644/ 
http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130419/180735302.html; “Russia ‘Deploys 
Missiles’ in Breakaway Region of Abkhazia, BBC News, March 12, 2013, 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10940297 
14 Sergei Markedonov, “The 2014 Sochi Olympics: A Patchwork of Challenges,” 
CSIS, January 14, 18 https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/140113_Markedonov_2014SochiOlympic
s_WEB.pdf 
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facto authorities, on paper at least, while still provoking criticism 
from Abkhaz who feared absorption into Russia.15  
One important point that Moscow wanted was removed from 
the remodelled treaty: a provision for Russians to have a fast track to 
acquire Abkhaz citizenship. That would give them the right to 
acquire property – a right all non-citizens of Abkhazia are currently 
denied. The fear in Abkhazia is that if Russians are allowed to buy 
property, then all its prime real estate will quickly be snapped up and 
Russia will very quickly become the legal owner of Abkhazia. A 
leaked cache of emails by and to Surkov, the author of the 2014 treaty, 
reveals that the property issue was a key concern in Moscow. It also 
shows that Moscow was frustrated that it could not control the 
Abkhaz elite and was speculating about how to buy or win their 
favours.16  
Russia pursues policies towards Abkhazia that suggest it sees 
it more as a strategic asset than as a place it genuinely seeks to see 
develop and prosper. The emphasis is on keeping a military presence 
at Gudauta, which gives Russia de facto control of 200km of Black Sea 
coastline and of sending a warning to Georgia about the dangers of 
aspiring to NATO membership. Diplomatic relations with Tbilisi; 
have been suspended since 2008. At the same time since 2012 Russia 
has been pursuing a normalisation policy with the post-Saakashvili 
government in Georgia in other areas, resulting in the restoration of 
trade, tourism and communication links.  
In several areas Moscow – or to be more precise some Russian 
political actors – seeks accommodation with Tbilisi in ways that have 
disquieted Abkhazia. For example, Moscow is still formally 
committed to fulfil the terms of the Swiss-brokered 2011 agreement 
whereby Georgia lifted its veto on Russian joining the World Trade 
Organization and let three “trade corridors” open up between 
Georgia and Russia, two of them across Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
for freight traffic. These corridors are unpopular in Abkhazia and 
                                                        
15 Thomas de Waal, “Abkhazia: Deeper with Russia,” Carnegie Moscow Center, 
November 20, 2014, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/57274 
16 David Batashvili, “’Surkov leaks’”: Glimpse into Russia’s Management of 
Georgia’s Occupied Regions,” Clarion Brief , October 2016.  
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South Ossetia as cargoes are supposed to be sealed as they pass 
through, and there is no acknowledgement by Russia that the two 
territories are supposedly independent countries.17  
Also, the Russian Orthodox Church still values relations with 
the Georgian Orthodox Church to the extent that it has ruled out the 
idea of the churches in Abkhazia being allowed to join the Moscow 
Patriarchate. Orthodox parishes in Abkhazia are still formally – if not 
in practice – affiliated to the Georgian church.  
5.4 Economy and society  
Abkhazia is materially better off than a decade ago, but its modest 
economy has not grown for several years and is heavily reliant on 
Russian subsidies.  
Moscow’s recognition in 2008 facilitated a big Russian-funded 
reconstruction programme, which finally cleared ruined buildings 
and repaired roads that had been left untouched since the end of the 
war in 1993. The city of Sukhumi and resort towns close to Russia 
were greatly improved. Abkhazia acquired a small retail and service 
sector in the form of shops, cafes and hotels that it had not had since 
the late Soviet period. Other innovations include an Abkhaz-wide 
debit-card named Apra that is accepted in most shops.  
However, there is now widespread discontent at what is 
widely termed an “economic crisis”. The government budget for 2019 
marked a reduction on previous years. Income was estimated at 9.735 
billion roubles (€133 million) and expenditure at 9.841 billion roubles 
(€135 million), a cut of around 4% from two years previously. This 
led to Abkhaz parliamentarian, Raul Lolua, calling it “a budget not 
of development but of stagnation.”18 The average monthly salary is 
only 10,000 roubles (around €140). 
                                                        
17 Thomas de Waal, “Georgia and Russia Inch Towards a Business Deal,” Strategic 
Europe, November 27, 2017. https://carnegieeurope.eu/ 
strategiceurope/74826 
18 «Парламент принял спорный бюджет Абхазии в первом чтении” 
[“Parliament adopted the controversial budget of Abkhazia in the first reading,” 
EurAsia Daily, December 6, 2018 https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2018/ 
12/06/parlament-prinyal-spornyy-byudzhet-abhazii-v-pervom-chtenii 
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Domestically generated income is modest. Two sectors of the 
economy generate revenue: agriculture and tourism. Both have 
experienced problems in recent years. The republic’s main 
agricultural products, citrus fruits and hazelnuts, have been ravaged 
by the brown marmorated stink bug which hurt the livelihoods of 
farmers in both Abkhazia and the Samegrelo region of Georgia. By 
one estimate, more than 80% of Abkhazia was affected by the bug in 
2017.19  
Tourism provides income both for large hotels and the ‘private 
sector’ of rented rooms. In Soviet times, the beach-resorts of 
Abkhazia, such as Gagra and Pitsunda, were a premier holiday 
destination for tourists from across the USSR. In the 1990s these 
resorts were closed down by the war and its aftermath, while 
Russians could travel to Turkey and other foreign destinations for the 
first time. Following Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia, tourist 
numbers climbed sharply. However, over the last three years they 
have declined again. This may be because of bad publicity about 
conditions of service and crime in Abkhazia. In 2017, for example, 
Russian travel agencies warned about a number of robberies 
committed against Russian visitors.20  
At the same time, the Russian government had less interest in 
advertising Abkhazia as it was heavily promoted tourism in an 
alternative Black Sea destination, Crimea, after annexing the 
peninsular from Ukraine in 2015. An Abkhaz journalist reported in 
September 2018 that 360 medium and large-scale hotels in Abkhazia 
registered 103,000 guests in 2017, but had only registered 67,000 at 
the end of the summer season in 2018.21  
                                                        
19 “Stink bug devastates hazelnut crops in Samegrelo and Abkhazia,” OC Media, 
September 20, 2017 https://oc-media.org/stink-bug-devastates-hazelnut-crops-
in-samegrelo-abkhazia/ 
20 “Абхазский союз туризма” заявил о массовом отказе туристов от поездок,” 
[“‘The Abkhaz Union of Tourism’ reported on a mass refusal of tourists to 
travel”], Kavkazsky Uzel, August 6, 2017, https://www.kavkaz-
uzel.eu/articles/307278/ 
21 Marianna Kotovo, “Abkhazia’s Informal Business Sector,” Jam News, 
September 18, 2018. https://jam-news.net/tourism-abkhazias-informal-
business-sector/ 
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Around half of the government budget is funded through 
direct assistance from Russia. That does not include two other 
significant financial contributions from Russia: its military assistance 
and payment of pensions. The Russian government pays the 
pensions of some but not all of Abkhazia’s 50,000 pensioners and has 
increased levels to make them closer to those in Russia’s 
neighbouring Southern Federal District.22  
Russia transfers funds to the budgets of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia in two ways, through an investment programme and also as 
socio-economic development aid. Both types of assistance are 
coordinated with the de facto authorities through an inter-
governmental commission. The investment programme mainly 
funds the building of infrastructure. The development aid covers 
costs in sectors such as education, healthcare and the police.23 The 
level of Russian assistance has declined sharply since 2012 in real 
terms, partly as a result of the devaluation of the rouble and partly (it 
can be surmised) due to new and heavy spending commitments in 
Crimea, Donbas and elsewhere. In 2019 it was projected to be less 
than $150 million.24  
Abkhazia has an over-sized government and under-funded 
public services. The republic’s de facto state structures absorb a huge 
                                                        
22 “Time to Talk Trade,” International Crisis Group, May 24, 2018, 34. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/249-
abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-time-talk-trade Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry 
Serikov said that only 30,000 pensioners received Russian pensions (In this article 
he is also quoted as saying there are 70,000 pensioners in Abkhazia, but this 
higher figure include may include other social welfare categories). See “Часть 
Депутатов Недовольна Проектом Республиканского Бюджета На 2018 Г,” 
[Some Deputies are Unhappy with the Draft Republican Budget for 2018”] 
Abkhazia-Inform, December 11, 2017, http://abkhazinform.com/ 
item/6808-chast-deputatov-nedovolna-proektom-respublikanskogo-
byudzheta-na-2018-g Many Abkhaz of younger pension age have been told that 
they are not eligible for Russian pensions on ground that they are too young or 
for other reasons. See Yelena Zavodskaya, “Российские граждане, но без 
пенсии” [“Russian citizens but without a Pension”], Ekho Kavkaza, March 19, 
2018. https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/29109735.html 
23 “Time to Talk Trade,” 33. 
24 “Time to Talk Trade,” 31.  
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amount of the budget, something that draws criticism from 
independent analysts. One of them, the economist Khatuna Shat-Ila 
noted in November 2018 that Abkhazia had 15 ministries (not 
mentioning various “state committees”) which required financing. 
She calculated that it cost 1.4 million roubles a year to maintain each 
parliamentary deputy while only 700,000 roubles annually were 
spent on each village in Abkhazia. She wrote, “From the example of 
the budget it is obvious that the actions of our authorities create 
something that resembles a corporate enterprise. That is why both 
business and criminal organisations want to join this corporate 
enterprise.”25  
Successive Abkhaz leaders have pledged to crack down on 
organised crime, with only limited success. The situation is 
acknowledged to be better than the lawless days of the 1990s, but de 
facto law enforcement bodies are weak and criminals (mainly local 
ones) use the shadowy international status of Abkhazia to avoid 
justice.26 High-level corruption is a persistent issue. Former leader 
Alexander Ankvab made tackling this problem his chief slogan – only 
to be accused himself in 2019 of having done a deal with an obscure 
Cyprus-based company for an oil-exploration contract.27  
Public services, such as education and health, are poorly 
funded. The education sector was allocated 354.1 million roubles 
(€4.5 million) in the 2019 budget. Russian aid has funded physical 
infrastructure but much less money has gone into teacher training 
and there are universal complaints about the quality of teaching at all 
levels of education. Abkhazia’s only university, AGU (Abkhaz State 
                                                        
25 «Абхазия: Кризис и Пути Выхода из Него,” [“Abkhazia: the Crisis and Ways out 
of it”], Abkhazia-Inform, November 29, 2018 http://abkhazinform.com/tochka-
zreniya/item/8139-abkhaziya-krizis-i-puti-vykhoda-iz-nego 
26 «Рауль Хаджимба: В Работе МВД не все так Гладко, как Представляется в 
Отчетах,” [“Raul Khajimba: in the work of the MIA it’s not as Smooth as 
Presented in Reports,” Abkhazia-Inform, June 20, 2016, 
http://abkhazinform.com/item/4000-raul-khadzhimba-v-rabote-mvd-ne-vse-
tak-gladko-kak-predstavlyaetsya-v-otchetakh 
27 “Former Abkhaz president Ankvab accused of corruption deal in oil 
contracts,” Jam News, February 22, 2019. https://jam-news.net/former-abkhaz-
president-ankvab-accused-of-corruption-deal-in-oil-contracts/ 
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University) has a well-respected but elderly leadership, lecturers 
earning only a few hundred euros a month and hundreds of students 
keen to learn but cut off from global trends in education. Better-off 
students go to Russia. There were reported to be 1,691 students in 
Russian higher education in 2018.28  
Lack of funding in the health system means that diseases such 
as HIV, Hepatitis C and tuberculosis are unusually prevalent in 
Abkhazia. According to the authoritative 2017 human rights report 
on Abkhazia by Thomas Hammarberg and Magdalena Grono, “The 
health system has not been reformed and doctors often struggle to 
make ends meet both in terms of the resources at hand, and their 
remuneration. The doctors – educated in the Soviet times or in Russia 
– cite a high demand for professional update training, and say their 
lack of access to new methodologies and health protocols is a serious 
problem. Several doctors cited ad hoc specialised training provided 
by the Russian Federation as very useful, and would be very keen on 
more professional qualification opportunities and exchanges, also 
beyond Russia. Health authorities cite blood-borne infectious 
diseases, cancer, cardio-vascular diseases and diabetes as the greatest 
public health concerns.”29  
Citizens with money seek good-quality healthcare in Georgia 
or Russia. In 2017, the Georgian government reported that 1,137 
residents of Abkhazia crossed the boundary line and received free 
medical treatment in Georgia proper. The Georgian authorities have 
also constructed a new hospital just outside Zugdidi near the border-
line.  
Abkhazia also suffers from serious environmental problems, 
which are not being addressed in the budget or by Russian funding 
and which are exacerbated by the absence of international expertise 
in the republic. In addition to the brown marmorated stink bug, the 
box-tree moth caterpillar, mistakenly imported into the region from 
                                                        
28 “Абитуриентам из Абхазии будет Проще Поступить в Российские Вузы”, 
[“It will be Easier for Applicants from Abkhazia to Apply to Russian 
Universities,”] Abkhazia-Inform, December 13, 2018. 
http://abkhazinform.com/item/8200-abiturientam-iz-abkhazii-budet-
proshche-postupit-v-rossijskie-vuzy 
29 Hammarberg and Grono, 43. 
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Italy in 2012, has devastated trees and vegetation. Other problems 
include: water contamination, in the sea, rivers and the Jvari 
reservoir; declining fish-stocks; urban pollution due to untreated 
sewage in Sukhumi and other towns; the threat of eutrophication (an 
influx of nutrients reducing the oxygen in the Black Sea.). 
In 2017, an explosion at an unmonitored ammunition dump in 
the village of Primorsky exploded. Three people were killed and 64 
were injured. Twelve houses were completely destroyed and over 
100 damaged. The fallout from the blast littered the village and 
surrounding land with thousands of explosives including huge 
aircraft bombs. For months there was no proper clear-up. The site was 
eventually cleared by the British de-mining NGO, the Halo Trust.30  
Road safety is a big issue of public concern. Abkhazia’s roads 
are perhaps the most dangerous in Europe. In the ten months from 
January-October 2018 there were 120 road accidents, causing 42 
deaths and 174 people serious injuries. The highest-profile casualty 
was former prime minister Gennady Gagulia, who was killed in 
September 2018 in a collision with a 22-year-old driver who was 
arrested. The problem is attributed to a toxic combination of under-
funding, weak law enforcement and a Caucasian macho culture of 
dangerous driving.31 
Within Abkhazia there is some debate about how to strengthen 
the domestic economy to give the republic a development strategy 
and deal with these problems. There is currently little prospect of 
vastly increased trade with Russia. Trade with Turkey, almost all 
carried out in a circuitous manner by sea through Russian waters, is 
hard to quantify – even though it is probably worth tens of million 
dollars a year. Being irregular, it is also not subject to quality 
inspection. Abkhaz food products go to Turkey unlabelled. This 
raises the question of whether Abkhazia could follow the example of 
Transdniestria and get the trade preferences available under 
                                                        
30 “The Road to Recovery: Primorsky One Year on,” The Halo Trust, July 29, 2018. 
https://www.halotrust.org/media-centre/impact-stories/primorsky-one-year-
on/ 
31 Eleonora Giloyan, “Alcohol, speeding and corruption – Abkhazia’s terrifying 
road safety statistics,” Jam News, February 20, 2019. https://jam-
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Georgia’s DCFTA agreement with the European Union. Emissaries 
from the European Commission made this proposition to Abkhaz 
officials in 2017 and 2018 but without much positive response.  
Circumstances are less favourable for this arrangement than 
they are with Transdniestria. Transdniestria has no common border 
with Russia but is sandwiched between right-bank Moldova and 
Ukraine, both of which have agreed a DCFTA with the EU. It has a 
developed industrial base and produces goods, such as textiles and 
shoes, which are attractive on the European market. The dispute is 
less toxic and it is more politically acceptable for Transdniestrians to 
take Moldovan passports and register as Moldovan companies. 
Unlike in Moldova, economic ties with Abkhazia were cut after the 
war when transport communications (the railway line, airport and 
sea-port) were shut or remained closed and then a Commonwealth 
of Independent States sanctions regime was imposed on the republic 
in 1996, with the partial support of Russia. Economic activity began 
to resume only in the 2000s, when Russia changed its policy but 
connections with Georgia had been sharply curtailed and are not the 
resource for people-to-people contacts and confidence-building 
measures that they are in Moldova. 
Independent analyst Rustam Anshba argues, “Abkhazia is 
different. It has no such incentive to maintain trade links with 
Georgia. Its economy was built around tourism, niche agriculture 
(like wines and tangerines) and the production of raw materials 
primarily used in local construction work. The Georgian peace 
initiative only offers the possibility of selling goods originated in 
Abkhazia in Georgian and European markets. This means that 
Abkhaz products would have to comply with the regulations and 
standards of the European Single Market, which is not realistic for 
Abkhaz producers. Abkhaz production is very limited in quantity 
and variety and has never been exposed to the regulated business 
culture of the EU. But it does have well-established trade links with 
Russia.”32  
                                                        
32 Rustam Anshba, “Georgia’s Overtures to Abkhazia and South Ossetia Are 
Flawed,” Chatham House, 26 November, 2018, Chatham House 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/georgia-s-overtures-
abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-are-flawed 
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Others say that Abkhazia should be looking to legalise its trade 
with Georgia. There is plenty of informal trade across the River Inguri 
and the market in Gali is full of household goods from Georgia. 
However, the trade is not regulated and under the 2008 Law on 
Occupied Territories, Georgian companies are prohibited from 
engaging in economic activity without receiving official permission 
from the government. (Thus far only the Inguri Hydro-Electric Power 
Station receives this permission). There are also restrictions from the 
Abkhaz side, although not so rigorously enforced. In a commentary 
of May 2018, Abkhaz newspaper editor and commentator Inal 
Khashig made the case that formalising trade with Georgia was a 
“patriotic” policy. He noted that there was a “missing billion” roubles 
in Abkhazia’s budget for 2017 which could be filled this way: “[I]n 
my deep conviction, the real patriotism is to provide our citizens with 
a decent standard of living. You want to know where to get the 
billion? It lies right under your feet.”33  
This would be a prelude to more formal trade with the 
European Union coordinated with Georgia. Any agreement would 
have to come up with a “status-neutral” formula for a certificate of 
origin that would be acceptable to Tbilisi and also a mechanism for 
ensuring that goods can be inspected to ensure they meet European 
quality standards, requiring inspection.  
5.5 Inguri power division 
The two sides in the conflict work together to manage one project, the 
Inguri-GES, the hydro-electric power station on the Inguri River 
which runs between Abkhazia and the Samegrelo region. The power 
station dates back to the 1970s and is the biggest in the South 
Caucasus. Its dam is 271 metres high and the sixth tallest in the world. 
It has its reservoir in government-controlled Georgia, but a concrete 
tunnel (bored 500 feet deep in a mountain ridge) channels water to a 
series of generators on the Abkhaz side. The station is managed and 
run by a Georgian company and more than 400 Georgian workers, all 
of whom are permitted to work on the Abkhaz side.  
                                                        
33 Inal Khashig, “Commentary: Where is Abkhazia’s missing billion?”, Jam News, 
May 11, 2018. https://jam-news.net/commentary-where-is-abkhazias-missing-
billion/ 
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Under an informal agreement struck in 1996, 60% of the 
electricity generated by the power station goes to the Georgian side 
(covering just under half of Georgia’s energy needs) and 40% to the 
Abkhaz side, an amount which usually covers all the republic’s 
power needs and is sometimes re-exported to Russia. The outcome is 
that Tbilisi is effectively funding Abkhazia with free electricity in 
order to keep the station running. Abkhazia uses the power very 
wastefully, according to the head of the station, “In Tbilisi, the price 
of electricity is 20 tetri [per kw/h, about 7 cents], but in Abkhazia – 
1.6 tetri, this is just impossible.”34  
The station needs modernising and constant repairs, much of 
which is funded by foreign donors, chiefly the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. In February 2019, due to low water 
levels on the river, electricity was rationed in Abkhazia and there 
were power cuts. The Georgian government paid the Russian 
company Inter RAO to supply Abkhazia with extra power, receiving 
criticism from the opposition for doing so.35  
Georgian expert Valeri Basaria calls the Inguri power station 
“an example of cooperation out of necessity” and cautions that 
believing it is a model for other joint projects is a “case of wishful 
thinking”.36 Rather, thus far the two sides have learned to work 
together due to a rather opaque top-level agreement that has not been 
replicated elsewhere and which also has had the negative result of 
feeding chronic energy inefficiency in Abkhazia.  
However, there are now tentative plans by the de facto 
government in Abkhazia, initiated by Aslan Basaria, director of the 
                                                        
34 Marina Kobakhia, “Abkhazia: life without electricity,” Jam News, February 26, 
2019. https://jam-news.net/abkhazia-life-without-electricity/ 
35“Грузинская оппозиция потребовала расследовать закупку электричества 
для Абхазии,” [“The Georgian opposition has demanded an investigation into 
the purchase of electricity for Abkhazia,”] Ekho Kavkaza, March 5, 2019. 
https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/29803980.html 
36 Valeri Basaria, “The Inguri hydropower station: why this model of trans-Inguri 
economic cooperation remains the only one,” in “Regulating trans-Ingur/i 
economic relations Views from two banks,” International Alert, July 2011, 20. 
https://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/Caucasus 
_TransInguri_EconRelationsViews_EN_2012_0.pdf 
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energy company, Chernomorenergo, to put Abkhazia’s energy 
market on a more secure footing, by charging businesses more 
systematically and metering homes. Basaria has said he has closed 
down much of the shadowy bitcoin mining industry in Abkhazia, 
which relies on cheap electricity. These moves would make Abkhazia 
a more reliable energy partner for Tbilisi and perhaps pave the way 
for cooperation in other areas.37  
5.6 Tbilisi’s policy  
Tbilisi’s policies have evolved since the 1990s. In 2014 there were still 
officially 259,000 people (86,000 families) registered as IDPs in 
Georgia, the majority of them from the Abkhazia conflict of 1992-3. 
Around a third of them were living in Samegrelo region (Mingrelia) 
adjoining Abkhazia.38 More than two decades after the conflict, most 
IDPs have left behind poor living conditions and have integrated into 
Georgian society, while the conflict of 2008 has further dimmed 
hopes of return.  
Georgians from Abkhazia also have less political influence 
than before. There is still a “government in exile”, headed until the 
spring of 2019 by a former parliamentarian from Abkhazia, Vakhtang 
Kolbaia. Article 37 of Georgia’s constitution states that, “Following 
the full restoration of Georgia’s jurisdiction throughout the entire 
territory of Georgia,” a second chamber of parliament will be 
established comprising members from the autonomous republics of 
Abkhazia and Ajaria as well as “other territorial units of Georgia.” 
(South Ossetia has no formal autonomous status and is not named.)39 
Abkhaz is also named as the official language of Abkhazia. 
Since 2012 there has been a retreat from policies aimed at 
isolation and more sustained effort to offer Abkhaz-Georgian 
government services – if residents of Abkhazia choose to cross into 
Georgian government-controlled territory. Paata Zakareishvili, 
                                                        
37 Author interview; Giorgi Lomsadze, “Could cryptocurrency leave Abkhazia in 
the dark?” Eurasianet, December 12, 2018. https://eurasianet.org/could-
cryptocurrency-leave-abkhazia-in-the-dark 
38 Figures are at http://www.mra.gov.ge/eng/static/55 
39 Constitution of Georgia can be found at https://matsne.gov.ge/en/ 
document/view/30346?publication=35 
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chosen by the Georgian Dream government to be in charge of the file 
on Abkhazia and South Ossetia, changed the name of his ministry 
from “Ministry of Reintegration” to “Ministry of Reconciliation and 
Civic Equality”. Zakareishvili stepped down in 2016.  
In 2018, an initiative was unveiled by prime minister Giorgi 
Kvirikashvili and minister of reconciliation Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, 
entitled “A Step Towards a Better Future”, offering Abkhaz and 
South Ossetians chances to trade with Georgia and some innovative 
ways of receiving Georgian healthcare, education and other services. 
Primarily, Abkhaz and South Ossetians would be eligible, without 
obtaining official Georgian ID, to register for a “personal number” 
giving them a right to these services. A number of service centres 
would be established in the village of Rukhi, near the boundary line 
with Abkhazia.40  
These initiatives were rebuffed by Abkhaz officials as offers of 
reintegration, albeit soft ones. Some other activities have been more 
successful. The two sides have exchanged archival materials, 
enabling the Abkhaz archive to get copies of some of the documents 
which were burned by Georgian militiamen in 1992. Perhaps the 
most successful project has tackled the painful issue of missing 
persons buried in unmarked graves during the conflict of 1992-93. A 
total of 2,258 people are still reported as missing. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), with funding from the EU, began 
work in 2013 to exhume bodies for reburial. In December 2018 
Nicolas Fleury, the ICRC operations coordinator for Europe and 
Central Asia, reported “Since the establishment of the coordination 
mechanism, the mortal remains of 431 people have been found and 
exhumed, out of which 148 were identified and handed over to their 
families for a dignified burial.”41 This process healed many lingering 
psychological wounds from the conflict and was widely reported on 
both sides of the conflict divide.  
                                                        
40 Text of “’A Step to a Better Future’ Peace Initiative Facilitation of Trade Across 
Dividing Lines” http://smr.gov.ge/Uploads/Concept_EN_ 
0eaaac2e.pdf 
41 “A step further in the search for persons missing in connection with 1992-93 
armed conflict in Abkhazia,” International Committee of the Red Cross, December 
4, 2018. https://www.icrc.org/en/document/step-further-searchfor-persons-
missing-connection-1992-93-armed-conflict-abkhazia 
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One issue remains extremely vexed between the two sides, that 
of Gali region. The most easterly region of Abkhazia, it has for 
decades had an almost exclusively Georgian population, of 
Mingrelians, who also speak Mingrelian, a language related to 
Georgian. There are an estimated 50,000 people in the region. After 
the conflict ended in 1993, most of the Gali Georgians returned to 
their homes, while freely crossing the Inguri River to Zugdidi region, 
where many of them had properties or relatives. They were the main 
traders of both legal and illegal goods, between western Georgia and 
Abkhazia. 
The conflict divide made life complicated for the Gali 
Georgians with both Sukhumi and Tbilisi and they never received 
strong government assistance from either. (One international official 
once described them as “children with two stepmothers”.) These 
problems have worsened since 2008, as Abkhazia has built up its de 
facto statehood and tightened controls on the boundary line on the 
Inguri. In 2017, all crossing points across the river except one were 
closed, making travel much more inconvenient for locals. Most locals 
are forced to cross the bridge on foot in all weathers. In January 2019, 
Temur Nadaraia, head of Gali district, ordered even that crossing 
point closed for a month, citing fears of bird-influenza coming across 
from Georgia. 
In recent years Gali residents have suffered from two problems: 
a ‘documentation gap’ in which they do not have the right documents 
to live and work on both sides of the Inguri, and restrictions on 
Georgian-language education.  
Residents of the region had long used dual documentation, 
using residence cards or old Soviet ID documents on the Abkhaz side, 
and Georgian passports on the Georgian-controlled side. After 2008, 
however, Abkhazia began to insist that all its citizens should use 
Abkhaz passports and officially permitted dual citizenship only with 
Russia. This created awkward problems for the people of Gali, which 
were exacerbated by the opposition to Alexander Ankvab, who 
claimed that he had unfairly gained the presidency thanks to 
“Georgian votes” in Gali. (Almost no one from Gali then voted in the 
2014 election on the grounds that they did not have the right 
documents.) In 2019, few Gali residents had taken Abkhaz passports, 
rendering them effectively second-class citizens in Abkhazia, unable 
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to properly register births or marriages for example. Many evidently 
keep their Georgian passports, even though this was illegal from 
Abkhazia’s point of view.42  
Thomas Hammarberg and Magdalena Grono write, “The 
frustration that Gali residents expressed was deep and widespread. 
Some said the lack of a clear status made it impossible for them to 
plan for their future lives and for those of their children, who 
typically cannot get the necessary documents to set up their 
independent lives in Gali, to marry or to acquire a home. Others said 
they were not regarded ‘as worthy of a paper’ that would legitimise 
them, but were still required to pay Abkhaz taxes.”43  
Georgian-language education is also a big concern. Eleven 
schools in the lower Gali district continued instruction in Georgian 
unhindered until the summer of 2015. However ahead of the 2015-
2016 school-year, the Abkhaz government announced a switch into 
teaching in Russian and Georgian teaching was gradually phased 
out. This was contrary to the wishes of parents – and their right to 
mother-tongue education – and despite a lack of Russian-speaking 
teachers and teaching materials. Georgian has continued to be taught 
only as a foreign language. As a result, many Gali parents have 
moved their children to Zugdidi so that they can continue Georgian-
language education there. This situation is strongly condemned in 
Georgia and has been frequently raised at the Geneva International 
Discussions.44  
5.7 The international outlook 
Abkhazia has become more internationally isolated since 2008. 
Georgia’s Law on Occupied Territories penalises activities in 
Abkhazia not authorised by the Georgian government and anyone 
who crosses into Abkhazia from Russian territory, across the River 
                                                        
42 Hammarberg and Grono, p 62. On Gali see also the Conciliation Resource 
report “The Realm of the Possible Finding ways forward in the Georgian-Abkhaz 
context: People in the Gal/i region,” July, 2015. https://www.c-
r.org/downloads/CR_The-Realm-of-the-possible_Gal-i_43_webEn.pdf 
43 Hammarberg and Grono, p 62 
44 Hammarberg and Grono, p 35-36  
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Psou. This has deterred several Russian organisations from working 
in Abkhazia.  
Abkhaz have restricted opportunities for foreign travel. Almost 
all of them refuse to take Georgian passports on principle (in contrast 
to Transdniestrians or Turkish Cypriots). Even if they were tempted 
to do so, the social stigma attached to taking Georgian documents 
would be too high. This applies to the “neutral travel documents” 
issued by the Georgian government since 2011. They do not carry 
Georgian state symbols, but do have a Georgian-issued international 
code and must be collected on Georgian-controlled territory. Almost 
no residents of Abkhazia have taken these documents.  
Up until 2002 most residents of Abkhazia used old Soviet 
passports, but then took up Russia’s offer of Russian foreign 
passports. Since 2008, however, Russia has issued far fewer passports 
on the grounds that Abkhazia is in its eyes an internationally 
recognised state. This means that the younger generation in Abkhazia 
only have an Abkhaz passport and very few chances to go abroad.  
Abkhaz look to Turkey as their second patron, but there is a 
divide between Turkish official policy and that of society. Up to half 
a million “Çerkes” live in Turkey, the descendants of the North 
Caucasian Circassian and Abkhaz “muhajirs” brutally deported to 
the Ottoman Empire in the 1860s and 1870s at the end of the 
Caucasian Wars. They are an influential community with several 
parliamentarians. Abkhaz groups frequently visit Turkey and former 
leader Sergei Bagapsh visited in 2011, ostensibly on health grounds. 
Turkish parliamentarians and journalists also visit Abkhazia via 
Russia.  
However, Turkey values a strong bilateral friendship with 
Georgia and is its biggest trading partner, so the Turkish government 
always reaffirms its support for Georgia’s territorial integrity 
including Abkhazia. Turkey does not seek a mediating role in the 
dispute, despite being well-placed to do so.  
There is substantial, if undocumented, trade between Turkey 
and Abkhazia, mainly from the port of Trabzon, which is a source of 
tension between Tbilisi and Ankara. Ships travel to Russia’s 
territorial waters around Sochi and from there make the journey to 
Sukhumi, where they are frequently seen in the harbour. Turkey 
supplies food and textiles which is resold in wholesale markets and 
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shops, as well as construction materials. Abkhazia exports coal and 
timber as well as fish and hazelnuts, none of it formally registered.45  
In the period 2008-2011, there were frequent incidents 
involving Turkish ships travelling to Abkhazia, which were detained 
by the Georgian side. At one point in 2010, the Georgian side held 
five Turkish vessels. Former Georgian deputy foreign minister Sergi 
Kapanadze has argued that the trade could be legalised if for example 
the Turkish ships also stopped in Georgian ports.46 There are 
certainly reasons for all parties to regularise the trade. It is also 
possible to envisage the setting up some kind of inspection process 
similar to that of EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine for Transdniestria, 
to ensure that normal goods are permitted but smuggling is halted.  
Syria and Jordan are also home to communities of Abkhaz 
descendants. In 2012-13 Abkhazia invited Syrian “muhajirs” to 
resettle there. In July 2013, 467 were reported to have done so. The 
issue was mostly symbolic, a statement that Abkhazia’s history was 
still meaningful and that the republic was mature enough to offer 
humanitarian aid, not just receive it. But it also paved the way for 
Syria’s recognition of Abkhaz independence in 2018.47  
The main international agency present in Abkhazia is the 
UNDP, which coordinates an aid programme via Georgia, focusing 
on health and environmental issues. A very few international NGOs, 
such as the Halo Trust, operate in the republic. However, European 
organisations are barely represented, even when it comes to softer 
engagement such as the health sector or teaching of English. 
                                                        
45 See: Sergei Kapanadze, “Turkish Trade With Abkhazia: An Apple Of Discord 
For Georgia,” Turkish Policy Quarterly, Fall 2014 
http://turkishpolicy.com/Files/ArticlePDF/turkish-trade-with-abkhazia-an-
apple-of-discord-for-georgia-fall-2014-en.pdf; and Hasan Kanbolat, “A new era 
in Turkey-Abkhazia relations,” September 2, 2014 republished at 
https://abkhazworld.com/aw/analysis/1256-a-new-era-in-turkey-abkhazia-
relations-by-hasan-kanbolat 
46 See Kapanadze, “Turkish Trade”. 
47 “467 compatriots have returned to Abkhazia from Syria,” Abkhaz World, July 
11, 2013. https://abkhazworld.com/aw/diaspora/128-467-compatriots-have-
returned-to-abkhazia-from-syria 
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In 2009 the EU approved a Non-Recognition and Engagement 
Policy (NREP) for Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The twin pillars of 
the policy were designed simultaneously to reassure Georgia of the 
EU’s support for its territorial integrity, while promoting enhanced 
engagement with Abkhazia. (Although the policy also mentions 
South Ossetia, in practice the de facto authorities there rejected 
European involvement there after the 2008 war). “One pillar is not 
thinkable without the other,” Semneby explained in 2011. Semneby 
made the case that the EU had its own intrinsic interest in 
engagement as “The EU cannot afford white spots to develop on the 
map of its immediate neighbourhood” and “The unresolved conflicts 
in Georgia remain a serious security threat to the EU.”48  
An active counter-campaign for non-recognition of Abkhazia 
by the EU and the United States has been broadly successful. Notably, 
Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko opted not to recognise 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, despite pressure from his Russian ally, 
after intense lobbying from EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.49  
Engagement has been modest, constrained by caution on both 
the Abkhaz and Georgian sides, as Brussels has put a much greater 
priority on bilateral relations with Tbilisi than on the Abkhazia 
conflict. Moreover, the non-paper formulating the basis for the NREP 
was never published and its profile remained low. In the decade after 
2008, the EU spent €40 million on projects in Abkhazia or involving 
Abkhaz partners, according to an EU official. These included 
supporting local NGOs, improving healthcare and education, 
repairing water facilities, rebuilding houses in Abkhazia’s southern 
Gali district, and working to find missing persons.  
The United Kingdom and Switzerland are probably the most 
active bilateral European donors. The UK also enables Abkhaz 
students to apply for post-graduate Chevening Scholarships under 
the category of “South Caucasus”, thus side-stepping the status issue. 
                                                        
48 “Statement by the EUSR for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby, OSCE 
Permanent Council, Vienna 10 February 2011” http://www.europarl. 
europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/dsca/dv/dsca_20110315_10/dsc
a_20110315_10en.pdf 
49 Press Conference by Alexander Lukashenko, October 17, 2014 http://president. 
gov.by/ru/news_ru/view/press-konferentsija-prezidenta-respubliki-belarus-
aglukashenko-zhurnalistam-rossijskix-regionalnyx-sredstv-10025/ 
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The British NGOs Conciliation Resources and International Alert 
have supported the small but important non-governmental sector in 
Abkhazia for many years. Previously this sector played a key role in 
dialogue initiatives with the Georgian side. Those contacts continue, 
although more quietly than before. The NGOs have been criticised in 
the Russian media outlets in Abkhazia. There has been speculation 
about a “foreign agents” law being passed analogous to the one in 
Russia, which would restrict the activities of organisations receiving 
foreign funding – an initiative that is strongly opposed by many in 
Abkhazia. 
In contrast to the far-reaching debates on political issues that 
took place prior to 2008 (such as the Schlaining Process) most 
internationally-moderated Abkhaz-Georgian dialogue meetings now 
focus on technical issues such as the environment and education.50 
The emphasis is on development and on keeping channels open with 
the outside world and with Georgia.  
 
                                                        
50 On the Schlaining Process, moderated by Conciliation Resources, see 
https://www.c-r.org/resources/politics-and-mediation-schlaining-process 
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South Ossetia has all but disappeared from international view since the 
Georgia-Russia conflict of 2008. In the last decade, despite heavy Russian 
investment, the region has become much more internationally isolated and 
depopulated than before and is being used by Moscow to pressure Tbilisi and 
channel funds to the breakaway Donbas regions. Yet links with Georgia 
proper remain and there are still prospects for renewed Georgian-Ossetian 
practical cooperation. 
6.1 Introduction 
The modern history of South Ossetia is a tragic one in which a 
generally peaceful region was first dragged into an unnecessary war 
with Georgia in the 1990s, then became the centre of the Georgian-
Russian conflict of 2008. Since then it has been granted what has been 
described as “unwanted independence”, which in practice means 
isolation, economic depression and de facto Russian military 
annexation. On a personal level, this isolation hurts Ossetians as 
much or even more than Georgians. Many mixed Georgian-Ossetian 
families have been divided. The South Ossetian economy has 
withered, deprived of its traditional economic links with 
neighbouring Georgian towns.1 
Since the 2008 conflict, South Ossetia has become even more 
cut off from the world than Abkhazia. International recognition by 
Russia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Syria and Venezuela means nothing in 
practice. No international organisations, except the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, have had a permanent presence there. 
The de facto border with Tbilisi-controlled territory, referred to in 
international practice as the “Administrative Boundary Line” or ABL, 
is much more closed than the one with Abkhazia. Up until 2008, 
South Ossetia used to have a substantial ethnic Georgian population. 
After the war, inhabitants of the 21 ethnic Georgian villages in the 
districts of Tskhinvali and Znauri, fled as did those of Perevi, a village 
on the western edge of South Ossetia.2  
                                                        
1 Stephen F. Jones, “South Ossetia’s Unwanted Independence,” Open 
Democracy, June 10, 2014. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/south-
ossetias-unwanted-independence/ 
2 “South Ossetia: The Burden of Recognition,” International Crisis Group, June 7, 
2010.  
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Since 2008, exploiting a lack of clarity about demarcation lines, 
Russians and South Ossetians have engaged in what an aggressive 
tactic of what has been termed “borderisation”, reinforcing the 
boundary with fences and barbed wire, moving posts and fences 
hundreds of metres into Tbilisi-controlled territory.  
The region’s misfortune is highlighted by a drastic 
demographic decline, which is even worse than that of Abkhazia or 
Transdniestria. The last Soviet census of 1989 recorded the 
population of South Ossetia as being 98,000, of whom 65,232 were 
Ossetians and 28,544 Georgians. The wars of 1990-92 and 2008 
resulted in a big population flight. In 2015, the population of South 
Ossetia was officially recorded as 53,438, including just under 4,000 
ethnic Georgians, most of them in the town of Akhalgori (Leningor).3  
Real figures are almost certainly lower. In 2009, the Russian 
independent researcher Varvara Pakhomenko calculated the 
population of the province as being between 26,000 and 32,000.4 Two 
more recent official numbers, on babies born and children attending 
school, allow us to make an educated guess at the real current 
population level. In 2017, a total of 513 babies were recorded as 
having been born in South Ossetia. If South Ossetia’s birth rate per 
head of population is comparable to that of Georgia and Russia (13 
babies born per 1,000 population a year) that puts the population at 
39,000.5 Two official sources record that there are around 5,500 school 
children in South Ossetia. In Georgia and Russia, around 14% of the 
population is in school education. If South Ossetia has a comparable 
proportion of school children, again that would suggest an overall 
population of 39,000.6  
                                                        
3 See statistics at http://ugosstat.ru/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Itogi-
perepisi-RYUO.pdf 
4 Varvara Pakhomenko, “Обитаемый остров” [“Inhabited Island”, Polit.ru, 
September 22, 2009. https://polit.ru/article/2009/09/22/demo/ 
5 See statistics at http://osinform.org/64904-kakova-rozhdaemost-v-yuzhnoy-
osetii.html; https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/sp.dyn.cbrt.in 
6 “Минобразования: в школы Южной Осетии пойдут более пяти тысяч 
учеников” [“Ministry of Education: more than 5,000 pupils are going to the 
schools of South Ossetia”], Sputnik-Ossetia, August 31, 2015; see also 
https://south-ossetia.info/respublika-yuzhnaya-osetiya-
segodnya/obrazovanie/ 
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A third figure, a count of 33,000 votes in South Ossetia’s 
presidential election in 2017, would suggest a higher population total. 
However, this may indicate another significant trend, the fact that 
many South Ossetians have now taken up residence in their more 
economically viable northern neighbour, North Ossetia, but keep 
their official South Ossetian residency.  
De facto, much of South Ossetia’s economic and political life is 
run out of the North Ossetian capital, Vladikavkaz. The juxtaposition 
of the two is ironic: North Ossetia is an autonomous republic of the 
Russian Federation, but has a much greater population (712,000, 
according to the 2010 census, of whom 459,000 were Ossetians), while 
the small and weak South Ossetia is recognised by Russia as being an 
independent state.  
6.2 Background 
Ossetians are a mainly Christian people, although some are Muslims, 
and old Pagan practices are still prevalent. Christianity has 
distinguished Ossetians from the Muslim peoples of the North 
Caucasus and traditionally made them Russia’s strongest allies in the 
region. They call themselves “Alans” after the Iranian tribe they are 
thought to descend from and divide into three sub-groups speaking 
distinctive dialects of Ossetian, an Iranian language. The most 
numerous, the Irons, live in the north, with the Kudars concentrated 
on the Georgian side of the Caucasus.  
In the Soviet period about two thirds of Ossetians lived in the 
North Caucasus, with most of the rest in Georgia. The “South Ossetia 
Autonomous Region” was created by Moscow in 1922 after the 
Ossetians had declared loyalty to the Bolsheviks and the region was 
ravaged by the Georgian Menshevik army in 1920. In Soviet times, 
the region lacked a strong identity, in contrast to Abkhazia. The 
economy was mainly agricultural. South Ossetians were well 
integrated into Soviet Georgia, with high levels of inter-marriage. A 
good road connection to North Ossetia was only established in 1985 
when the Roki Tunnel through the Caucasus mountains was opened.  
Conflict was triggered in 1989 when the Georgian nationalist 
leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia and others called national minorities in 
Georgia “guests” and accused them of being close to Russia and 
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disloyal to Georgia. “They [Ossetians] have no right to a state here in 
Georgia. They are a national minority. Their homeland is North 
Ossetia...” he said. “Here they are newcomers.”7 Georgian 
nationalists disavowed the term “South Ossetia” with its implied link 
to North Ossetia and called the region Shida [Inner] Kartli, 
“Samachablo” (a reference to the estates of the nineteenth-century 
prince Machabeli), or “Tskhinvali region” after the region’s main 
town. The latter is the chosen term in Georgia, while “South Ossetia” 
remains preferred international usage. 
In 1990, a “war of laws” developed between Tbilisi and 
Tskhinvali, as the Ossetians declared their loyalty to the USSR and 
demanded increased autonomy. Georgian militias attacked South 
Ossetia and in December that year the new Georgian parliament 
cancelled South Ossetia’s autonomy – a status that has not been 
reversed to this day. Intermittent conflict carried on until 1992, fought 
mainly by irregular fighters on both sides, with the Ossetians getting 
some assistance from elements in the Soviet military. Around 1,000 
people died. The war was barely noticed by the international media, 
but at the time it was the worst internal conflict in the Soviet Union 
since the 1920s.  
The fighting escalated in the spring of 1992. Seeking to avoid a 
wider Georgian-Russian conflict, new Georgian leader Eduard 
Shevardnadze and Russian president Boris Yeltsin signed a ceasefire 
agreement in the town of Dagomys on June 24, 1992. This stipulated 
withdrawal of forces, demilitarisation of the region, the withdrawal 
of the remaining ex-Soviet forces from South Ossetia, and the 
formation of a four-sided “Joint Control Commission” to oversee the 
conflict zone and a peacekeeping force, with 2,000 Russian, Ossetian, 
and Georgian soldiers. 
South Ossetia became de facto politically separate from 
Georgia, but remained integrated with it in practical respects. Unlike 
in Abkhazia, most Georgians stayed on in the region after the end of 
the conflict and the border remained open. Both legal and (especially) 
illegal trade flourished. Ludvig Chibirov, South Ossetia’s de facto 
leader, had a cordial relationship with Shevardnadze and the two 
                                                        
7 Stuart J. Kaufman, “Modern Hatreds, The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War,” 
Cornell University Press, 2001, 111. 
192  BEYOND FROZEN CONFLICT 
 
men came close to a political agreement, but there was no feeling of 
urgency on either side. Things changed in 2001, when Chibirov lost 
the election to Eduard Kokotiy and President Vladimir Putin’s 
government in Russia began handing out passports and pension 
rights to South Ossetians.  
From 1992 to 2004, de facto, South Ossetia remained part of the 
Georgian economy and the conflict resembled that over 
Transdniestria, being much more a non-violent political dispute than 
a toxic conflict. Thousands of Georgians and Ossetians traded every 
day at the Ergneti market, on the demarcation line between South 
Ossetia and Gori Region, which was the largest wholesale market in 
the South Caucasus and the main source of revenue for South Ossetia, 
almost all of it untaxed and unmonitored. However, in 2004, 
Georgia’s new president Mikheil Saakashvili launched an “anti-
smuggling operation” and shut down the market. A summer of 
violence followed and the South Ossetia dispute became more 
threatening again.  
The slow countdown to war from 2006 to August 2008 has been 
recorded at length by many sources. The post-1992 conflict resolution 
mechanisms were outdated, giving the OSCE a modest mandate and 
Russia a guaranteed military presence in the region in the form of its 
peacekeepers. Kokoity, more aggressively nationalist than his 
predecessor, canvassed for and received greater Russian financial 
and political support. Saakashvili supported an alternative 
government situated inside an enclave of Georgian villages just north 
of Tskhinvali. The developing conflict became part of a proxy dispute 
between Russia and the United States over NATO expansion, the 
independence of Kosovo and other issues. It also had a very local 
dimension, with the Tbilisi-installed administration of Dmitry 
Sanakoyev operating out of a cluster of Georgian villages north of 
Tskhinvali – leaving both the Georgians of South Ossetia and the 
South Ossetian de facto authorities with the sensation of being 
encircled.  
When war broke out in August 2008, each side felt compelled 
to act quickly to protect its own in a relatively small territory. 
Saakashvilii attacked Tskhinvali on the evening of August 7, 2008. 
The Russian military responded a few hours later, quickly reversed 
the Georgian advance, bombed the town of Gori and pushed into 
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Georgia proper. At the end of the Five-Day War around 1,000 people 
had lost their lives. Ethnic Georgians fled South Ossetia and Moscow 
recognised both it and Abkhazia as independent states. 
6.3 Political life  
South Ossetia is a closed semi-authoritarian society with few 
freedoms. It lacks the independent civil society organisations and 
media outlets that can be found in Abkhazia. One of the few 
independent journalists, Irina Kelekhsayeva, has been harassed for 
reporting on alleged corruption.8  
The region has competitive elections. but they take place 
between a small pool of candidates, all of whom take a very similar 
stance on Russia and Georgia. In April 2017, Anatoly Bibilov, a 
military veteran, became South Ossetia’s fourth de facto president, 
replacing former KGB-chief Leonid Tibilov. Bibilov had failed to be 
elected in 2011, when a slightly more independent candidate, Alla 
Dzhioeva, was declared to have won the poll, causing some 
consternation in Moscow. The vote was invalidated on a technicality 
and Dzhioeva was not allowed to compete in the re-run.  
Political clashes are more about disputes between different 
patron-client networks over allocation of Russian resources than 
about ideological differences. Thus former de facto president Kokoity 
lashed out at Kremlin “curator” Surkov and his unnamed allies in a 
2017 television interview. He blamed Russian contractors for 
cheating their South Ossetian sub-contractors and alleged that 
Surkov and his team had given licence to “pro-Western and pro-
Georgian forces”. Yet Kokoity himself had been blamed in Moscow 
for mass misappropriation of funds after the 2008 war.9  
South Ossetia has very limited government capacity and much 
of its legislation and decision-making originate in Moscow. A leaked 
                                                        
8 “South Ossetian journalist ‘under pressure’ from authorities,” OC Media, 
February 21, 2018. https://oc-media.org/south-ossetian-journalist-under-
pressure-from-authorities/#more-10303 
9 “Those are pro-western ‘evil spirits’ that promote corruption in South Ossetia 
– Surkov,” Jam News, June 20, 2017. https://jam-news.net/those-are-pro-
western-evil-spirits-that-promote-corruption-in-south-ossetia-surkov/ 
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cache of emails from the office of Kremlin “curator” Surkov revealed 
that Russian government agencies had formed 13 working groups 
drafting bills to be adopted by the parliament in Tskhinvali.10 In 2015, 
this arrangement became more formal as South Ossetia signed a 
“Treaty on Alliance and Integration” which officially fused many 
government competencies with Russia.11  
South Ossetia has shown no interest in pursuing wider 
diplomatic recognition beyond Russia since 2008. Indeed, it has 
invited rogue status by being the only place in the world to have 
recognised the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk republics, in 2014. 
(Abkhazia did not follow suit). If in Abkhazia, the official message is 
still one of an aspiration for international statehood, both South 
Ossetian leaders and the public make it clear they do not take the idea 
of a South Ossetian state seriously. In a 2010 survey, more than 80% 
of South Ossetians said they wanted union with North Ossetia and 
Russia.12  
On October 19 2015, the press secretary of South Ossetian 
leader Leonid Tibilov revealed that he had raised the idea of a 
referendum on union with Russia in a meeting with Kremlin aide 
Vladislav Surkov. Tibilov was quoted as saying this was in line with 
“today’s political realities”. “Reunification with Russia is the age-old 
dream of the South Ossetian people, which has cherished this idea 
over two centuries of resistance to Georgian chauvinism and 
fascism.”13 However, the next day, Kremlin press secretary Dmitry 
                                                        
10 David Batashvili, “’Surkov leaks’”: Glimpse into Russia’s Management of 
Georgia’s Occupied Regions,” Clarion Brief , October 2016. 
11 Maxim Edwards “Thus Votes South Ossetia: A Referendum the Kremlin 
Would Prefer to Ignore,” Intersection, April 28, 2017. 
http://intersectionproject.eu/article/russia-europe/thus-votes-south-ossetia-
referendum-kremlin-would-prefer-ignore; see also http://en.kremlin.ru/ 
acts/news/49801 
12 Gerard Toal and John O'Loughlin, “How people in South Ossetia, Abkhazia 
and Transnistria feel about annexation by Russia,” Washington Post, March 20, 
2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetia-abkhazia-and-transnistria-
feel-about-annexation-by-russia/?utm_term=.ec2cda6dd36a 
13 “Срочно: Президент РЮО Леонид Тибилов сделал заявление об 
инициировании референдума о вхождении РЮО в состав РФ” [“Urgent: 
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Peskov denied that the topic had come up, saying of South Ossetia, 
“It is an independent state, which is recognised by the Russian 
Federation with which we have diplomatic relations.” Asked to 
clarify further, Peskov said, “I’ve said what I’ve said,” and that “it’s 
long been well known that in South Ossetia there are many 
supporters of integration with Russia.”14  
In 2017, South Ossetians had to content themselves with a more 
symbolic change, approving the change of the territory’s name to 
“Republic of South Ossetia–State of Alania”. De facto president 
Bibilov was previously one of the loudest voices calling for 
unification with North Ossetia. He continues to raise the issue but 
without putting a timeframe on it. In April 2019, on a visit to Crimea, 
Bibilov said, “I think that the path taken by Crimea will definitely 
also be taken by the republic of South Ossetia.”15  
Thus, South Ossetia wants union with Russia more than Russia 
itself does. The region’s few economic assets and tiny population 
evidently make it useful to Moscow mainly as a military and 
diplomatic pawn in a wider game. Moscow has made this clear by 
generally making major announcements on South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia supposedly in reaction to moves made on Georgia by the 
EU and United States. For example, the declaration on the recognition 
of independence of the two regions in August 2008 explicitly 
mentioned Kosovo; the two treaties of 2015 followed the European 
Parliament’s ratification of the EU’s Association Agreement with 
Georgia; the ratification of a merger of the Russian and South 
                                                        
The president of RSO Leonid Tibilov made a statement on initiating a 
referendum on RSO joining the RF”], RES, October 19, 2015. 
http://cominf.org/node/1166506480 
14 “В Кремле называют Южную Осетию независимым государством, 
признанным Российской Федерацией” [“In the Kremlin they call South 
Ossetia an Independent State, Recognized by the Russian Federation,” TASS, 
October 20, 2015. https://tass.ru/politika/2361492 
15 Liz Fuller, “Terms Of 'Union' With Russia Dominate South Ossetian 
Presidential Election,” RFE/RL Caucasus Report, April 8, 2017;” Южная Осетия 
должна стать частью России, по аналогии с Крымом, - президент Бибилов” 
[“South Ossetia should become a part of Russia on the analogy of Crimea – 
President Bibilov.”], RES, April 18, 2019. http://cominf.org/node/1166522122  
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Ossetian armed forces was timed to follow the sale of Javelin missiles 
to Georgia by the United States.  
Evidently, the status quo evidently suits Moscow and there is 
no interest in going further towards formal union with South Ossetia. 
While the outright annexation of Crimea may have delivered a 
domestic triumph for President Putin – and therefore an international 
price deemed worth paying – South Ossetia is a much tinier territory 
and less popular cause. Evidently the calculation is that Russia would 
lose far more, in giving up leverage and receiving greater 
international condemnation, by annexing the territory de jure rather 
than de facto.  
6.4 Security and borderisation  
The Russian military is the most powerful actor in South Ossetia. In 
2009, the 4th Guards Military Base was established there, merging the 
existing 135th and 693rd motorised regiments. It is estimated to 
comprise around 4,000 Russian soldiers, not including border guards. 
This may be an under estimate. An information website for Russian 
parents, whose sons are doing military service, records that on its 
own the base in Tskhinvali has six barracks, each fit to house 600 
soldiers.16  
The military is heavily equipped with tanks, armoured 
personnel carriers and artillery, as well as Tochka-U and Smerch 
missiles. (Georgia alleges that there are also S-300 missiles in the 
region although this is denied in Russia.) As well as the main military 
base in Tskhinvali, there is also a training ground near the village of 
Dzartsem and a large airfield in the village of Urgadanta, west of 
Dzhava (the latter is clearly visible on Google Maps).17  
Since the massive Russian deployment, the South Ossetian 
military has reduced in numbers. A formal deal to integrate it with 
                                                        
16 See https://voinskayachast.net/suhoputnie-voyska/motostrelkovie/vch66431 
17 See http://fb.ru/article/325899/voennaya-baza-v-tshinvale-respublika-
yujnaya-osetiya-v-ch-adres; 
https://www.google.co.uk/maps/place/Java/@42.3876476,43.8902071,1782m
/data=!3m1!1e3!4m5!3m4!1s0x405b35b577e3b18b:0xdeb28ad07b178a34!8m2!3d
42.3893816!4d43.9248521?hl=en 
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the Russian armed forces was ratified in 2018, allowing for South 
Ossetians to serve in the Russian armed forces. The chief of general 
staff of the South Ossetian forces, Viktor Fyodorov, is also a Russian 
with no background in South Ossetia prior to 2011.18  
Russia also keeps at least 900 border troops subordinate to the 
FSB manning the boundary line in South Ossetia. These troops have 
engaged in “borderisation” activities, moving the de facto border by 
tens or hundreds of metres, putting new white and green signs and 
barbed wire inside Tbilisi-controlled territory. The Russian side 
claims it is using old Soviet maps, although the border of the South 
Ossetia Autonomous Oblast was never precisely delineated. The 
process draws strong international condemnation. It is sometimes 
hard to determine how far boundary demarcations have been moved, 
and some reports have been exaggerated. But one demarcation 
exercise was reported to have left a 1.6km portion of the strategic 
Baku-Supsa oil pipeline outside Tbilisi’s control. There is also plenty 
of anecdotal evidence to confirm that several dozen Georgian 
villagers have been cut off from pastures, cemeteries or even their 
houses by the process. In addition, there is almost certainly a financial 
motive for the practice, as Georgians who get detained are ransomed 
for their safe return.19  
Many Georgians cross the long and disputed border and some 
of them are caught and detained, causing great anger in Georgia. In 
                                                        
18 “State Duma ratifies deal on integrating South Ossetia forces into Russian 
army,” TASS, January 24, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/986645; for Fyodorov 
see http://alaniamil.org/zamestiteli-ministra.html 
19 “Russian Troops Demarcate Part of Georgian Oil Pipeline,” RFE/RL, July 14, 2015. 
https://www.rferl.org/a/russian-troops-demarcate-georgian-oil-pipeline/ 
27126985.html; “Burden of Recognition,” 8; Andrew Higgins, “In Russia’s ‘Frozen 
Zone,’ a Creeping Border with Georgia,” The New York Times, October 23, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/europe/in-russias-frozen-zone-a-
creeping-border-with-georgia.html; “Russian military resumes ‘borderisation’ 
process in South Ossetian conflict zone,” Jam News, November 7, 2018. https://jam-
news.net/russian-military-resumes-borderisation-process-in-south-ossetian-
conflict-zone/; “EU Monitoring Mission statement on additional borderisation 
activities in Atotsi along the Administrative Boundary Line with South Ossetia,” 
EUMM, November 9, 2018. https://eumm.eu/en/press_and_public_ 
information/press_releases/6509/ 
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one notorious case, a 35-year-old Georgian, Archil Tatunashvili, was 
detained in Akhalgori in February 2018 and declared dead in South 
Ossetian custody a month later. The Georgian authorities said that 
his body showed marks of severe torture. The Georgian authorities 
linked the Tatunashvili case with that of Gigi Otkhozoria, a Georgian 
who was killed on the border with Abkhazia, to make a 
“Tatunashvili-Otkhozoria List” of officials whom Tbilisi alleges were 
culpable for deaths of ethnic Georgians in the two territories and 
should be made subject to international sanctions.20  
As the boundary with South Ossetia is longer and less fixed 
than the one with Abkhazia, border incidents and detentions are a 
major issue for the European Union Monitoring Mission, which still 
keeps 196 monitors in Georgia but is not given access to Abkhazia or 
South Ossetia.  
6.5 Economy and society  
South Ossetia used to earn its revenue primarily from selling 
agricultural projects in Georgia, and from being a conduit route 
between Georgia and Russia. Both of those options have been shut 
down since 2008. The local economy is extremely small, relying on a 
few businesses producing mineral water, fruit or meat products. (The 
Ossetian-born conductor Valery Gergiev has reportedly invested in 
one of these businesses.) Otherwise, the region is almost entirely 
dependent on Russian financial support. In 2018, the budget was 
fixed at 7.672 billion roubles (€106 million), of which 86% (6.592 
million roubles) came directly from Russia. Even some of the locally 
generated income in the budget comes indirectly from Russia, being 
taxes on the local subsidiaries of the Russian companies Gazprom 
and Megafon.21  
                                                        
20 “Georgian autopsy says Tatunashvili sustained over 100 injuries before dying,” 
OC Media, June 6, 2018. https://oc-media.org/georgian-autopsy-says-tatunashvili-
sustained-over-100-injuries-before-dying/ 
21 Draft budget for 2018 available at http://cominf.org/node/1166514363; Ilya 
Zhelgulev, “The independent republic where everything depends on Moscow,” 
Meduza, October 9, 2018. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/ 
10/10/the-independent-republic-where-everything-depends-on-moscow 
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Much of the budget is spent on an over-large government 
bureaucracy to the detriment of socio-economic needs. One 
commentator wrote in 2016:  
It is apparent that the grave economic situation in 
Tskhinvali region affects the social environment and results 
in the regression of all the vitally important spheres. The 
situation is particularly important in the healthcare sphere. 
The salaries of 305 doctors and hundreds of medical 
personnel are at the level of third world countries (average 
salary of a doctor is 14,137 rubles or $214; salaries of medical 
personnel are far lower). This hampers the motivation for 
professional development and the desire to work legally. 
Despite impressive statistical data represented in official 
documents, there is very high corruption in healthcare and 
increases of mortality due to the low qualification of 
doctors. Research conducted in schools and kindergartens 
highlights an alarming situation in view of the health 
condition of the future generation; namely the spread of 
gastrointestinal diseases among juveniles (plus 
psychological and behaviour disorders).22  
Corruption and misappropriation of funds has been a big issue, 
especially in the first few years after the war. Russia allocated $840 
million in rehabilitation assistance and budgetary support, but much 
of it was reportedly never spent on projects on the ground. 
Immediately after the conflict, in September 2008, Sergei Stepashin, 
the head of Russia’s Audit Chamber was outspoken about the need 
to monitor expenditure, saying, “I have just returned from South 
Ossetia and I wish to state that we need to establish a proper 
authority there, otherwise all this money will go up in smoke.”23 
                                                        
22 Lia Chlachidze “Tskhinvali’s painful past, depressing present and dark 
future,” Transconflict, December 21, 2016. http://www.transconflict.com/ 
2016/12/tskhinvalis-painful-past-depressing-present-and-dark-future-212/ 
23 “С.Степашин: Помощь Южной Осетии может ‘улететь в трубу’” 
[“S.Stepashin: Aid for South Ossetia can go up in smoke,”] RIA Novosti, 
September 24, 2008. https://www.vedomosti.ru/library/news/2008/ 
09/24/sstepashin-pomosch-yuzhnoj-osetii-mozhet-uletet-v-trubu 
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However, Stepashin’s agency released a report not long after 
which said that of about $55 million in priority aid pledged by Russia, 
only about $15 million had been delivered and only $1.4 million 
spent. Many reconstruction projects were only ever completed on 
paper. “Russia’s economic assistance simply dissolved. It was like 
standing in quicksand,” one Kremlin source told a reporter from the 
website Meduza. “That aid corrupted people, and it went 
nowhere.”24  
More recently, South Ossetia has become the centre for another 
scam, this time apparently directly instigated by Russian officialdom. 
Moscow faced a problem in doing financial transactions with the two 
eastern Ukrainian ‘People’s Republics’, which it supported but did 
not officially recognise. The solution was to route transactions via a 
bank in South Ossetia – a place Russia recognises as a foreign country 
but which is conveniently also the only place in the world to have 
recognised the two entities.  
The “International Settlement Bank”, set up in South Ossetia in 
2015, makes bank transfers to companies in the two breakaway 
territories. Moreover, more than 200 companies from the DNR and 
LNR are reported to be registered in South Ossetia,25 removing direct 
Russian responsibility from them. In March 2017, all the largest 
industrial enterprises in the Donetsk region, most of them nominally 
owned by Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, began to register 
themselves as branches of Vneshtorgservis, a company incorporated 
in South Ossetia. According to Kommersant newspaper 
Vneshtorgservis is actually controlled by Sergey Kurchenko, a 
businessman close to the family of former Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych.26  
                                                        
24 Ellen Barry, “Disrepair in South Ossetia Dims Hopes After Georgia War,” The 
New York Times, March 7, 2009. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/ 
08/world/europe/08ossetia.html ; Vladimir Borsobin, Nigina Beroeva, 
“Республика исчезнувших миллиардов,” [“The Republic of Vanished 
Billions”], Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 7, 2011, https://www.kp.ru/ 
daily/25801.4/2781757/; Zhelgulev, “The independent republic.” 
25 https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3283539 
26 Zhelgulev, “The independent republic.”; Ilya Barabanov, Yekaterina 
Yeremenko, «Партнер у нас один – Российская Федерация» [“We have the 
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6.6 Links with Georgia  
Despite the closed border-line, some links with Georgia remain. 
Inside Georgia, inter-ethnic Georgian-Ossetian relations are 
generally better than between Georgians and Abkhaz. According to 
Georgia’s 2014 census, there were 14,400 Ossetians living in Georgia 
proper, mainly in the Kakheti and Shida Kartli regions. This is down 
from 98,000 (excluding South Ossetia) in 1989. Many Ossetians left 
Georgia in the Gamsakhurdia years because of discrimination. More 
recently, according to a 2009 European Centre for Minority Issues 
report, the “recent decrease in the Ossetian population is largely 
connected with migration to Russia caused by difficult social 
conditions rather than ethnic discrimination or oppression. 
Essentially the issue is one of difficult rural conditions; it is from the 
villages that most out-migration has occurred, generally to North 
Ossetia.” The report notes that many Ossetians who remain have 
assimilated into Georgian society. Inter-marriage has also 
contributed to assimilation.27  
With regard to South Ossetia itself, the example of the years 
1992-2004 raises the question of whether, as then, people-to-people 
relations would resume if the border were to re-open, despite the 
experience of 2008 and the strong anti-Georgian propaganda 
message disseminated by the South Ossetian authorities. A 
resumption of cross-border trade would instantly provide an 
incentive for the two communities to collaborate – possibly one 
reason that it is being restricted.  
Cross-border traffic by vehicles is allowed at the small town of 
Akhalgori, which the Tbilisi government lost control of only in 2008. 
Here, according to an International Crisis Group report there is a 
strong appetite for collaboration: “In 2017, commerce boomed: long 
queues of trucks were common, particularly during the summer 
harvest. An average of twenty per day were passing through the 
checkpoint to deliver goods from Tbilisi to South Ossetian markets, 
                                                        
same partner – the Russian Federation”] Kommersant Vlast, May 6, 2017. 
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3283539  
27 Giorgi Sordia, “Ossetians in Georgia In the Wake of the 2008 War: ECMI 
Working Paper # 45,” ECMI, September 2009. https://www.ecmi.de/uploads/ 
tx_lfpubdb/working_paper_45_en.pdf 
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which have no other source of affordable food. Georgian comestibles 
cost two or three times more in South Ossetia than at Tbilisi markets, 
but they are still up to five times cheaper than Russian imports.” At 
one point, the South Ossetian authorities tried to place restrictions on 
cargoes, but they backed down.  
South Ossetia would also be opened up if Tbilisi and Moscow 
were to start implementing a deal on transport corridors agreed in 
2011 as a condition for Georgia lifting its veto on Russia’s accession 
to the World Trade Organization. The deal, negotiated by Swiss 
diplomats, stipulated that three land corridors would operate 
between Russia and Georgia, two of them crossing the disputed 
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (which are not named in 
the agreement, the locations being only indicated by GPS 
coordinates.) The cargoes on the trucks are to be sealed by an 
international company, now confirmed as the Swiss firm SGS, and 
monitored electronically on their journey.28 
The opening of the new corridors would obviate the need to 
rely on what is currently the only working Georgian-Russian border 
crossing at Upper Lars, which is often closed for four or five months 
of the year because of bad weather. It would increase trade across the 
mountains, giving an economic boost not just to Georgia and Russia 
but to Armenia – for whom this is the main land route to the north – 
and eastern Turkey as well. The Armenian government and Russian 
business have been lobbying hard for the deal. 
However, the deal is unpopular in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. They are not acknowledged as partners in it, even though it 
would open up borders and provide indirect income and 
opportunities for more trade at a later point. Former South Ossetian 
leader Anatoly Bibilov insisted that South Ossetia should have equal 
partnership rights, something clearly unacceptable in Tbilisi.29  
                                                        
28 “Time to Talk Trade,” International Crisis Group, May 24, 2018, 34. 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/georgia/249-
abkhazia-and-south-ossetia-time-talk-trade 
29 http://www.mid.ru/ru/kommentarii/-/asset_publisher/2MrVt3CzL5sw 
/content/id/2776682?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_2MrVt3CzL5sw&_101_INSTA
NCE_2MrVt3CzL5sw_languageId=en_GB 
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In 2017 and 2018 there were indications that the two sides were 
close to beginning to operate the South Ossetian route, but Moscow 
has equivocated, suggesting that political support for South Ossetia 
thus far trumps broader economic and political considerations in the 
South Caucasus. The fate of the deal will be an indication of what 
Russia’s intentions are regarding South Ossetia and Georgia more 
generally. 30 
 
                                                        
30 “Time to Talk Trade,”; Thomas de Waal, “Georgia and Russia Inch Towards a 
Business Deal,” Carnegie Europe, November 27, 2017, https://carnegie 
europe.eu/strategiceurope/74826. 
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As it enters its fourth decade, the Nagorny Karabakh dispute between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan remains the most dangerous conflict in the post-
Soviet space. Since 2018 political tensions have eased and casualties have 
dropped on the Line of Contact dividing the two armies since a new 
administration, headed by prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, came to power 
in Armenia. However, there are no substantial political negotiations and 
Armenians and Azerbaijanis remain locked in long-term rivalry over the 
disputed province. The facts on the ground in Nagorny Karabakh itself and 
the surrounding occupied regions make resolution much harder than before 
and the region remains dangerously militarised. Dealing with the conflict 
requires both short-term conflict management and a strategy for longer-term 
conflict transformation. 
7.1 Introduction  
The Nagorny Karabakh conflict is the longest-running unresolved 
dispute in the former Soviet Union, dating back to the middle of the 
Gorbachev era in 1988. It is also potentially the most dangerous, as 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are in a perpetual state of military readiness 
to go to war again over the disputed territory they fought over in 
1991-94. At the end of that conflict, the Armenian side prevailed at 
great cost. Around 20,000 people died and one million people were 
displaced on both sides, the majority of them Azerbaijanis. A brief 
upsurge of fighting in 2016 cost around 200 lives. 
Since the ceasefire of 1994 the Armenians have kept control not 
just of the former autonomous region of Nagorny Karabakh itself, 
but, wholly or partially, of seven regions of Azerbaijan around it, 
which were home to more than half a million Azerbaijanis. If one 
includes the disputed territory of Nagorny Karabakh itself, 
Armenians now hold 13.6% of the de jure territory of Azerbaijan.1  
The conflict crippled the development of both countries. 
Armenia’s two longest international borders remain closed, that with 
Azerbaijan, and also the one with Turkey, which Ankara closed in 
1993 in solidarity with its ally, Baku. Both sides have diverted 
considerable resources to military spending. 
                                                        
1 On statistics of the conflict, see Thomas de Waal, “Black Garden: Armenia and 
Azerbaijan Through Peace and War,” New York University Press, 2013, Appendix 
1, p.325-328. 
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The conflict differs from others in the post-Soviet space in 
several important respects. It pits two nation-states against one 
another. Although the Armenians of Karabakh began the dispute in 
1988 in a bid to secede from Soviet Azerbaijan, no one (including 
Armenia) recognises the Nagorny Karabakh Republic (or “Artsakh 
Republic” as they now call it) which they declared in 1991. The 
Karabakh Armenians are heavily reliant on the Republic of Armenia, 
financially, militarily and politically and Yerevan has represented 
them in negotiations for the past two decades.  
What began as a dispute about self-determination is now better 
understood as a clash between Armenia and Azerbaijan fought 
through diplomatic lobbying in international organisations, the 
information space (especially social media), in economic competition 
and occasional acts of violence. Laurence Broers in his 2019 book, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, Anatomy of a Rivalry, argues that the dispute 
is an “enduring rivalry”, more akin in many ways to the conflict 
between India and Pakistan than it is to the other post-Soviet 
conflicts.2  
Another key difference is that Russia does not pay a central 
role, unlike in the other post-Soviet conflict zones. In this dispute, 
Moscow seeks good relations with both parties. Despite a formal 
military and economic partnership with Armenia, Russia also values 
a strong bilateral relationship with Azerbaijan. Russia has no boots 
on the ground: no Russian peacekeepers were sent to the conflict zone 
following the ceasefire agreement of May 1994, after Azerbaijan, 
tacitly supported by the Armenians, rejected a plan to deploy them 
along the Line of Contact separating the two sides.3  
Russia’s formal diplomatic role is performed in partnership 
with two Western powers. It shares a mediation role with France and 
the United States, having been the three co-chairs of the OSCE’s 
Minsk Group since 1997. Although Russia tends to be the most active 
international player in the dispute (notably in the last decade through 
foreign minister Sergei Lavrov) Moscow still coordinates its messages 
                                                        
2 Laurence Broers, Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry, Edinburgh 
University Press, 2019. 
3 For this story, see Tatul Hakobyan, “Karabakh Diary, Green and Black: Neither 
War nor Peace,” Yerevan, 2010.  
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with the two other co-chair powers, and is constrained from pursuing 
a unilateral role, if it wanted to do so. In October 2019, Lavrov said, 
“But we as the co-chairs, work in unison together with the Americans 
and the French. This is one of the few situations where we have the 
same vision. We have fundamental documents, we do not want to 
revise them.”4  
Finally, the conflict is more dangerous than others, with the 
possible exception of the Donbas conflict. In April 2016, up to 200 
people died when the two sides went back to war for four days before 
a ceasefire was agreed. Along the 250km-long ceasefire line known 
as the Line of Contact, which was established in May 1994, there are 
around 20,000 soldiers and multiple heavy weapons yet the ceasefire 
is observed by just six unarmed monitors from the small OSCE 
Mission.  
As in many other conflicts fought between neighbours, this 
conflict has deep roots in the societies on either side of the conflict 
divide. The struggle over Karabakh has shaped modern Armenia and 
Azerbaijani identity and it is inconceivable to most Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis – even those not from the territory of Karabakh itself – 
to imagine giving up on claims to it. Shared feelings of anger and 
trauma are especially strong in Azerbaijan, the losing side in the 
conflict. Armenians are regularly denounced as “fascists” and 
“aggressors” in mainstream political discourse.  
Tragic events in which atrocities were committed are 
commemorated by both sides to this day. For Armenians, the key 
moment was the pogrom in the Azerbaijani town of Sumgait in 
February 1988 in which an Azerbaijani mob killed 26 Armenians. 
After this the entire Armenian population of the town was evacuated, 
and a mass exodus began with ethnic Armenians leaving Azerbaijan 
and ethnic Azerbaijanis leaving Armenia. Azerbaijan commemorates 
every year the worst episode of the conflict, the massacre by 
Armenian forces of 485 (or more) Azerbaijanis who were fleeing the 
town of Khojaly in February 1992.5  
                                                        
4 Remarks from October 2, 2019, available in Russian at http://www.mid.ru/ru/ 
foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3826083 
5 For more details on Sumgait and Khojaly, see “Black Garden,” p. 32-45, p. 182-185.  
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A 2018 report by the NGO International Alert noted how on all 
sides “people plan their lives through the prism of the conflict, 
around the conflict and within the conflict.” It talked of the 
psychological condition of “learned helplessness” where people do 
not envisage a different life for themselves.6  
Tensions have eased a little between the conflict parties since 
the 2018 peaceful revolution in Armenia which removed the 
unpopular regime of Serzh Sargsyan and brought in a new leader 
with a popular mandate, Nikol Pashinyan. For a while at least, this 
re-energised the almost moribund negotiation process around 
Nagorny Karabakh. Pashinyan met Azerbaijani president Ilham 
Aliev three times informally at international gatherings within a 
short space of time even before their first formal meeting in Vienna 
in March 2019.  
Apparently relieved at the departure of Sargsyan, a Karabakh 
Armenian, with whom negotiations had been difficult, the 
Azerbaijani authorities welcomed the appointment of Pashinyan. 
Both sides lowered their rhetoric against each for a while. More 
importantly casualty levels on the Line of Contact dropped 
significantly, with less than 20 deaths reported there in 2018.  
There were also changes on the Azerbaijani side. For example, 
a new head of the Karabakh Azerbaijani community, Tural 
Ganjaliyev, was appointed in December 2018, who it was hoped 
would be less negative about contacts with Armenians than his 
predecessor. 7 
In January 2019, after a meeting of Foreign Ministers Elmar 
Mammadyarov and Zohrab Mnatsakanyan, the OSCE Minsk Group 
co-chairs put out the most positive statement in years. They 
announced that, “The Ministers discussed a wide range of issues 
related to the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
                                                        
6 International Alert, “Envisioning Peace, An Analysis of Grassroots Views on 
the Nagorny Karabakh Conflict,” 2018, https://www.international-
alert.org/sites/default/files/Caucasus_EnvisioningPeace_EN_2018.pdf 
7 See “Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh community receives new head – what does 
this mean for conflict negotiations?” Jam News, December 21, 2018, https://jam-
news.net/azerbaijani-community-of-nagorno-karabakh-receives-new-head/ 
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agreed upon the necessity of taking concrete measures to prepare the 
populations for peace.”8  
Several small but positive steps followed. The two sides set up 
a hotline so commanders on the Line of Contact could talk to one 
another. There was an agreement to de-escalate military activity on 
the shared international frontier between the two sides allowing 
farmers to work without fear. Three Armenian and three Azerbaijani 
journalists did an exchange visit to the other side of the conflict divide 
in November 2019.  
However, Armenian and Azerbaijani domestic rhetoric has 
remained as implacable on before on the core issues of the conflict 
and there has little progress in restarting substantial political 
negotiations. Many challenges remain in 2020.  
7.2 Faltering negotiations  
At the core of the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute is a virtually 
unresolvable issue of the status of the territory of Nagorny Karabakh. 
This issue is what first triggered the dispute in the modern era in 
February 1988, when the regional Soviet in Karabakh passed a 
resolution requesting that the region be transferred from the 
jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan to Armenia – a move that triggered 
mass demonstrations of support in Yerevan and angry opposition in 
Azerbaijan.  
For Armenians, Karabakh is a historic Armenian province with 
old Armenian churches, that in modern times has had an Armenian 
majority but which was unjustly awarded to Soviet Azerbaijan in 
1921 by the Bolsheviks. The protests of 1988 were seen as the 
culmination of a long history of democratic striving, which was met 
with violence in Azerbaijan. For Azerbaijanis, Karabakh is also 
regarded as a place of great cultural importance which was a Muslim 
khanate for centuries centred around the town of Shusha, the 
birthplace of Azerbaijani musicians and artists. Situated inside the 
plains of Azerbaijan, Azerbaijanis assert that it is part of their 
country, in terms of economy and geography – and that it is 
internationally recognised as such.  
                                                        
8 See https://www.osce.org/minsk-group/409220 
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To back down from these claims is almost unthinkable for 
either side. Several different plans, negotiated by the OSCE Minsk 
Group, have foundered on the resistance of one side or the other to 
what is regarded as a surrender of sovereignty. They include the 
phased plan which caused the downfall of Armenian president 
Levon Ter-Petrosian in 1998, and the mooted land-swap discussed at 
Key West in 2001. 
Since 2006, the basis for negotiations has been a short 
framework document known since 2007 as the “Madrid Principles” 
as it was first written down on paper at the OSCE Ministerial Council 
in Madrid in November 2007. The text has been never been made 
public and has reportedly been revised several times over the years. 
But its essence is not a secret as a summary of the six main points was 
published in three declarations by the presidents of France, Russia 
and the United States at three G7 summits in L’Aquila, Muskoka and 
Deauville in the years 2009-11.9 Moreover, in 2016 the Armenian 
Research Center ANI published what appears to be a leaked version 
of the original 2007 Madrid document.10  
The preamble of the document refers to three articles of the 
Helsinki Final Act of 1975: “Article II related to refraining from the 
threat or use of use of force, to Article IV related to the territorial 
integrity of States, and to Article VIII related to the equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples.” 
Seeking to resolve the tension between the two latter articles as 
they relate to the Karabakh dispute, the central idea of the Madrid 
plan is stated as being that “The final legal status of NK [Nagorny 
Karabakh] will be determined through a plebiscite allowing the free 
and genuine expression of the will of the population of NK.”  
The other main five provisions of the plan are that: Nagorny 
Karabakh will be granted “interim status” in the period before the 
vote, meaning a status that gives it greater legitimacy but not 
international recognition; the Azerbaijani territories around Nagorny 
Karabakh will be returned to Azerbaijani control, with special 
provisions for the Kelbajar and Lachin regions; a corridor will be 
                                                        
9 See https://www.osce.org/mg/51152 
10 See Ani Armenian Research Center, “Madrid Principles – Full Text”, April 11, 
2016, https://www.aniarc.am/2016/04/11/madrid-principles-full-text/ 
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established between Armenia and Karabakh; “all internally displaced 
persons and refugees from the conflict-affected areas will have a right 
to return on a voluntary basis”; an international peace making 
mission will be deployed to the conflict zone.  
The central idea behind the plan is to promise a plebiscite that 
would give the Armenians the prospect of eventual legally 
recognised secession from Azerbaijan, but to deliver other benefits 
first that are tangible to Azerbaijanis, such as the return of the 
territories around Karabakh and the return of displaced people. In 
the meantime, the Karabakh Armenians would benefit from an 
enhanced international “interim status” and an international 
peacekeeping force would ensure stability on the ground. However, 
neither side was happy with the proposed compromise: the 
Armenians opposed the idea of surrendering territory for the sake of 
a vote many years hence, while the Azerbaijanis said they could not 
tolerate the theoretical prospect of Karabakh’s secession, even at a 
point far in the future.  
The last serious push to close this deal was made by Russian 
president Dmitry Medvedev and foreign minister Sergei Lavrov at an 
inconclusive meeting in Kazan in 2011. Lavrov continued to work on 
the plan, reportedly amending it to propose opening up transport 
routes earlier in a phased plan. However, the security situation 
around the Line of Contact slowly deteriorated. In its statements on 
the conflict, the Armenian side began to focus almost exclusively on 
the need to stabilise the 1994 ceasefire regime, while the Azerbaijani 
side stressed the need for “comprehensive talks”. The negotiations 
have been at best faltering since then.  
After the two sides fought the brief Four-Day War of April 2016 
the three mediators in the conflict, France, Russia, and the United 
States, met in Vienna on May 16 2016 with the Azerbaijani and 
Armenian presidents, Ilham Aliev and Serzh Sargsyan. The meeting 
was led by US Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergey Lavrov. A statement issued by the mediators 
afterward announced that both the Armenians and Azerbaijanis had 
acceded to long-standing demands.11 There would be a strengthening 
of the ceasefire regime and a mechanism to investigate ceasefire 
                                                        
11 See https://www.osce.org/mg/240316 
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violations (the Armenian demand), and new comprehensive peace 
talks in June (the key Azerbaijani demand). However, as 
international attention waned once again, both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan walked back from promises they had made in Vienna.  
The change of regime in Armenia in 2018 gave a positive 
impetus to the mediation process, as noted above. However, there is 
little sign of any negotiations on substance. As time passes, it gets 
harder to implement the territorial changes on the ground needed for 
a plan. All international negotiations make a distinction between the 
territory of Nagorny Karabakh, whose boundaries are set by the 
borders of the Soviet-era Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Region 
(NKAO in Russian) drawn in 1923, and the seven occupied regions 
of Azerbaijan captured by Armenians in 1992-4. Under all peace 
plans, the former is set to be given special status, while the latter is to 
be returned to Azerbaijani control, with the exception of a land 
corridor through the Lachin region.  
For years, with the exception of Lachin, the occupied 
territories, which were left devasted and completely depopulated by 
the Armenians in 1994, lay empty and were only used by the 
Armenian military. In the last decade, in a development that makes a 
future peace deal much more difficult, the distinctions on the ground 
between these two territories has been blurred. A small group of 
settlers – perhaps 3,000 in the Kelbajar region – has taken up 
residence in these territories.12 Farmers plough the land there.  
In 2017 the Armenians of Karabakh renamed their 
unrecognised republic the Republic of Artsakh thus erasing further 
the concept of a defined Nagorny Karabakh region. A new road was 
built across Kelbajar region in 2017 connecting Armenia and 
Karabakh through occupied Azerbaijani land and another one is 
planned. In 2010, the Karabakh Armenian authorities announced 
they were giving the ruined Azerbaijani town of Aghdam 
the Armenian name of Akna. They opened an archaeological 
                                                        
12 Broers, “Armenia and Azerbaijan,” p.273. 
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museum nearby showcasing Armenian artefacts to prove the ancient 
Armenian provenance of the region.13  
This tougher line has won support from Armenian diaspora 
groups and commentators, who have given strong support to 
Nagorny Karabakh over the years. After the fighting of 2016, 
Antranig Kasbarian, a diaspora Armenian journalist, said, “These 
liberated territories are strategically crucial as security zones: They 
maintain Azerbaijan’s distance from Karabagh’s main population 
centres, while creating an integral, territorial bond between Karabagh 
and Armenia. At the same time, many of these territories have a 
historically Armenian pedigree.”14 
7.3 Militarisation  
Locked in a long-running rivalry, Armenia and Azerbaijan have 
some of the highest levels of military spending in the world, as a 
percentage of GDP – 4.8% and 3.8% in 2018 respectively.15 Even at the 
best of times, they are one step away from war, and are only 
constrained from conflict by their own political calculations.  
In 2016 the world was briefly reminded that the Nagorny 
Karabakh conflict zone ranks with the Line of Control next to Indian-
administered Kashmir and the border of North and South Korea as 
one of the most dangerous places on earth. The Line of Contact, the 
200km-long ceasefire line which runs through Azerbaijani territory, 
was set up in 1994. It is monitored by just six unarmed OSCE 
monitors. Initially, two poorly equipped conscript armies faced each 
other across the line. Now two well-equipped armies of roughly 
                                                        
13 Joshua Kucera, “Armenia and Karabakh announce construction of third 
connecting highway,” Eurasianet July 25, 2019, https://eurasianet.org/ 
armenia-and-karabakh-announce-construction-of-third-connecting-highway; 
PanArmenianNet, “New settlement appears on NKR map,” November 2, 2010, 
http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/56153/New_settlement_app
ears_on_NKR_map 
14 Rupen Janbazian, “A Fighting Spirit and Mind: The Unwavering Will of the 
Karabaghtsi,” Armenian Weekly, May 2, 2016, https://armenianweekly.com/ 
2016/05/02/a-fighting-spirit-and-mind/ 
15 Data at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Data%20for%20all 
%20countries%20from%201988%E2%80%932018%20as%20a%20share%20of%20
GDP%20%28pdf%29.pdf 
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10,000 confront one another at distances as small as 100 metres. In 
addition, the two segments of international border between Armenia 
and Azerbaijan are also heavily militarised.  
For Azerbaijan, the losing side in the conflict of the 1990s, the 
weak ceasefire regime is its main point of leverage over the Armenian 
side. Although information confirming this is hard to obtain it is 
logical that the Azerbaijani side has an incentive to use military 
methods to send a message to the Armenians that the status quo in 
which Azerbaijani land is occupied is unsustainable. Baku rejected a 
2011 initiative by the foreign ministers of France, Russia, and the 
United States to have long-range snipers withdrawn from the Line of 
Contact.16  
Drawing on its big oil revenues, Azerbaijan doubled 
its military budget twice in the first decade of Ilham Aliyev’s 
presidency, between 2006 and 2011 to more than $4 billion a year.17 
In recent years, as oil revenues have fallen, that budget has fallen 
again but is still much larger than Armenia’s. In the fighting of 2016 
Azerbaijan used tanks, heavy artillery, and attack helicopters, as well 
as Israeli-produced military drones. 
According to SIPRI, in the years 2013-2018, Azerbaijan 
obtained 51% of its weapons from Russia (with Israel in second place 
supplying 43%). It spent $330 million on weapons in 2018. With every 
year, the weapons grew more sophisticated. In 2018 Azerbaijan 
bought from Israel long-range tactical ground-to-ground missiles 
with a range of up to 430km.18  
                                                        
16 RFE/RL Caucasus Report, “Fighting In Nagorno-Karabakh: War Or War 
Dance?” August 08, 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/caucasus-report-karabakh-
war-dance/26521123.html 
17 Milda Seputyte and Ott Ummelas, “Oil Riches Help Azerbaijan Outgun 
Armenia in Military Spending,” Bloomberg, 6 April 2016, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/oil-riches-help-
azerbaijan-outgun-armenia-in-military-spending 
18 SIPRI Fact Sheet, 2019, “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2018,” 
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-03/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf; see 
SIPRI arms imports data https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL. 
MPRT.KD ; Ami Rojkes Dombe, “Azerbaijan Buys LORA Weapon System from 
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The Armenians cannot afford the same level of military 
expenditure, but they have the advantage of only having to defend 
against a potential attack and of holding higher mountainous terrain. 
As a member of the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty 
Organization, Armenia can buy Russian weapons at reduced prices. 
In February 2016, Armenia’s First Deputy Defence Minister 
(who is now minister) David Tonoyan announced that his country 
was moving from a “static” to a more proactive “deterrence” defence 
doctrine. In line with that approach, Yerevan secured a $200 million 
loan to buy new weapons from Russia, including Smerch rockets and 
TOS-1A flamethrower systems. These were not delivered before the 
April fighting began.19  
On 2 April 2016, war broke out for four days along the Line of 
Contact before Moscow negotiated a ceasefire. Azerbaijani special 
forces made some quick advances and captured two hills, one of 
which, Lele Tepe, lies about 5km north of the Iranian border and has 
some strategic significance. This was the first time that Azerbaijan 
had scored a military success, however modest, in Karabakh in more 
than two decades. It rallied the Azerbaijani public around the flag 
and distracted them from economic woes caused by falling oil prices 
and a devalued currency. 
The fighting raised emotions and hardened positions on the 
Armenian side. Volunteers flocked to the frontline and there was 
anger at reports of atrocity in the village of Talish. Voices calling for 
peace were mostly silenced.  
The Armenians have let it be known that they now 
possess Russian-made Iskander cruise missiles and that they are 
targeted at Azerbaijan’s oil and gas infrastructure. In July 2018, the 
                                                        
IAI,” Israel Defense, June 13, 2018, https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/ 
node/34578 
19 Gohar Abrahamyan, “Switching to Deterrence: Armenian armed forces to 
adopt new approach to restrain Azerbaijan,” Armenia Now, 
https://www.armenianow.com/karabakh/70098/armenia_army_military_rus
sia_weapons_azerbaijan_karabakh; Emil Danielyan, “Russia Details Fresh Arms 
Supplies To Armenia,” RFE/RL, February 19, 2016, 
https://www.azatutyun.am/a/27560789.html 
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Karabakh Armenian Defence Minister Levon Mnatskanian declared 
that his forces were able to paralyse the Mingechaur hydro-electric 
power plant.20  
These extravagant threats are designed to raise the cost of 
starting a conflict, and may indeed have a deterrent effect. The stakes 
are very high for anyone who would seek to resolve the Karabakh 
conflict by military means and the consequences potentially 
calamitous. However, military rhetoric of this kind is also reported 
extensively by the other side and also badly undercuts efforts to 
restart a meaningful peace process.  
7.4 International context  
The primary drivers of the Karabakh dispute are local: the capitals of 
Baku and Yerevan and the Karabakhi Armenians. (The exiled 
Karabakh Azerbaijanis lack an autonomous political voice). Their 
entrenched positions, reluctance to consider compromise and 
aggressive rhetoric sustain the conflict into its fourth decade.  
The international context is also important, however. The main 
international multilateral organisation dealing with the conflict is the 
OSCE. Its predecessor the CSCE took on the mediation role in 1992, 
when the conflict was still ongoing and there were great hopes in its 
possibilities as a pan-European security organisation. The Budapest 
Summit of 1994, which followed the ceasefire agreement of May that 
year and turned the CSCE into the OSCE, established three structures 
for the resolution of the conflict, which were intended to be “three 
legs of the stool”.  
The first leg, the Minsk co-chair group mediation mechanism 
(two co-chairs until 1997, three since then) continues to be the main 
diplomatic channel for the dispute. Although the co-chairmanship is 
much criticised in the region (and not only there), it is hard to imagine 
what would be a better substitute for it, given that the three 
mediators, France, Russia and the United States, are also permanent 
members of the United Nations Security Council.  
                                                        
20 Emil Sanamyan, “Armenian, Azerbaijani Officials Raise Stakes in Conflict,” 
USC Institute of Armenian Studies, July 26, 2018, https://armenian.usc.edu/ 
armenian-azerbaijani-officials-raise-stakes-in-conflict/ 
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The second leg is the ceasefire monitoring mission headed by 
the Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office of the OSCE, 
consisting of six monitors. Set up in 1994 with a very limited mandate, 
it has been headed since 1996 by Ambassador Andrej Kasprzyk. His 
team monitors the ceasefire twice monthly in pre-arranged visits to 
the Line of Contact. Kasprzyk, with his deep knowledge of the 
conflict, often acts as a de facto fourth co-chair. Other parts of this 
mission’s mandate such as work on assisting confidence-building 
measures are rarely applied.21 
The third leg is the High-Level Planning Group, a small office 
based in Vienna, mandated to design and establish a peacekeeping 
mission. The HLPG was active in the first two or three years after the 
Budapest summit, but has since had very little to do.22  
The second and third legs of the stool suffer from the way that 
the OSCE has failed to develop into the strong organisation that was 
envisaged in the 1990s. The OSCE lacks both the organisational depth 
or resources to do more than manage the burden of the conflict. Its 
consensus basis means that Armenia and Azerbaijan both have 
vetoes, with the result that initiatives to strengthen the ceasefire 
regime have been blocked by Baku, and Yerevan in particular has 
sometimes made life difficult for the High-Level Planning Group.  
Russia is the most active international player in the conflict and 
also the one whose precise agenda is the least clear, whether this be 
from a multiplicity of interests or from a deliberate strategy of 
ambiguity.  
Moscow, in its previous capacity as the Soviet centre, failed to 
prevent the escalation of the conflict in 1988-91. This came down to a 
number of factors: Mikhail Gorbachev initially failed to grasp the 
gravity of the dispute and believed it could be solved with appeals 
                                                        
21 Summary of the mandate at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/ 
2009_2014/documents/afet/dv/201/201106/20110615_mandatepr_en.pdf 
22 On the “three legs” of the OSCE and the role of the High Level Planning Group 
see Thomas de Waal, “Prisoners of the Caucasus: Resolving the Karabakh 
Security Dilemma,” Carnegie Europe, June 16, 2016, 
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/06/16/prisoners-of-caucasus-resolving-
karabakh-security-dilemma-pub-63825 
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for workers’ solidarity; a plan to offer Nagorny Karabakh an 
“economic renaissance” with direct financial assistance from Moscow 
fell through as both communities rejected it; Moscow gave out mixed 
signals, as two leading members of the Politburo Yegor Ligachev and 
Alexander Yakovlev lent their personal support to Baku and Yerevan 
respectively.23 In 1990-91 these contradictions grew as the Soviet 
security establishment increasingly backed Soviet Azerbaijan and 
sought to punish the more rebellious Armenia, while the newly 
empowered Russian Supreme Soviet under Boris Yeltsin openly 
supported the Armenians. As war broke out, unemployed Soviet 
military officers fought on both sides – although the new Russian 
military increasingly gave more support to Armenia.  
In May 1994, following the signing of the ceasefire agreement, 
negotiated by Russian envoy Vladimir Kazimirov, Russian Defence 
Minister Pavel Grachev tried to impose a Russian peacekeeping force 
in the conflict zone, but this was rejected by Azerbaijan, with the 
support of the Karabakh Armenians, neither of whom wanted to see 
Russian soldiers on the ground. This distinguished the conflict and 
Russia’s role in it from Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdniestria.  
Since Vladimir Putin became president of Russia in 2000, 
Russia has been the main mediator, while displaying little sense of 
urgency to resolve the dispute. Putin himself has prioritised having 
bilateral relations with Baku and Yerevan and makes it clear that he 
sees little to gain from Russia putting pressure on the two capitals to 
make peace with one another. In 2010 Putin stated, “Both Russia and 
other participants in this process are ready to help, but we cannot take 
Armenia or Azerbaijan’s place. Russia will not take on any additional 
responsibility to press the countries to act, only to be viewed as guilty 
of some misdeed by one or both of the countries later on. Our 
relationship with Azerbaijan and Armenia spans centuries. We do 
not want to be seen as having pressured one side to accept an unfair 
outcome. I would like to stress that we can only guarantee any 
agreements that are reached.”24 This approach also allows Russia to 
                                                        
23 See “Black Garden,” p. 60-61. 
24 From press conference between Putin and Turkish prime minister Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan, June 8, 2010, http://archive.premier.gov.ru/eng/events/ 
news/10922/ 
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sell weapons to both sides, in what seems to be a clear breach of its 
commitments as an OSCE mediator.  
This kind of statement suggests that Russia actively does not 
want to resolve the dispute. Russia has multiple interests in this 
region, however and its position is complex. Moscow for example 
also has a strong interest in not seeing a new war broke out over 
Karabakh. Should this happen, Russia would be formally called upon 
to honour its commitments to Armenia as a CSTO ally and offer it 
military assistance should, as would be highly likely, the territory of 
the Republic of Armenia come under attack. Offering such assistance 
would wreck Russia’s relationship with Azerbaijan, while not 
offering it would ruin relations with Armenia. In 2016, Russia was 
heavily criticised by Armenians for staying neutral in the Four-Day 
War and not coming to the aid of its military ally, Armenia.25  
Moreover, in the views of many Russians, Russia could also 
stand to gain from a Karabakh peace process – especially one which 
was, as the current plan envisages, long-drawn-out and in which 
Russia would be able to put boots on the ground for the first time, as 
peacekeepers.  
Moscow tried and failed to send Russian peacekeepers to the 
region after the 1994 ceasefire. Neither side evidently wants them to 
be there. Moreover, in a draft peace deal discussed in Key West in 
2001, Russia acceded to a gentleman’s agreement under which a 
peacekeeping force would include “no neighbours and no co-chair 
countries”, as former mediators have confirmed, a formula that 
would specifically exclude both Russia and Turkey. However, there 
are indications that the Russians have not given up on these 
ambitions. 26 
The vision of Russia as an active peacemaker was pursued by 
Dmitry Medvedev in his four-year presidency. Medvedev took a 
strong interest in the issue and met the Armenian and Azerbaijani 
presidents nine times in a trilateral format. Russian Foreign Minister 
                                                        
25 See “Armenians Protest Against Russian Arms Sales To Azerbaijan,” 
RFE/RL, April 13, 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/armenia-protest-russian-
arm-sales-to-azerbaijan/27673173.html 
26 See de Waal, “Prisoners of the Caucasus.”  
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Sergei Lavrov became the chief negotiator in that period and he 
remains the highest-ranking official with a hands-on interest in the 
conflict. A “Lavrov Plan”, denied in Moscow, but reported by the 
media supposedly envisaged land communications being restored 
across the region in a first phase. That would benefit Russia by 
restoring its land links to Turkey and Iran via Armenia.27  
The other two big neighbours in the region, Iran and Turkey, 
are also both former imperial powers in the South Caucasus. Both 
have an interest in seeing the Karabakh dispute peacefully resolved 
but, for different reasons, neither plays an active role.  
Iran tried to play a mediating role in 1992, but was humiliated 
when the Armenians launched a big offensive in Karabakh, just as a 
meeting was held in Tehran. Since then, it has been kept out of any 
formal mediating role, partly at the insistence of the Americans, and 
also because the conflict is the preserve of the OSCE, a European 
institution of which Iran is not a member. Like Russia, Iran tries to 
maintain good relations with both sides – despite occasional rows 
with Azerbaijan – and keeps a low profile when it comes to 
diplomacy on this conflict. 
Turkey would also stand to gain from a conflict settlement, but 
is constrained by commitments to its close ally, Azerbaijan. A 
solution would open up communication routes for Turkey to the 
Caspian Sea and Central Asia. It would be the key to restoring 
diplomatic relations with Armenia and opening the border, which it 
closed in 1993 during the conflict in solidarity with Azerbaijan. A 
diplomatic rapprochement with Armenia, pursued despite 
opposition from Baku, foundered in 2009-10 and there is little chance 
of it being revived as long as Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ilham Aliev 
are in power. Erdogan reaffirmed his commitment to Azerbaijan by 
strongly supporting Aliev during the 2016 fighting. Turkey thus stays 
on the side-lines of the diplomatic process.  
The United States is the only international actor which has 
occasionally spent political capital on pursuing a Karabakh peace 
                                                        
27 See Zaur Shiriyev, “Old Conflict, New Armenia: The View from Baku,” 
International Crisis Group, February 8, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/ 
europe-central-asia/caucasus/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan/old-conflict-new-
armenia-view-baku 
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settlement. The US hosted a summit in Key West in Florida in 2001 
when it took the lead from the other two OSCE co-chairs and tried to 
persuade Presidents Heydar Aliev and Robert Kocharian to make a 
deal. After some initial positive signs, Aliev eventually disavowed 
the deal.  
As with other international powers, the Karabakh dispute has 
become a second-order priority for Washington in the last decade. It 
is also constrained by bilateral relations with Yerevan (which has 
many friends in Congress) and with Baku (which has strong 
supporters in the US military and energy sector). Under the Trump 
presidency, the new US Minsk Group co-chair, Andrew Schofer, was 
not given ambassadorial status, in a departure from previous 
practice.  
France is the least visible of the three co-chair countries, 
although periodically French presidents have taken a sudden interest 
in the conflict, as Jacques Chirac did in 2000 and again in 2006. The 
job of co-chair has not gone to prominent diplomats and France rarely 
convenes public meetings on the conflict. The European Union is 
involved in so far as France is an EU member-state. The EU is briefed 
by France on latest developments. The EU would undoubtedly have 
claimed a bigger role had the conflict occurred later than it did and 
commentators and officials periodically argue that it should be given 
more weight in the conflict resolution process. This notion is 
generally resisted by both France and Russia (but less so by the 
United States). Periodic attempts by the EU to get more involved have 
not been successful. Most notably, EU Special Representative for the 
South Caucasus Peter Semneby aborted a planned visit to Nagorny 
Karabakh in June 2007, after objections from Baku and without 
receiving support from the OSCE co-chairs.  
The conflict would undoubtedly benefit from the expertise the 
EU has deployed in the Balkans as well as its more liberal approach 
to conflict resolution. In practice its absence from Track 1 mediation 
leads the EU to confine itself to indirect support for the peace process. 
It is the biggest support for non-governmental organisations in the 
region working on the conflict through The European Partnership for 
the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh 
(ENPK) project. The third three-year phase of EPNK ended in April 
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2019, after funding five international NGOs with a total budget of 
€4.7 million.28  
7.5 Challenges for 2020 
Despite a marked improvement in the security situation and a 
warmer international mood about the conflict, the same fundamental 
obstacles to progress remain in 2020 as they have for more than two 
decades.  
The two leaders have acted respectfully towards one another 
in international forums, but in November 2019 both repeated 
conspiracy theories which seek to avoid responsibility for two key 
episodes in the conflict, the savage anti-Armenian pogroms in 
Sumgait and 1988 the massacre of Azerbaijanis at Khojaly in 1992. In 
a speech in Sumgait President Ilham Aliev claimed that the pogroms 
had been an Armenian “provocation”.  
In similar fashion Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan 
suggested that the Khojaly massacre might have been carried out by 
Azerbaijanis, even though many Armenians, including his 
predecessor, have admitted that it was committed by Armenians.29  
In Baku, a more progressive voice on the Karabakh issue, 
Hikmat Hajiev, was appointed Foreign Ministry spokesman in July 
2018. He set out for the first time in years an Azerbaijani programme 
for the conflict named the “6D plan” as it consisted of “De-
occupation, De-Militarisation, De-mining, Deployment, Dialogue 
and Development”.30 
The articulation of a plan was a positive step. However, the 
plan itself was uncompromising in its key points and reference to 
                                                        
28 Details at http://www.epnk.org/ 
29 Trend News Agency, “President Ilham Aliyev: Sumgayit events were 
provocation on part of Armenian nationalists,” 25 November 2019, 
https://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/3153661.html; Naira Badalian, 
“Armenian PM in Milan replaces Azerbaijani video blogger,” Arminfo, 
November 20 2019, https://arminfo.info/full_news.php?id=47231&lang=3 
30 Hikmat Hajiev, “Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict: Between lasting peace and 
eternal war,” Euractiv, July 5, 2018, https://www.euractiv.com/section/ 
azerbaijan/opinion/armenia-azerbaijan-conflict-between-lasting-peace-and-
eternal-war/ 
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“the issue of occupation and military aggression, which constitute the 
fundamental basis of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.” There is no 
reference to autonomy or self-determination in the document, let 
alone the Madrid Principles.  
On the Armenian side, Pashinyan has been equally forthright 
that “Artsakh is Armenia, and that’s it.” In fact, Armenia’s new leader 
has been more outspoken in saying this than his predecessors, 
perhaps because, as an Armenian from Yerevan, he feels the need to 
prove his credentials to the Armenians of Karabakh.  
Following the peaceful revolution in Yerevan in 2018, the 
leadership of the unrecognised NKR (Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, 
whose name was changed in 2017 to Artsakh Republic) stayed in 
place, despite its close ties to the previous administration the former 
administration of President Serzh Sargsyan. That is the cause of some 
tensions between Yerevan and Stepanakert, especially as elections are 
scheduled in Karabakh in 2020.  
Traditionally, the Karabakh Armenians, who are at the 
epicentre of the conflict, have taken a tougher line than the 
government in Yerevan on any prospect of territorial compromise 
with Azerbaijan. In his public speeches, Pashinyan has also talked 
tough, telling domestic audiences that Armenia and Karabakh must 
one day be joined in union (the Armenian words is “miatsum”) – the 
central tenet of the Armenian cause on the Karabakh issue since the 
dispute first flared in 1988. In August 2019 Pashinyan led a crowd in 
the Karabakh capital Stepanakert repeating the word “miatsum”.31  
Pashinyan has also insisted that as the leader of the Republic of 
Armenia, he cannot speak on behalf of the Karabakh Armenians and 
that they must be represented in the negotiations. Since the late 1990s, 
Yerevan has negotiated on behalf of the Karabakh Armenians, an 
arrangement that has suited Baku very well and it is not keen to 
change. Pashinyan has said that he has in mind “both very specific 
                                                        
31 Joshua Kucera, “Pashinyan calls for unification between Armenia and 
Karabakh,” Eurasianet, August 6, 2019, https://eurasianet.org/pashinyan-calls-
for-unification-between-armenia-and-karabakh 
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forms and methods on how Karabakh can engage in negotiations”, 
but has not been more precise.32  
Azerbaijan is also due to have early parliamentary elections in 
the first months of 2020. The president recently carried out his most 
thorough-going reshuffle and is clearly focused on domestic political 
issues. Neither side in the Karabakh dispute therefore is likely to 
soften their nationalist rhetoric or be seen to be offering concessions 
as they seek to further their domestic agenda and consolidate power 
at home.  
7.6 Conclusions: What potential for incremental 
change?  
The Karabakh conflict is unusually resistant to transformation, the 
kind of incremental change in which barriers are broken down and 
bonds of trust are restored across the conflict divide. A recent 
exchange trip by journalists notwithstanding, steps such as these are 
far less common than in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, not to mention 
conflicts such as Cyprus or Transdniestria where there is daily 
interaction across the conflict divide. 
The long-term benefits of a peace settlement are obvious, as the 
conflict holds back the development of the whole region. A 2019 
study by Berlin Economics, commissioned by the European Union, 
makes an undeniable economic case for a solution:  
In public finances, both Armenia and Azerbaijan would 
strongly benefit from large savings on conflict-related 
fiscal expenditures. Military expenditures could be 
reduced by 2% of annual GDP in both countries to a level 
comparable with other countries at peace. In addition, 
Armenia could save annual expenditures of 0.9% of GDP 
for supporting the local economy in Nagorno-Karabakh 
and 0.1% of GDP in interest payments, thus saving 3% of 
GDP every year. Azerbaijan could eventually save 
expenditures for supporting displaced people 
                                                        
32 Quoted in “Q&A With Emil Sanamyan on Prospects for Genuine Peace 
Process,” USC Institute of Armenian Studies, February 14, 2019, 
https://armenian.usc.edu/qa-with-emil-sanamyan-on-prospects-for-genuine-
peace-process/ 
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amounting to 0.4% of annual GDP, thus reducing total 
expenditure by 2.4% of GDP yearly. Such large fiscal 
savings would enable both countries to sharply reduce 
budget deficits and at the same time substantially 
increase spending in socially useful areas such as 
education or health by eliminating present budgetary 
pressures.33  
However, all sides are still trapped by the same life-and-death 
issues of identity and security which triggered the conflict in the 
1980s. In practice this means that the two societies have practically no 
contact with one another. Only very limited social groups, such as 
traders who do business in Georgia, or students who meet the other 
side in foreign capitals, encounter members of the other ethnic group 
and hear their point of view. When it comes to confidence-building 
measures the two sides tend to hold mutually exclusive positions. For 
the Armenian side confidence building must begin with steps to 
cement the ceasefire regime and stop threatening military conquest. 
For Azerbaijan, confidence building must start with a commitment 
by the Armenians to make territorial compromises and engage 
seriously in political talks. In this context, Azerbaijan is very reluctant 
to agree to measures, such as visits by Armenians or confidence-
building measures across the Line of Contact that would “normalise 
the status quo” without any tangible political progress.  
The result is that both societies live with narratives of 
permanent division and alienation from the other. Few people can 
imagine anything different. The 2018 International Alert report 
Envisioning Peace finds that, “in Armenia and Azerbaijan, people say 
they find it hard to plan a long-term future. This could be down to 
people living according to a system of learned helplessness.” The 
report also observes that those social and regional groups most 
directly affected by the conflict are also the most marginalised by it: 
“Armenia and Azerbaijan are quite similar once again in this regard: 
                                                        
33 Berlin Economics, “The Economic Effect Of A Resolution Of The Nagorno-
Karabakh Conflict On Armenia And Azerbaijan,” June 15, 2018, https://berlin-
economics.com/the_economic_effect_of_a_resolution_of_the_nagorno-
karabakh_conflict/ 
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the further people live from the frontline, the more strongly they 
speak about patriotism.”34  
Hopes that a new generation will demand change have so far 
not been borne out. Younger people are more globalised than their 
parents and carry less baggage from the conflict. On the other hand, 
they have grown up with dominant national narratives that portray 
the other side, Armenians or Azerbaijanis, as enemies. Unlike older 
generations who lived in Soviet times, they lack memories of a time 
when the two nations lived side by side peacefully and most could 
speak a common language.  
All this suggests that anyone seeking an end to the Karabakh 
conflict must employ a double strategy in the shorter and longer term 
that eschews the vocabulary of “conflict resolution” employed in 
other contexts. The short term requires “conflict management” to 
keep the two sides from going back to a war that would inflict terrible 
human suffering and put back the cause of peace by another 
generation. The longer term calls for an approach of strategic patience 
and “conflict transformation” in which more work is done inside 
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies than between them.  
 
 
  
                                                        
34 Envisioning Peace, p.6, p.9. 
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